Scottish Independence and National Identity

Relatore
Prof. Katia Caldari

Laureando
Giovanni Beninato
n° matr.1014627 / LMLCC

Anno Accademico 2012 / 2013
Alla mia famiglia
INTRODUCTION

On 18 September 2014, the Scottish people will be asked to participate in a referendum organized by the Scottish National Party (SNP), the political force currently governing Scotland. As it has been extensively chronicled in the British and international media, the event is bound to be of utmost importance for the future of the country, as, if successful, it will redefine the relationships between Scotland and the rest of UK (rUK), between Scotland and the Europe, and between rUK and Europe. The referendum is about the independence of Scotland. More specifically, it will present the Scots with the question “Should Scotland be an independent country?”, and the citizens will have to answer with a simple “Yes” or “No”. The majority’s verdict will then decide the UK’s next political moves. If the referendum succeeds, the parliaments of Britain and Scotland will start to make arrangements for the separation of Scotland, and the new state will theoretically be able to function as a self-reliant entity. However, independence will not be a simple thing to achieve. The process to obtain it will not be (and never has been) straightforward, and, for every step, there are multiple implications to consider: constitutional legitimacy of the referendum, continuation or not of existing economic agreements, automatic or not EU membership, currency options, internal and international market interests, re-organization of sources of income and fiscal policies, Scotland’s old and new relationship with the rest of Britain, the people’s perception and opinion, just to list some of the most prominent.

As of now, Scotland has, as part of the UK, a devolved administration: a Scottish Parliament, established in 1999, has a variably limited power to legislate on Scottish matters, although many of the most important aspects (such as sovereignty, the Constitution, economic policies, international trade and relationships, defence, criminal law) are regulated only by the UK Parliament, in which, currently, 59 Scottish representatives have a seat. Scotland’s status under Devolution is that of a region which benefits from the economic status, the international prestige, and the policies it shares with England and the rest of Britain, but, at the same time, can not freely administer its money (which is
collected and then redistributed the UK Treasury), and can only partially assess its own preferences, either through Scottish parliamentary representation (as Scots have not enough voting power to be decisive in the elections for the UK Parliament) or legislative action taken by the Scottish Government. The referendum on independence is expected to give an answer to the following question: would Scots, given the chance, decide for their homeland to exist as an independent state, casting off all its privileges of UK membership and count only on their own economic resources (primarily North Sea oil revenues), or would Scots decide it might be better for things to remain as they are, to leave a 300 year old union untouched, and sacrifice independence for economic and international security?

Currently, the Scottish Parliament is running two major reforms in parallel: other than the independence referendum, which only an intense campaigning period awaits before the day it will be held, legislative action to extend devolved powers has been attempted and finally achieved with the Scotland Act 2012, which, from 2015-6 on, will grant Scotland greater freedom in administering taxation and borrowing. It is an important step toward self-determination for Scotland, but one that, for the SNP at the Government, is not enough an achievement if considering Scotland’s potential. There is, however, a significant difference in scope between obtaining more devolved powers from a constitutionally defined entity and aiming for a complete separation from said entity. As a result, the road to independence has been ridden with obstacles of various origins. Recent and current political developments for the referendum have been showing a long series of compromises and confrontations between political forces and between parliaments, leading to adjustments and, in some cases, the sacrifice of possible solutions (such as the so-called “Devo Max”, an option strongly advocated by non-nationalist reformists, which consisted in providing an almost complete devolution of powers without altering Scotland’s place within the UK) in order to find an agreement. Although numerous polls and

\[1\] As we will see, this is not entirely true, but, in light of the strong focus on separation in both “for” and “against” independence campaigns, it is not unreasonable to assign it at least some ideological value.
studies have been issued in order to gauge where the Scots’ preferences have been heading to (consistently showing, in the last decade, support for the Scottish National Party, but not for independence), there is uncertainty concerning what will really await Scotland in the next years: as further implications surface, such as British Prime Minister David Cameron’s decision to hold in 2017 a referendum to ask the British if they want to secede from the European Union, there are going to be changes in people’s perception about the status quo, what is going to change and what is going to need preserving.

But what are the causes of all this? What were the events that moulded Scotland and its people into what they are today, and directed their political action into planning a referendum for independence? As history often exemplifies, there may be no single catalyst that provides us with simple and quick answers. As we study Scotland’s national identity of today, we cannot not take into consideration the events of the recent past that shaped it. And soon we discover that the process of Scottish independence has much deeper roots, and we need to go back years, decades, centuries to explore its origins.

This thesis attempts to provide a concise analysis of the events in Scotland’s history that caused, or contributed to, the evolution of the concept of independence in Scottish identity. In order for it to be as comprehensive as possible, the analysis is multidisciplinary, including elements of political, economic and social history. The six chapters comprising this thesis follow a chronological succession, spanning increasingly shorter periods as the documents in our possession increase and the analysis alternatively focuses on political elements, international relationships (with the unique interaction between Scotland and England being at the forefront), local and international economy, social movements, and other phenomena. The chapters (1 and 2 written in Italian, and 3 - 6 in English) are divided as follows:

Chapter 1 (1100-1700) provides a historical account of the period starting with the foundation of the Kingdom of Alba (Scotland’s ancient name), and chronicles the conflicts between Scotland and England, whose kings many times vowed to conquer the North of Britain. The Wars of Independence (1296-1357) are given particular attention, as they planted the seeds for an Independence
mythos whose echo would ripple in the nationalist discourse for the centuries to follow. Then it comes the reign of the Stuarts, under which the Protestant Reform, which was successful in making Scotland protestant and, thus, became a diplomacy asset and liability, and the Union of the Crowns (1603) of England and Scotland under the same king occurred. The Glorious Revolution commanded by William d’Orange and his queen Anne opens the discourse on Scotland as a part of a greater reality (the Commonwealth), to which follows the Darien adventure, Scotland's first autonomous colonial expedition, which ended in disaster and left Scotland economically vulnerable to England's proposal of a union.

Chapter 2 (1700-1707) explains the causes that brought the Scottish politicians to agree to signing on behalf of their nation a Treaty (later Act) of Union in 1707, which eventually led to the creation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain. The aftermath of the Darien disaster and the economic woes of those who invested in it influenced the internal debate within the Scottish parliament, and, consequently, the negotiations with the English parliament. Particular importance has the Equivalent, the lump sum England offered to Scotland in case the union succeeded, which garnered for Scottish politicians allegations of treason and corruption. A deep analysis of the implications of Scotland's decision to ultimately accept the conditions of the Treaty of Union explores the role of religion in the formation of pressure groups, and their effect on the mood of the nation.

Chapter 3 (1707-1800) focuses on the first century of the United Kingdom, and is divided in two distinct phases: an initial period of slow economic upturn which fuelled discontent, Anglophobia, social unrest, and saw a difficult coexistence of a legally regulated British, and a largely informal, clan-like Scottish administrative powers; and another period, after the first decades, where a revolution in agriculture, urban development, new business chances and the cultural renaissance known as the Scottish Enlightenment (which saw the contribution of eminent philosophers and economists such as David Hume and Adam Smith), marked an age of improvement for Scotland.

Chapter 4 (1800-1920) provides an extended look to the “Workshop of the Empire”, as Scotland was called in the 19th century, which saw the introduction of electoral reforms to extend the franchise of voters, the expansion of the industrial
sector (particularly cotton, linen, mining, metallurgy, shipbuilding), and the corresponding growth of workforces and worker movements. The development of Trade Unions is recounted and linked to radicalism, the current which defied the dominant Liberalism encompassing Scotland’s politics and business ideals. Another major fact chronicled is the Disruption of 1843, an event which caused the Church of Scotland to split over divergences concerning authority and the Catholic Irish immigrants. The rise of Home Rule movements is analysed in a context of unionism versus nationalism. One final part presents the national identity of Scotland in the literature of Sir Walter Scott and other Scottish writers of the period.

Chapter 5 (1900-1999) deals with Scotland’s history during the World Wars and in the post-war period. Following a view of Scotland’s stable but not optimal political and economic status before WWI, an analysis of migration fluxes from the Highlands to the Lowlands, England or abroad, is a study of the social changes that interested both the industrial workforce and the part of the population eligible for conscription, exploring the parallel realities of unionist patriotism on the military side and the socialist movements harboured in the industrial plants and workshops, increasingly reconverted to armament facilities. An account of the rise of the Labour party in the inter-war period is followed by a detailed analysis of the economic decline of Scotland’s economy, which the Government tried to tackle by rearranging the administrative structure, in the period going from the end of WWI to the end of WWII. The last two sections respectively examine the political and economic aspects of Scotland’s history in the 50 years between the aftermath of WWII, in which Scotland saw a severe decline of its economy and international competitiveness, and the institution of Devolution for Scotland in 1999: the political account focuses on the initiatives of the various governments for Scotland’s recovery, and the electoral battle between the dominant Labour and an increasingly stronger Scottish National Party for Scottish representation in the UK Parliament, where English votes brought the Conservatives to the Government; the economic account concerns the decreasing importance of the Scottish industry, which embraced specialization too late to be properly competitive in the international scene, and underwent a difficult update under Margaret Thatcher’s
anti-“state assisted” policies, which generated hostility toward her among the Scots; the role of corporatism and multinationals in the reconversion of the industry and the economic and national implications of the discovery of North Sea oil. The chapter ends with some considerations on Scotland’s regaining of a parliament under the Scotland Act 1998, and the nationalist legacy indirectly inspired by the Thatcher years.

The last chapter summarizes the events going from 1999 to 2013, with many a prognostication about events yet to unfold. It opens with a description of the Devolution settlement for Scotland and the powers and prerogatives of the Scottish Parliament. It then recounts the election of the Scottish National Party to the government in 2007, which made of independence a concrete possibility, and the subsequent initiatives held for the Scottish people in order to raise awareness, and the negotiations with the UK Parliament to decide a settlement for a referendum on independence to be held, have legal value and actual effect based on the winning option. The last part focuses on all the determining factors and implications of a possible independence settlement, including sovereignty, relationship with the Royal Family, economic relationship with the rest of Britain, EU membership and international agreements, fiscal policies and North Sea oil revenues, banking and currency, military forces, UK intentions. Some brief considerations concerning Scotland’s future give closure to the chapter and the thesis.
CHAPTER I: Una panoramica storica, dal 1100 al 1700

1.1: La formazione dello stato di Scozia (1100 – 1280)

Le radici del processo di ricerca dell’indipendenza da parte della Scozia sono grandi e profonde. Volendo trovare un ideale punto d’origine, dovremo aprire un discorso sul come, quando e, soprattutto, perché uno stato cerca di separarsi da un dominio esterno o dalla minaccia di un’invasione. La ragione per la quale una comunità decide volontariamente di differenziarsi da un’altra sottintende che la gente che ne fa parte creda nella sua esistenza: lo stato, per esistere, deve sapere di essere, o di avere la potenzialità per essere tale, ragion per cui in esso devono essere già germogliati i semi di un senso di coesione che trascenda la dimensione e precarietà di patti tra nobili per il governo della terra o la diffusione di un credo religioso. Vi dev’essere, in sintesi, nato un senso di unità nazionale. Chiare basi politiche e territoriali del processo che porterà a questo iniziano a scorgersi nel 1100, in un periodo in cui le isole britanniche erano luogo di uno scenario politico frammentato. A nord, sotto il dominio di un re vi era innanzitutto il regno di Alba, a cui le fonti latine si sarebbero riferite con il termine Scotia, che comprendeva le terre dei Pitti tra Forth e Spey; vi erano poi la Cumbria, a ovest, e Lothian, a sud; vi si sarebbero aggiunti 160 anni dopo Galloway, nel sudovest, un secolo dopo le isole occidentali, allora sotto dominio scandinavo, e ulteriori 360 anni dopo le isole del nord. La Scozia era una terra in cui convivevano numerose comunità e dove si parlavano diverse lingue. Ad accomunarli, la loro fedeltà alla figura centralizzata del re.

L’evoluzione del regno era legata a un’estensiva gestione del settore agricolo e urbanistico, che prendeva da tradizioni di varia antichità ora le unità territoriali (“thanes”, “thanages”, “shires”, termini anglosassoni), ora le sue istituzioni simboliche (l’abbazia di Scone, dove erano incoronati i re, e St.Andrews, dove risiedevano le alte cariche vescovili). La forma che prevaleva in campo linguistico e culturale era il gaelico: in esso si esprimevano gli uomini di corte, di legge, e la maggior parte della popolazione; di esso si componevano in larga parte, sin dal nono secolo, la cultura e l’organizzazione ecclesiastica.
Il dodicesimo secolo si aprì portando importanti novità nelle strutture sociali e culturali di questo scenario. Sotto il dominio dei suoi sovrani normanni, l’Inghilterra stava realizzando una massiccia espansione nelle isole circostanti, e guardava al dominio formale e militare dei popoli celtici confinanti. In Scozia stava contemporaneamente avvenendo un grande fenomeno migratorio da più direzioni: coloni arrivati dalla Bretagna, dalla Normandia e dalle Fiandre produssero e accelerarono importanti cambiamenti nella cultura prevalentemente gaelica della loro nuova dimora, e contribuirono così a renderla luogo di un più ampio processo di “europeizzazione” che dal 1060 in poi aveva prodotto crescenti similarità tra gli aspetti politici, religiosi e socioeconomici dei paesi di tutta l’Europa occidentale. La parte di fenomeno che più interessò la Scozia fu l’“anglicizzazione”, operata principalmente dalle ondate migratorie di gente anglofona, che avvenne sotto il regno di David I (1124-53), re di Scozia di estrazione nobiliare inglese apparentato al re d’Inghilterra Henry I.

E’ doveroso notare il carattere peculiare di questo evento nel contesto britannico: non si trattò, a differenza di quanto avvenne in Galles e Irlanda, di un processo di conquista militare, quanto di un insediamento ottenuto con il permesso dei re scozzesi, ai quali i coloni dovevano riconoscere la propria sudditanza. Tale differenza dimostrò ampiamente il suo peso, perché ciò che avveniva era un assorbimento anziché una sottomissione della popolazione e della cultura che essa portava con sé. Importantissimo ruolo fu qui giocato dalla figura della Corona, che proprio in virtù della sua unicità e centralità, poteva promuovere e regolare le iniziative sociali, dirimere le questioni e applicare il suo potere esecutivo con ordine, basandosi su comprovate modalità e tecniche di governo. Testimonianza dell’efficacia dell’operato di re David I si ha da Ailred, abate cistercense di Rievaulx, nello Yorkshire, che nei suoi scritti ci lascia l’impressione di un re che ha portato il suo regno a un livello superiore di modernizzazione, prendendo una popolazione di barbari feroci e riformandola tramite l’introduzione al Cristianesimo2. Grande è il contributo di David I alla riaffermazione del potere religioso in Scozia, con la costruzione di abbazie nelle Lowlands orientali.

---

destinandole principalmente agli ordini degli Agostiniani e dei Cistercensi. Non minore il suo intervento nell’economia, che comprende il conio delle prime monete scozzesi e la fondazione di grandi centri abitativi e commerciali chiamati “Royal burghs” (borghi reali). La politica centralizzante del suo regno si manifesta nell’affermazione continua della propria figura come grande, monopolistica e forte, e nella ridefinizione della struttura governativa generale e capillare, attraverso cui passa lo sradicamento del vecchio rapporto di assoggettamento tra i sudditi e i sovrani locali.

La successione a David I rappresenta un elemento di rottura con il mondo celtico: nel 1153 la corona passa al dodicenne Malcolm IV, il più vicino per linea dinastica dopo la morte di Henry, figlio di David. L’avvenimento porta un messaggio chiaro: la successione avviene per via dinastica, a prescindere dall’età del nuovo re; si forma così una regola che tutela la forma monarchica e la sua autorità, e che verrà seguita fino alla morte di Alexander III nel 1286. La figura del re scozzese è dunque reale e si contrappone inevitabilmente a quella del re inglese, generando crescente coscienza comune e senso di appartenenza al “regno di Scozia”. La ricerca di elementi che rinforzassero il concetto di stato e quello della figura reale attorno a cui esso gravitava furono obiettivi seguiti con tenacia dai patrioti scozzesi, ma in particolare quelli che dipendevano da forze esterne richiesero molto tempo: l’interferenza degli inglesi fece sì che il benestare papale per l’incoronazione non arrivasse prima del 1329, ma la sacralità del re non poteva essere messa in dubbio. Venne dunque asserito il divino diritto per il quale il re poteva governare da parte della Chiesa di Scozia, la cui indipendenza dalle istituzioni di “mediazione” come Canterbury venne dichiarata e difesa. Riguardo la considerazione da parte degli altri sovrani degli stati europei, essa fu guadagnata tramite l’assunzione dello stile regale e della presenza negli affari internazionali che già gli altri re osservavano. David I e i suoi successori applicarono innovazioni dove sapevano che un metodo già esistente non avrebbe dato risultati, tanto in campo legale, quanto economico e governativo. I re scozzesi univano in loro aspetti di rinnovamento a fianco di elementi marcatamente celtici, come gli antichi troni nei quali sedevano, e i rituali e i simboli di antichi credo e tradizioni. Altro elemento di derivazione celtica, e in totale discordanza con ciò che si usava in
Inghilterra, era il modo in cui il re si poneva: il suo prestigio e la sua autorità risiedevano nella forza del legame che egli riusciva a creare con il popolo, in quanto riusciva a porsi come esempio di carisma e virtù. Caratteristica chiave di tutto ciò fu il rapporto di equilibrio che la dinastia di David mantenne tra l’eredità celtica e l’innovazione socioculturale mediata dalla civiltà inglese: la pacificazione delle varie realtà che le ondate migratorie e l’apertura internazionale avevano portato a convivere era un elemento essenziale per la formazione di un regno unito e solido, e gli sforzi fatti al riguardo pagarono nel senso che in tutto il secolo non vi furono grandi rivolte civili o contro la corona. Il processo di unificazione politico e comunitario incontrò, tuttavia, numerosi ostacoli, a cominciare dalle zone Gaelico-Normanne la cui assimilazione avveniva molto lentamente e difficilmente.

Nel dodicesimo secolo esistevano potenziati di varia grandezza e capacità militare, a capo dei quali vi erano regnanti alla ricerca di affermare la propria egemonia sul territorio e procedere alla sua espansione anche a costo di sfidare le forze reali. Spesso tali battaglie finivano con la sconfitta dei piccoli signori, a cui non si rado seguiva l’annessione del loro territorio e un loro giuramento di fedeltà al re. In questo modo la dinastia di David poté annettere le terre di Moray (quando Angus di Moray venne ucciso nel 1130), Galloway (in seguito a una campagna di Malcolm IV nel 1160), Ross e Caithness (pacificate da Alexander II), e le isole di Hebrides e Man (conquistate da Alexander III con il Trattato di Perth nel 1266 dopo aver assaltato Skye e aver vinto il contrattacco di Hakon IV di Norvegia a Largs). Fu quest’ultima vittoria a portare tutte le terre di Scozia sotto il comando di unico re, stabilendo, di fatto, la presenza di due grandi monarchie nelle isole britanniche.

Al tempo di Alexander III (1249-86) tutte le azioni militari, governative, economiche e religiose che avevano portato all’affermazione del regno di Scozia, giunsero a un importante livello di fruizione: il regno era geograficamente definito, unito sotto una stessa struttura legale ed amministrativa, dotato di una forza militare paragonabile ad uno stato europeo di media grandezza, libero da ribellioni e guerre intestine. Edward I, re d’Inghilterra, lo riconobbe come un vero stato, distinto in territorio, leggi e costumi. Voce dell’unicità politica scozzese era il parlamento, che, nonostante non possedesse il carattere di punto d’incontro tra
vere opposizioni, svolgeva la funzione di garante ufficiale della corona, anche e soprattutto quando una sua azione si sarebbe rea necessaria per la nomina dei "guardiani del regno" alla morte di Alexander III.

Nel 1280 la Scozia era la terra degli Scozzesi (Scots), una popolazione che si poteva distinguere dagli inglesi, i francesi, i bretoni, o i norvegesi. La risoluzione delle tensioni con gli Anglo-Normanni, che nel Galles e in Irlanda erano stati identificati come invasori e avevano intrattenuto rapporti di tutt'altra difficoltà, aveva portato alla nascita di una comunità le cui basi ibride avevano facilitato l'identificazione da parte di molti, diversi gruppi originari. Nonostante permanessero differenze linguistiche e culturali, non portarono a divisioni determinate dall'etnia. Nonostante la relativa gioventù, la Scozia giunse al quattordicesimo secolo come un popolo, la cui gente comune si unì ai nobili e ai cavalieri per combattere le invasioni inglesi durante le guerre d'indipendenza.

1.2: Le guerre d'indipendenza (1296-1357)

1.2.1: La successione ad Alexander III e i Guardians of Scotland

Il periodo topico della storia dell'indipendenza Scozzese inizia nel 1286, quando Alexander III, Re di Scozia, parte dal castello di Edimburgo e affronta con una piccola scorta una cavalcata in una tempestosa notte di marzo alla volta di Kinghorn, dove la nuova, giovane moglie lo attende. Lungo la strada, i soldati di guardia perdono di vista il re, per ritrovarlo solo il giorno seguente, privo di vita, con il collo spezzato da una caduta dal cavallo. Che gli scozzesi si trovarono improvvisamente senza il loro Re era già avvenimento tragico, ma non quanto il fatto che Alexander aveva lasciato il regno senza un erede. Il giovane figlio era morto due anni prima, e la speranza che la moglie aspettasse un bambino fu disattesa poco dopo. L'unico possibile erede consanguineo del defunto Re era la nipote di tre anni Margaret, detta "Maid of Norway", figlia di Eric, Re di Norvegia. Che la piccola, orfana della madre morta di parto, potesse eventualmente aspirare al trono di Scozia era fonte di grande preoccupazione, poiché a quel tempo la mortalità infantile era considerevolmente alta, e molti bambini non raggiungevano i cinque anni. Vi era anche il problema di trovare un reggente della corona che regnasse durante l'infanzia e la fanciullezza della bambina: nonostante non vi fosse
scarsità di nobili, l’idea di alterare il precario equilibrio tra i loro poteri avrebbe generato dissapori e scontri, fino alla non remota possibilità che si sfociasse in una guerra civile. Uguale conseguenza era paventata per l’argomento matrimonio: al tempo una donna non era considerata adatta al ruolo di governo, men che meno se non adulta. Si sarebbe dovuto quindi procedere all’affiancarle un marito, ma anche in questo caso la scelta sarebbe avvenuta tra i nobili, e questo non era possibile. Per venire incontro alla situazione fu comunque deciso un incontro a Scone, nell’aprile del 1286. I nobili si riunirono e concordarono sull’elezione di sei uomini (due duchi, due baroni e due vescovi) che governassero la Scozia finché Margaret non raggiungesse l’età da marito. Essi furono conosciuti come “The Guardians of Scotland”, i guardiani della Scozia, i quali, oltre ad esercitare l’attività di governo, s’impegnarono a ricercare un marito per la futura regina. Chi fu scelto era il principe Edward, figlio di Edward I, Re d’Inghilterra. In seguito ad un accordo (“Treaty of Salisbury”) stipulato nel 1289, che avrebbe visto Margaret passare la fanciullezza presso la corte Inglese, Edward e i Guardiani ufficializzarono nel 1290 il matrimonio tra Margaret e il Principe Edward tramite un documento chiamato Treaty of Birgham”. In esso vennero dettagliati una serie d’impegni che Edward doveva assumersi nei riguardi della Scozia, tra cui il rispetto dei confini, la garanzia di un parlamento scozzese e la preservazione della cultura del paese.

1.2.2: Il regno di John Balliol e le mire di Edward I

Nel settembre 1290, un’altra tragedia si abbatté sul regno di Scozia: la principessa Margaret, imbarcata su un viaggio per mare tra la Norvegia e Oarkney, morì all’arrivo, probabilmente a causa di una polmonite. I Guardiani temettero che l’equilibrio nazionale avrebbe potuto degenerare rapidamente, per cui chiesero a Edward I di scegliere un erede al trono tra 13 candidati, tra cui spiccavano Robert Bruce, signore di Annandale, e John Balliol. Nel 1291 Edward chiamò i guardiani a Norham e li impose che prima di fare la sua scelta egli fosse riconosciuto come loro “overlord” (signore). La risposta dei sei nobili scozzesi, per cui un eventuale rifiuto avrebbe comportato vari svantaggi, alcuni dei quali legati all’esercito che Edward si era portato con sé per intimidirli, fu però astuta: essi dichiararono che solo un re avrebbe potuto decidere al riguardo, sicché la scelta del candidato, conosciuta
come “the Great Cause”, divenne la priorità assoluta per i poteri in gioco. Nessuno dei pretendenti si ritirò. Il 17 novembre 1292 Edward scelse John Balliol, autore, a detta del re inglese, della migliore richiesta ufficiale. La decisione fu male accolta da molti dei candidati, i quali sostennero che Balliol era stato scelto in realtà perché più facile da manipolare. Re John venne incoronato il 30 novembre 1292, giorno di St. Andrew, secondo l’antica tradizione celtica che voleva che il Re sedesse sull’antica Pietra del Destino. Fu anche un momento amaro, perché John dovette pronunciare un giuramento di fedeltà al parlamento di Edward, situato a Newcastle, in Inghilterra. La cosa in sé non era considerata particolarmente rilevante, poiché anche Alexander aveva dovuto fare lo stesso a suo tempo, senza che vi fossero poi implicazioni, e persino Edward stesso al re di Francia. Ciò che fece la differenza in questo caso fu che Edward aveva seriamente intenzione di considerare la Scozia come parte del suo regno, non diversamente da una delle sue numerose contee. Re John si vide dunque un inglese, master Thomas di Husingore, a fargli da cancelliere. Questi propose al re di intraprendere una serie di riforme legali che portassero le leggi e i costumi scozzesi più in linea con il sistema inglese. L’introduzione di un “Treasurer” e l’ordine di Edward di modificare il “Royal Seal”, il Sigillo Reale di Scozia, perché riflettesse il giuramento di fedeltà fattogli da John portarono diffusa e crescente convinzione che l’autorità del re di Scozia fosse stata, effettivamente, sottomessa a quella del Re d’Inghilterra. Edward non perdeva occasione per esercitare la sua autorità, anche (e soprattutto) quando essa contrastasse con quella del Re di Scozia: si offrì di ascoltare personalmente qualunque lamentela giungesse dalla corte di John, con il risultato che chi si vedesse colpito da un verdetto a sfavore dalla corte scozzese avrebbe potuto rivolgersi ad Edward per ottennerne un altro; durante un caso riguardante una cittadina di Berwick, Edward riprese in pubblico John, che aveva citato il trattato di Birgham a dimostrazione che il re d’Inghilterra stava uscendo dai confini del potere accordatogli, e inviò per tutto il regno un messaggio che dichiarava la non validità del trattato e il rifiuto di riconoscere la Scozia come stato indipendente; umiliò infine John costringendolo a rispondere di persona alle lamentele di un suo suddito, dove di norma si sarebbe dovuto interporre un rappresentante del re.
Nell’estate del 1294, Edward si preparava alla guerra contro Philip IV, Re di Francia, per il possesso della Gasconia e la cessione della provincia di Aquitania. Ciò ebbe conseguenze importanti nel teso rapporto tra Inghilterra e Scozia: Edward ordinò a John di recarsi a sud di Portsmouth con 10 duchi, 16 baroni e i loro cavalieri: il re d’Inghilterra stava di fatto trattando il Re di Scozia e il suo paese come se fossero a sua disposizione. Il malcontento crebbe di continuo tra i nobili, non solo verso Edward, ma anche nei confronti del loro re, da loro considerato troppo debole e incapace di contrapporsi efficacemente alla tirannia del re inglese.

Tra l’estate del 1294 e del 1295, la convinzione diffusa che l’intera situazione riguardante re Edward si fosse trascinata troppo oltre spinse i nobili scozzesi a istituire un concilio di 12 tra vescovi, duchi e baroni. Questi inviarono nel luglio del 1295 dei messaggeri al Re di Francia, proponendogli un’alleanza contro re Edward. L’accordo venne preso e la “Auld Alliance” fu stipulata il 23 febbraio 1296. La cosa fece infuriare il re d’Inghilterra, che era però già impegnato a contrastare una ribellione nel Galles. La vendetta contro gli scozzesi si sarebbe dovuta consumare in seguito alla sottomissione di un’altra nazione celtica.

1.2.3: L’invasione della Scozia e le prime ribellioni

L’invasione della Scozia iniziò nel marzo 1296, quando, dopo aver attraversato il fiume Tweed, Edward giunse alle mura fortificate di Berwick. Egli offrì ai difensori la possibilità di avere salva la vita se essi avessero deputo le armi, ma gli scozzesi, memori di quanto erano valse in passato le promesse del re, rifiutarono sdegnosamente. Gli inglesi attaccarono la città, la quale resistette per tre giorni prima di essere invasa. Gli abitanti vennero trucidati e le loro abitazioni date a dei coloni della vicina contea inglese di Northumbria. Il grosso dell’esercito scozzese, frattanto, attendeva gli inglesi più a nord, lungo la costa sulla quale si affacciava il castello dei Dumbar, il cui possesso era stato concesso ai soldati scozzesi dalla moglie del duca di Dumbar, fiera patriota, mentre il marito fuggiva a Berwick a donare la propria fedeltà a Edward. L’esercito inglese inviò un terzo delle sue forze guidate da Warenne, duca di Surrey, e numerosi veterani bene armati, dei quali le forze scozzesi, poco organizzate e prive di esperienza di grandi manovre militari, non disponevano. Surrey posizionò le sue truppe in modo da
 convincere i comandanti scozzesi che gli inglesi si stessero ritirando. Ciò spinse gli avversari a lasciarsi dietro la collina su cui tenevano posizione, per gettarsi sul nemico. L’attacco degli scozzesi non rispondeva ad una strategia di nessun tipo, e gli inglesi, mantenendo l’ordine e la formazione delle truppe, ebbero la meglio. L’esito della battaglia non poté essere più infausto per gli scozzesi: migliaia di morti, 130 nobili catturati e un esercito virtualmente annientato. La facile vittoria di Edward risuonò pesantemente per tutta la Scozia, spingendo molti alla resa immediata. Vi furono alcune battaglie a Roxborough, vi fu la resistenza dei castelli di Jedburgh ed Edimburgo, ma i continui attacchi ed assedi perpetrati dagli inglesi spazzarono via ogni resistenza in pochi giorni. Re John e i suoi Lords fuggirono a nordest del paese meditando sulla possibilità di una resa completa e definitiva.

A fine Agosto, quasi 1600 nobili si riunirono a Berwick per giurare personalmente fedeltà a Edward. Questo giuramento sarebbe stato conosciuto come “The Ragman's Roll”. Re John si arrese ufficialmente il 2 luglio. Spedì una lettera a Edward chiedendo umilmente perdono per i suoi crimini, adducendo i cattivi consigli dei suoi nobili come causa. Edward accettò, ma si vendicò sul Re di Scozia organizzando una cerimonia in cui John dovette abbandonare il trattato stipulato con la Francia e chiedergli pubblicamente perdono, per poi essere privato del trono e dell’abito regale. Il re nudo fu quindi gettato a terra. L’umiliazione era completa.

1.2.4: Le battaglie di William Wallace e Andrew de Moray

L’11 settembre 1297 gli arcieri inglesi e gallesi di Surrey attraversarono il ponte, ma vennero presto fatti rientrare dal duca, destatosi tardi dal poco riposo che il precario stato di salute gli aveva concesso. Al soldati fu possibile l’attraversamento solo più tardi, nel pomeriggio. Wallace e Moray, che avevano osservato lo svolgersi dell’avanzata, tennero ferme le loro truppe finché pressappoco 5.400 soldati dell’armata avversaria non ebbero raggiunto la riva nord. Fu allora che le forze scozzesi attaccarono e rapidamente circondarono gli inglesi, prendendo possesso dell’intera zona al di là del ponte ed eliminando tutti i nemici appena intrappolati. Privo della possibilità di inviare rinforzi lungo lo stretto ponte, Surrey non poté far altro che guardare una considerevole parte della sua armata, venire sconfitta e massacrata dagli avversari. Molti provarono a salvarsi gettandosi nel fiume, ma di questi furono in pochi a non morire annegati. Cressingham, che aveva attraversato il fiume con l’avanguardia, venne ucciso e fatto a pezzi. Nonostante disponesse ancora di un gran numero di soldati, Surrey aveva perso confidenza sulla vittoria, così ordinò alle sue truppe di distruggere il ponte prima di ritirarsi verso Berwick. Alla luce della vittoria di Wallace, il conte di Lennox e James Stewart, l’Alto Controllore di Scozia, che fino a quel momento avevano fornito supporto agli inglesi, presero le proprie truppe e si unirono agli scozzesi, attaccando il convoglio che trasportava le riserve degli inglesi, e accelerandone così la ritirata. La partenza di Surrey lasciò una guarnigione indifesa a Stirling Castle, che poco dopo si arrese agli scozzesi. Non è stato documentato a quanto ammontarono le perdite tra l’esercito di Wallace: si suppone che siano state relativamente leggere, ma tra queste figura anche Moray, che non sopravvisse alle ferite riportate. Gli inglesi, dal canto loro, ebbero circa 6000 tra morti e feriti. La vittoria a Stirling Bridge spinse in alto la fama di Wallace, il quale fu nominato Guardiano di Scozia il marzo seguente assieme a Moray. Tale onorificenza poteva parzialmente dipendere dal fatto che i nobili preferissero esporre i due piuttosto che loro stessi, o perché le loro armate erano ora fieramente dalla parte di Wallace. Qualunque fosse la principale ragione, non vi è accordo tra gli storici riguardo la legittimità della posizione di Wallace, a cui causa, probabilmente, era portata avanti in nome dell’esiliato re John. Gli assalti degli scozzesi perdurarono fino a giungere nell’Inghilterra del Nord, mentre, nella corte...
reale inglese, Re Edward si vedeva a fronteggiare una ribellione dei suoi baroni, mossa dal discontento maturato verso il loro oppressivo monarca. La cosa ebbe breve durata, e nel luglio 1298 Edward aveva di nuovo sufficiente potere militare da riunire un’armata e marciare alla volta della Scozia. 2000 cavalieri e quasi 15.000 fanti si avviavano così con il loro re alla guerra. L’intenzione di Wallace non era di incontrare gli inglesi sul campo di battaglia, vista la schiacciante superiorità numerica dell’avversario, ma di farsi inseguire verso nord, cosicché fosse loro sempre più difficile procurarsi del cibo. All’arrivo presso Edimburgo, la situazione degli inglesi era difficile, ed Edward già considerava una possibile ritirata. Volendo assicurare la cosa, Wallace avanzò fino a Falkirk, a circa 13 miglia dagli accampamenti inglesi. Quando lo venne a sapere, Edward decise di combattere.

Il 22 luglio gli inglesi attaccarono le postazioni scozzesi. Contro i cavalieri inglesi, gli scozzesi assunsero una formazione difensiva conosciuta come “schiltron” (schiltrone), con le lance puntate in avanti. I soldati di Wallace, così disposti, poterono respingere i cavalieri e la fanteria, ma si rivelarono un bersaglio facile per gli arcieri. Dopo ripetuti attacchi a distanza, che ridussero dramaticamente i ranghi scozzesi, gli inglesi attaccarono nuovamente, travolgendo gli avversari, eliminandone gran parte e disperdendo i rimanenti. La battaglia di Falkirk era così risultata in una sconfitta per Wallace, il quale, riuscito a fuggire dal campo di battaglia, rimise il suo mandato di guardiano e si diresse verso la Francia alla ricerca di supporto.

1.2.5: Robert the Bruce e la rivalsa scozzese

In seguito alla vittoria, Edward proseguì nella continua soppressione di focolai di ribellione, mentre gli scozzesi elessero nuovi guardiani: Robert Bruce duca di Carrick, nipote del Bruce che aveva corso per il trono contro John Balliol, e John Comyn, signore di Badenoch. La collaborazione tra i due fu molto difficile, e cessò poco tempo dopo quando, nel 1302, Bruce cedette il proprio status e giurò fedeltà a Edward perché gli fosse possibile il matrimonio con Elizabeth de Burgh, che non avrebbe potuto prendere luogo senza il benestare del monarca inglese. Nel 1302 fu anche combattuta una battaglia decisiva per la guerra d’indipendenza, che però non vide la Scozia come protagonista ma l’esercito francese, che fu sconfitto a
Courtrai, nelle Fiandre, dalla fanteria fiamminga. Ciò ebbe importantissime conseguenze per le forze inglesi, che finora avevano combattuto su più fronti ma ora, con un avversario, il re di Francia, privato del suo esercito, potevano ora concentrarsi sul nemico scozzese. Dopo numerose campagne in cui erano stati continuamente respinti, e che poco avevano fruttato se non morte per fame per moltissimi soldati, gli inglesi colpirono come mai prima, e dopo una desperata resistenza, nel 1305 gli scozzesi capitolarono. Nello stesso anno avvenne la cattura di William Wallace, per il quale era stata offerta una grande ricompensa a chi lo consegnasse agli inglesi. L’ex guardiano di Scozia fu portato a Londra, dove fu processato per crimini di guerra veri o presunti, imprigionato per Alto Tradimento, condannato a morte per impiccazione, giustiziato e mutilato. Il passo successivo di Edward fu di procedere al governo delle terre appena conquistate. I vari atti parlamentari che dovevano regolare l’esecuzione di ciò non ebbero però applicazione o effetto però, perché, a sei mesi dall’esecuzione di Wallace, in Scozia si formarono nuovamente movimenti di ribellione, a capo dei quali vi era Robert Bruce, ora signore di Annandale, deciso a prendere il trono di Scozia. Cresciuto alla corte di Edward e possedere di una vasta conoscenza riguardo la politica e gli uomini in essa coinvolti, Bruce dichiarava la sua intenzione di combattere per la Scozia e di condurre la battaglia nel nome di Balliol, l’antico possidente di un trono che egli voleva per sé.

Nei primi mesi del 1306, quando si trovava a Londra, Bruce venne a sapere che John Comyn aveva allertato Edward di un suo piano di conquistare il trono. Fuggì allora in Scozia, e a Greyfriar’s Kirk, in Dumfries, incontrò Comyn e lo uccise durante un alterco. Ciò, oltre a procurargli la scomunica dalla Chiesa, lo costrinse a cercare di ottenere il trono prima possibile per poter affrontare l’ira del clan Comyn in qualità di re. Andò a Glasgow per farsi assolvere dal sacrilego assassinio, e poi, il 27 marzo 1306, a Scone dove fu in fretta incoronato. A Methven, presso Perth, un’armata inviata da Edward lo sconfisse e costrinse a fuggire verso le isole.

Dopo un anno durante il quale Bruce aveva fatto perdere le proprie tracce, le truppe inglesi seminavano il terrore per tutta la Scozia. Fu allora, nel 1307, che egli ricomparve, con a lato Sir James Douglas, detto “The Black Douglas”, e vinse una prima battaglia a Palm Sunday. Ciò gli permise di conquistare il supporto di
clan da tutta la Scozia, che gli inviarono dei soldati con cui egli poté rinforzare le proprie schiere e vincere numerose altre battaglie contro i cavalieri inglesi. Un Edward particolarmente furioso decise quindi di assemblare un esercito del quale si mise a capo per punire gli impudenti scozzesi. Il re d’Inghilterra si trovava tuttavia in cattiva salute, e morì durante il viaggio verso nord, avendo solo il tempo di ordinare che dopo la sua morte, le sue ossa fossero condotte alla testa dell’esercito finché la Scozia non fosse stata sottomessa. Fu compito del figlio, Edward II, di far sì che la volontà del padre fosse rispettata, ma egli, già occupato con affari domestici, decise di dirigersi a sud. Bruce aveva così la possibilità di consolidare la sua posizione e regolare i conti con i nemici interni: combatté e sconfisse i MacDougall, e poi i Comyn, e ottenne il controllo di buona parte della Scozia.

Nel 1309 Bruce fu riconosciuto come sovrano dal Re di Francia, e ottenne, nonostante la precedente scomunica, l’appoggio della Kirk, la Chiesa di Scozia. Libero da forti rivali nel suo Paese, Bruce volse lo sguardo verso gli inglesi. Nel 1311 Bruce aveva snidato tutte le guarnigioni inglesi in Scozia dalle loro roccaforti, con l’eccezione di Stirling e Berwick, e si preparava a invadere l’Inghilterra del nord. Edward decise di staccarsi dai problemi della sua corte per rispondere agli attacchi con una grossa armata. Lo scontro tra le forze avversarie avvenne il 24 giugno 1314 a Bannockburn, in quella che viene ricordata come una delle battaglie decisive della storia dell’intera Gran Bretagna. Le truppe di Robert Bruce, tre volte inferiori a quelle di Edward, grazie all’uso di tattiche militari che impedivano agli inglesi di controbattere efficacemente, ottennero una vittoria che permise alla Scozia di liberarsi completamente dalla minaccia inglese. Bruce poteva ora procedere senza ostacoli nell’Inghilterra del nord e perfino in Irlanda, dove suo fratello Edward fu incoronato re. L’Inghilterra non aveva altra scelta che negoziare la pace.

I successi militari di Bruce furono seguiti da altrettanto importanti azioni diplomatiche. Nel 1328, a Northampton, fu suggellato un trattato di pace che riconosceva l’indipendenza del regno di Scozia e Bruce il suo legittimo re. A questo segui una dichiarazione d’indipendenza firmata ad Arbroath. La Scozia era così
diventata il primo stato nazionale in Europa, il primo ad avere unità territoriale sotto uno stesso Re.

Robert I morì a Cardross il 7 giugno 1329, un anno dopo che ebbe coronato il suo sogno di una Scozia libera. Il regno che lasciava era forte come non lo era stato per molti anni: si tenevano ora regolarmente incontri parlamentari, vi era una tassazione efficace e le casse dello stato abbondavano di tesori presi in Inghilterra. Non vi erano grandi scontri interni con i baroni, anche se le cose sarebbero presto peggiorate. Alla morte del re salì al trono il figlio di cinque anni David, che prese il nome di David II, il quale ebbe come tutore il duca di Moray. In Inghilterra, il figlio di Edward II, dopo la sua morte, gli era succeduto al trono d’Inghilterra con il nome di Edward III, e pianificava di intervenire negli affari scozzesi con l’aiuto dei nobili decaduti le cui terre erano state confiscate da Bruce. Mentre veniva così a crearsi un’armata scozzese ribelle, per il giovane re David le cose si stavano rendendo difficili: la morte del duca di Douglas e di Moray lasciò il Re senza due fidati ed esperti consiglieri. Edward III, intanto, si accordava con Edward Balliol, figlio di John, e i nobili decaduti perché essi procedessero per mare e giungessero in terra scozzese. Arrivati a Kinghorn in Fife, i ribelli marciarono e sconfissero a Dupplin l’esercito scozzese guidato dal duca di Mar, successore a Moray nel comando militare. Edward Balliol fu così incoronato Re di Scozia a Scone, ma presto dovette fuggire, incalzato dai fedeli di Bruce. Cercò e ottenne allora il supporto di Edward dandogli il possesso della città di Berwick, e, l’anno successivo, gli prestò omaggio e cedette il titolo di buona parte della Scozia del sud. David fu inviato dagli scozzesi in Francia, dove sarebbe rimasto sette anni in esilio. I reggenti che occuparono il trono vacante negli anni successivi dovettero resistere a un’invasione inglese capeggiata da Edward III, che, grazie a una strategica vittoria a Halidon Hill e ai numerosi nobili e membri del clero che passarono dalla sua parte, poté piantare le sue guarnigioni su tutte le Lowlands. Tale risultato portò a una vera e propria colonizzazione della zona da parte di numerosi migranti, mercanti e religiosi, che modificarono grandemente la struttura sociale.

La situazione si sarebbe capovolta nel 1338, quando Edward III andò alla conquista del trono di Francia, portando il suo esercito nelle Fiandre e dando inizio alla Guerra dei Cent’anni. La Scozia era nuovamente un regno frammentato, privo
dei nobili che l’avevano guidata alla pace, del suo re in esilio e di un’economia che aveva appena cominciato a riprendersi. Dell’opportunità che la campagna inglese in Francia apriva per la Scozia approfittò Robert Stewart, Guardiano di Scozia e futuro primo monarca della casata degli Stuart, che, con l’aiuto dei francesi, liberò Bute, Perth e respinse gli inglesi a sud del Forth. Nel 1341 riportò al trono l’esiliato re David. L’azione del Re si concentrò sugli attacchi militari al confine, in violazione delle tregue, finché il Re di Francia, il cui esercito era stato sconfitto a Crecy, lo esortò ad intraprendere una contro-invasione dell’Inghilterra che gli potesse servire da diversivo. David accettò, ma quando affrontò in battaglia l’esercito inglese a Neville’s Cross, ne ricavò una pesantissima sconfitta. Catturato, passò i successivi dodici anni da prigioniero nella corte di Edward III. Il trono fu allora occupato da Stewart, che riuscì a battere gli inglesi e a ricacciarli a sud del confine. Edward dovette concordare una tregua di 10 anni, ma poté contare su un riscatto di 100,000 merks (ognuno dei quali valeva 2/3 di una sterlina scozzese) per la restituzione di David. La Scozia usciva da questa situazione in preda a una molteplicità di problemi: nuove tasse erano state imposte dalla necessità di pagare la restituzione del re, la terra era rovinata dalle molte battaglie su di essa combattute e la Peste Nera stava mietendo vittime tra la popolazione.

Nel 1363 David si recò a Londra dove strinse un accordo con Edward che ne prevedeva la successione come Re di Scozia, fosse David morto senza figli, includendo nell’eventualità il ritorno della Pietra del Destino al suo luogo originale. Gli scozzesi tuttavia rifiutarono l’accordo, offrendosi invece di continuare a pagare il riscatto (aumentato a 100.000 sterline). I nuovi termini prevedevano una tregua di 25 anni, ma nel 1369 fu redatto un altro trattato che beneficiava più gli scozzesi, per effetto della guerra in Francia. Il regno di David fu caratterizzato da ripetute cessioni di autorità a commissioni, riforme del sistema fiscale (che favorì le entrate a disposizione del Re) e del sistema legale. Alla sua morte, nel 1371, David era un re impopolare, inviso ai nobili per il suo matrimonio con la vedova di un laird Dopo la morte della sua moglie inglese. Gli scozzesi non volevano che un suo figlio gli succedesse al trono, così nominarono il cinquantacinquenne Robert Stewart, che prese il nome di Robert II e fu il primo della dinastia degli Stuart. Il regno che egli si trovò a governare fu continuamente piagato dagli scontri tra i nobili e la corona,
dove erano furiosamente contese le terre lungo in confine inglese e i clan si muovevano guerra l’uno contro l’altro. In una simile situazione, la Scozia non poté trarre vantaggio dai problemi che l’Inghilterra aveva con la Francia. Quando morì nel 1390, Robert II lasciò al figlio John, nominato Robert III, un regno di rivalità e guerre intestine, che il nuovo re, cinquantatreenne e con un handicap mentale derivatogli da un incidente a cavallo, lasciò governare al fratello più giovane, il duca di Albany.

1.3: La salita al regno della dinastia Stuart

Per più di 150 anni la Scozia sarebbe stata indipendente e libera dalle mire dell’Inghilterra, ma i suoi governanti si trovarono a dover gestire un regno continuamente piagato dagli scontri tra i nobili e la corona, dove erano furiosamente contese le terre lungo il confine inglese e i clan si muovevano guerra l’uno contro l’altro. In una simile situazione, la Scozia non poté trarre vantaggio dai problemi che l’Inghilterra aveva con la Francia. Quando morì nel 1390, Robert II lasciò al figlio John, nominato Robert III, un regno di rivalità e guerre intestine, davanti alle quali il nuovo re, cinquantatreenne e con un handicap mentale derivatogli da un incidente a cavallo, si trovò impotente. Virtualmente sostituito dal fratello Robert, duca di Albany, Robert III morì nel 1406, dopo la morte, avvenuta in circostanze misteriose, del figlio maggiore David e il rapimento dell'altro figlio James durante un viaggio intrapreso in segreto verso la Francia, per essere tenuto al sicuro. James fu portato a Londra, dove sarebbe rimasto prigioniero per 18 anni. Il governo del regno di Scozia fu quindi esercitato ufficialmente dal duca di Albany, in qualità di reggente.

In assenza di un regnante che riunisse in sé il carisma e la legittimità di un re unificatore, i nobili scozzesi trassero vantaggio dalla situazione fondando dei propri domini che essi governavano autonomamente, trasformando, di fatto, la rivalità tra clan in una contesa tra piccoli regni, i più potenti dei quali, come la famiglia Douglas, nemmeno la monarchia poteva ignorare. Iniziativa privata e noncuranza delle politiche centrali furono costantemente esercitate dalle famiglie con sufficiente potere: i MacDonald del nord-ovest, che avevano stretto alleanze con l’Inghilterra di Henry IV, cercarono di estendere militarmente la propria
autorità sulla Scozia, interrompendosi a un passo dal giungere allo scontro aperto con le forze del reggente. Anche in termini di rapporti con l’estero non vi era da trovarsi pace: un nuovo attacco inglese fu perpetrato nel 1400 da parte di Henry IV, ma il suo esito largamente inefficace servì perlopiù a dimostrare che in quel momento la conquista militare della Scozia si trovava al di là delle possibilità del monarca inglese. Dall’altro lato, le continue schermaglie promosse dagli scozzesi contro gli inglesi per il recupero dei borghi e dei castelli in territorio di confine e per il riconoscimento formale dell’indipendenza della Scozia da parte del re d’Inghilterra culminarono nella battaglia di Humbleton nel 1402, in cui gli scozzesi furono sconfitti e dovettero ritirarsi. L’unità territoriale veniva così contrastata sia internamente dall’iniziativa personale dei nobili, che esternamente dalla ripetuta occupazione inglese, generando di conseguenza un marcato senso di anglofobia nella popolazione, rintracciabile nel vernacolare della cronaca in versi di Andrew da Wyntoun\(^3\) o nel latino dello *Scotchchronicon*\(^4\) di Bower. Leggiamo all’interno di quest’ultimo un discorso di un duca di Douglas:

\[
\begin{align*}
These\ & are\ our\ age\ old\ enemies \\
Who\ & are\ trying\ to\ steal\ our\ possessions \\
Those\ & serfs\ want\ us\ to\ bear\ the\ yolk \\
And\ & to\ wipe\ us\ out\ with\ all\ that\ is\ ours \\
Besides\ & they\ do\ the\ church\ wrong \\
They\ & are\ schismatics...^{5}
\end{align*}
\]

Nel 1413 Henry V succedette al trono d’Inghilterra, e intraprese una serie di campagne vittoriose contro la Francia, arrivando a estendere la sua conquista fino

\(^3\) Canonico agostiniano a cui si deve la *Original Chronicle*, manoscritto in vernacolare scozzese scritto tra il 1420 e il 1425, i cui episodi della vita di William Wallace furono fonte primaria per la costruzione del mito dell’eroe dell’indipendenza scozzese.

\(^4\) Cronaca della storia di Scozia fino alla morte di James I (1437) in sedici volumi scritta da Walter Bower tra il 1440 e il 1447 su commissione di Sir David Stewart di Rosyth. Concepita come continuazione ed espansione della *Chronica Gentis Scotorum* di John Fordun (1360) che compone i primi cinque volumi dell’opera arricchiti da note e materiale aggiuntivo di Bower. Considerata dalla National Library of Scotland “probably the most important mediaeval account of early Scottish history”.

alle regioni centrali. I francesi dovettero chiamare nuovamente in loro soccorso l’alleato scozzese, facendo appello alla Auld Alliance come strumento mai sopito di unione tra i due paesi. Il contributo dell’esercito di Scozia, con a capo Buchan, figlio di Albany, si rivelò fondamentale per invertire le sorti della guerra, dando origine a una lunga tradizione di mutuo rispetto e supporto tra i francesi e gli scozzesi e la concessione d’importanti onorificenze quali Conestabile di Francia e Comandante Supremo dell’esercito francese per Buchan. Sconfitto grazie all’intervento degli scozzesi, il Re d’Inghilterra Henry V morì nel 1422, maledicendo i suoi nemici6.

Alla morte di Albany nel 1420, in un momento che vedeva l’Inghilterra in difficoltà nel fronte francese, s’intravidero le condizioni per un ritorno in Scozia di James I. In seguito al matrimonio con Joan, cugina di Henry VI, James tornò al trono di Scozia con il difficile compito di ristabilire l’ordine e il primato della monarchia in un contesto che anni di rivalità nobiliari e scarsa cura dell’esercizio amministrativo avevano reso ingovernabile. Il rifiuto dei nobili di cedere le loro prerogative in favore di una rinnovata centralizzazione del potere spinse il re ad adottare misure aggressive: riprese con la forza il ducato di Fife, Menteith e Lennox dagli Albany, condannandone vari membri all’esecuzione; respinse una ribellione guidata da Alexander of the Isles e prese possesso dei castelli di Stirling e Dumbarton. Il suo regno fu dedito alla ristorazione del potere assoluto della monarchia e a importanti riforme in ambito legislativo, per le quali ottenne il nome di “Rex Legifer”. Tale approccio, rinforzato da un regime fiscale di superiore severità rispetto al passato, gli procurò però numerosi nemici, alcuni dei quali, con la complicità dello zio Walter, duca di Atholl, riuscirono ad assassinarlo nel 1437.

Il successore James II, di soli sei anni, visse inizialmente sotto la reggenza di Sir William Crichton e Sir Alexander Livingston7, e fu al centro di una nuova serie

---

6 Liber Plascardensis, x. 27. in Lang A., A history of Scotland from the Roman Occupation (Edinburgh: Edinburgh W. Blackwood, 1900), p.294
di crimini politici, che videro un ruolo prominente della potente famiglia Douglas. Salito al governo a 19 anni, James si impegnò personalmente in uno scontro che durò tre anni e che portò alla morte di William, l’ottavo conte dei Douglas, e dei fratelli conti di Moray e Ormond; all’esilio fu condannato il fratello superstite James.

Gli anni seguenti offrirono un periodo di relativa pace, che fu interrotto quando James decise di intervenire nella guerra civile inglese a fianco del re Henry VI, e morì durante l’assedio di Roxburgh nel 1460. Si dovette ricorrere a una nuova reggenza, durante la quale si moltiplicarono gli intrighi di corte e gli scontri tra i pretendenti a un ruolo di potere. Fu anche un periodo in cui i semi della cultura e della scolarizzazione, su ispirazione francese, crebbero nella fondazione delle prestigiose Università di St. Andrews (1412), Glasgow (1451) e Aberdeen (1459). Lungo il secolo che vide una forte influenza rinascimentale europea emerse, specialmente dagli studi umanistici, una élite non religiosa, composta da figli di nobili o mercanti, ma anche di proprietari terrieri e borghesi, dotata di un’alta educazione nelle lettere, la cui testimonianza risiede nei documenti politici e nelle opere letterarie in volgare scozzese (di cui, nel secondo caso, protagonisti furono i grandi *makars*8 Henryson, Dunbar e Douglas, i cui versi sono capisaldi del vernacolo dell’epoca)9.

Il regno di James III iniziò nel 1469, e fu dettato da un interesse nettamente inferiore rispetto ai predecessori nel partecipare agli affari di governo e nel tenere le redini del potere. Come misura di prevenzione riguardo possibili cospirazioni per il possessio della corona, James fece imprigionare i fratelli Albany e Mar, il primo dei quali fu artefice di una fuga che lo portò a Londra, dove si unì ad un armata che invase la Scozia nel 1482. Quando James venne catturato da un gruppo di nobili dissidenti, Albany e Mar assunsero la reggenza del regno, per

---

8“Makar”, in lingua scozzese usato per descrivere un poeta o un autore capace e versatile nell’arte della scrittura, identifica in maniera particolare dei poeti e scrittori scozzesi vissuti nel quindicesimo e sedicesimo secolo.
8<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/359131/makar>
abbandonarla in seguito all’affacciarsi di nuove conspirazioni. James dovette tornare per combattere i ribelli, ma evitò lo scontro diretto finché non fu costretto ad affrontare nella battaglia di Sauchieburn un’armata guidata da Archibald Douglas. Lo scontro portò alla sconfitta delle sue truppe e alla sua morte per mano di sconosciuti.10

James IV salì al trono nel 1488, in una situazione in cui il potere dominante era detenuto dalla famiglia Douglas, e speso a quasi esclusivo beneficio dei propri servitori e collaboratori. Il re quindicienne, non ancora al governo, diede però prova della sua leadership sgominando una ribellione guidata da alleati e rivali del padre. James s’impose presto come il possensore di una forte visione politica. Desideroso di creare un’identità scozzese che trascendesse la girosta di alleanze e separazioni tra regioni e famiglie e riportasse in auge il concetto di autorità propria solo del Re, egli trovò nella lingua un possibile mezzo di unificazione: sotto il suo regno fiorì una letteratura umanistica e legale in volgare scozzese. Inoltre, in un periodo in cui una crescente parte della nobiltà scozzese utilizzava l’inglese, il re decise di imparare il gaelico, lingua ancora ampiamente parlata nelle Highlands e nelle isole, ma non diffusa né gradita a sufficienza nelle Lowlands. Il Re dimostrò in varie occasioni di possedere numerosi talenti, che gli procurarono l’ammirazione di grandi sapienti dell’epoca, tra cui lo studioso Erasmo. La sua ambizione, relativa in particolar modo alla sua opera di pacificatore tra stati in guerra e il suo desiderio di guidare le armate della cristianità alla liberazione di Costantinopoli dai turchi, fu fonte di grandissimo prestigio per la sua figura e per tutta la Scozia. La creazione di una grande flotta da guerra, la quale incluse una nave maestosa e potente come la Great Michael, diede l’avvio a un’industria navale che nei secoli a venire avrebbe fatto della Scozia una primatista mondiale del settore.

Nel 1503 James IV prese in sposa la principessa inglese Margaret Tudor, sorella di Enrico VIII, firmando per l’occasione un trattato di pace la cui rottura avrebbe comportato la scomunica da parte del Papa. La cerimonia ebbe luogo a

Holyrood Palace a Edimburgo, alla presenza di molti dignitari inglesi. Nei seguenti anni, che videro lo svilupparsi di molte tensioni tra la Francia e l'Inghilterra, James, preoccupato che la sicurezza della Scozia sarebbe stata compromessa da un'eventuale capitolazione della Francia, agì da mediatore, cercando di pacificare ove possibile le questioni tra i contendenti, cosa che gli procurò il nome di “Rex Pacificator”. Quando il Papa, il re di Spagna e il doge di Venezia formarono una Santa Lega contro la Francia, a cui aderì anche Henry VIII, re d'Inghilterra, James decise di non prendervi parte, adducendo come ragione che la Francia fosse un elemento essenziale per la stabilità dell'Europa, e rinnovò invece la Auld Alliance. Quando la Francia chiese aiuto alla Scozia, James decise di inviare un ultimatum al re inglese, ma in risposta ottenne che Henry VIII si era dichiarato “reale possessore della Scozia” e che il regno appartenesse al re scozzese solo “in termini di omaggio”. La reazione di James non si fece attendere: il re scozzese radunò un vasto esercito e marciò verso l'Inghilterra.

Il settembre 1513 James incontrò la morte durante la battaglia di Flodden Field, in uno scontro che gli scozzesi intrapresero con tenacia, ma che fu vinto dalla superiore capacità militare degli inglesi, i quali fecero uso dell'artiglieria e di nuove lance che batterono le più corte armi scozzesi. Nella battaglia persero la vita il re, suo figlio Alexander e migliaia di soldati, signori delle Highlands, duchi, baroni, altri nobili, e potenti uomini di chiesa. La Scozia si trovava senza un re e senza un esercito. Al posto dell'infante James V, prese il potere sua madre, la regina Margaret nel 1514, la quale sposò il duca di Angus, capo del potente clan “Red Douglas”, e venne successivamente sostituita alla reggenza dal duca di Albany, nipote di James III e promotore della prosecuzione dell'alleanza con la Francia. Il suo incarico fu però ostacolato da una serie di complotti promossi da Margaret e dal marito, che spinsero, una volta scoperti, la regina a cercare rifugio in Inghilterra, dando così occasione a suo fratello Henry VIII di interferire ulteriormente negli affari del regno di Scozia. Colpito da queste pressioni, nel 1524 Albany tornò in Francia. In un contesto sempre più teatro di scontri tra i Douglas e gli Hamilton, che risultò in una presa sempre più salda da parte dei primi sul re, e quindi sulla Scozia, il quattordicenne James V fuggì dai suoi carcerieri a Stirling e, dichiaratosi pronto a governare, dichiarò vendetta contro Angus Douglas,
mandando avanti il suo proposito al punto da spingerlo a chiedere asilo al re d’Inghilterra. Il giovane re poteva dunque iniziare a ristabilire l’ordine nella sua nazione. Un particolare evento dalle vastissime conseguenze ebbe luogo nel 1517 in Germania, dove il monaco Martin Lutero inchiodò la sua Tesi alla porta della chiesa di Wittenberg. In breve tempo tutta l’Europa si trovò coinvolta in una guerra di religione. La Riforma colpì profondamente anche la Scozia, dove la battaglia tra cattolici e protestanti giocò un ruolo pesante sull’alleanza che sarebbe derivata da chi James avrebbe scelto come sposa. Nel 1537, mentre si creavano divisioni sempre più aspre tra chi accoglieva e chi respingeva la Riforma, il re non tenne conto delle implicazioni religiose, ma si ispirò invece all’Auld Alliance, scegliendo come sposa Madeleine, la figlia di Francois I, re di una fermamente cattolica Francia. Quando ella morì sei mesi dopo, James si risposò con un’altra principessa francese, Marie de Guise-Lorraine, la quale gli diede due figli, che morirono entrambi nel 1541. Il re si trovò privo di eredi, al pari di Henry VIII.

Nel 1534, dopo aver rotto con Roma, il monarca inglese premette per annullare il Galles e rendere la Scozia protestante, perché così sviluppasse avversità contro la Francia e, di conseguenza, disordine interno per le implicazioni politico-religiose della situazione coniugale del re di Scozia. Quando a James venne offerta la corona d’Irlanda nel 1542, Henry utilizzò l’evento come pretesto per proclamarsi Signore Supremo di Scozia. James rispose organizzando un attacco contro l’Inghilterra, ma trovò scarso supporto tra i suoi nobili. L’esercito inglese raggiunse e sconfisse un’armata scozzese molto inferiore a Solway Moss. In seguito alla disfatta, James, malato, fuggì alle Falkland, e morì poco dopo aver appreso che la moglie gli aveva dato una figlia, e che quindi non vi sarebbe stato un erede maschio della sua dinastia al trono. L’avvenimento più probabile sarebbe stato, infatti, che la figlia, Mary, avrebbe preso in matrimonio il rappresentante (e il cognome) di un’altra casata, di fatto mettendo fine alla dinastia degli Stuart. Il re d’Inghilterra Henry VIII cercò di cogliere la possibilità, pianificando di sposare il

---

11 Si riporta che, in quell’occasione, James disse: “It came with a lass and it will go with a lass” con riferimento al suo casato, originatosi dal matrimonio tra Margery Bruce e Walter Stewart e destinato, secondo James, a finire con sua figlia.
cagionevole figlio Edward alla giovanissima Mary, ma i progetti del re d'Inghilterra si arrestarono nel mezzo dei negoziati (i “Treaties of Greenwich”) con il reggente del trono James Hamilton, conte di Arran, quando Marie de Guise, la madre di Mary, e il cardinale vescovo di st. Andrews, David Beaton, incoronarono di comune accordo la piccola Mary, di soli nove mesi, nella cappella reale del castello di Stirling il 9 settembre 1543, e il trattato di matrimonio fu ripudiato. Henry VIII ordinò così una nuova invasione della Scozia, che, secoli dopo, lo scrittore Sir Walter Scott avrebbe chiamato “The war of the Rough Wooing”: ai soldati inglesi fu ordinato di “put everything to the fire and sword”, razziare e devastare ogni villaggio sul loro cammino inclusi alcuni dalla parte inglese del confine, fomentando così un sentimento d'odio che gli scozzesi avrebbero provato per secoli nei confronti dei loro vicini.

1.4: La riforma protestante

La rivoluzione iniziata da Martin Lutero aveva scosso nel profondo la connessione tra la posizione temporale e spirituale della Chiesa e l'ordine sociale retto dal potere: ciò che sembrava legge naturale veniva sfidato, capovolto, e distorto al punto da creare una serie di fratture ad ogni livello della struttura su cui l'intera Europa si era fino basata fino ad allora. Per comprendere la portata del fenomeno vi è innanzitutto da considerare l'elemento Chiesa come parte integrante del mondo temporale: leggi e regolamenti riguardanti la nobiltà e il popolo; poteri del Papa che si estendevano sino al diritto alla corona dei regnanti, la cui validità era (o non era) confermata quale parte del progetto di Dio per il mondo; ufficiali della Chiesa non di rado capaci di accumulare grandi ricchezze e molte volte privi dell'educazione minima necessaria per l'ufficio a cui erano preposti; riti, assoluzioni, bolle papali, indulgenze e reliquie oggetto di scambio commerciale; scomunica usata come mezzo di dissuasione e coercizione. Il messaggio di rottura di Lutero procedette dalla Germania al resto d'Europa ora nella forma di un proselitismo pacifico, ora nell'assalto furioso delle chiese e degli altri luoghi di culto, visti come luoghi d'idolatria. La forma di protestantismo divenuta più famosa in Europa, il calvinismo, fu quella che raggiunse le isole britanniche, dove trovò un appoggio tanto vasto che quando Henry VIII ruppe con
il Papa a causa del negato accordo per il divorzio, la maggioranza degli inglesi seguì il re nella creazione di una nuova Chiesa d’Inghilterra, istituita ufficialmente nel 1534, che produsse, fra le altre cose, la prima stesura di una Bibbia in inglese che trovò enorme successo in Inghilterra e in Scozia. James V era stato un devoto cattolico, ma i nobili scozzesi avevano visto la possibilità di approfittare di un eventuale attacco ai privilegi della Chiesa per potersi appropriare delle terre di proprietà dei suoi ministri. Il progetto in questione era reso particolarmente appetibile dal fatto che, al tempo, le ricchezze della Chiesa in Scozia corrispondevano pressappoco a un terzo del suo territorio, metà della sua ricchezza e la totalità del suo patrimonio librario. L’Inghilterra attraversava un periodo di prosperità maggiore della cattolica Francia, che nell’alleanza con la Scozia sembrava avesse più da guadagnare che da concedere. L’insieme di questi motivi portò ad una rapida e vasta diffusione del protestantesimo, perché favorita dall’intervento dei nobili.

Quando, all’inizio della seconda metà del 1500, per resistere agli assalti dell’Inghilterra, gli scozzesi si rivolsero ai francesi, il vento della Riforma era estremamente forte in tutto il nord Europa, e l’alleanza con la Francia cattolica piuttosto che con l’Inghilterra protestante fu foriera di implicazioni e difficoltà. Il protestantesimo aveva infatti trovato terreno fertile nelle ricche Lowlands, dove il commercio e l’influenza dell’Inghilterra avevano portato i più veloci cambiamenti. Diffuso si era dimostrato il dissenso che albergava in vasti strati della popolazione nei confronti del clero, e fenomeni ai quali la Chiesa si opponeva, come la diffusione della Bibbia in lingua inglese in Inghilterra, avevano trovato vasta ricezione in Scozia. Come in molte parti d’Europa, la reazione della Chiesa al diffondersi delle nuove idee fu di portare all’esecuzione di coloro che le avevano originariamente trasmesse, ma alle misure adottate dal cardinale vescovo di St. Andrews David Beaton si opposero con forza le idee ispirate da Patrick Hamilton12.

---

12 Pastore riformista che pubblicò nel 1528 il suo *Patrick’s Places*, trattato sulla separazione operata da Lutero tra legge e vangelo, per il quale fu condannato come eretico e bruciato vivo il 29 febbraio 1528.
e, successivamente, John Knox 13. Quest’ultimo fu una figura chiave nell’evangelizzazione protestante della Scozia: giunto in terra caledoniana nel 1544 a lato del leader protestante George Wishart, Knox partì armato di Bibbia e spada lungo una strada che avrebbe toccato tutta la Scozia. Beaton riuscì ad accusare Wishart di aver preso parte in una cospirazione con gli inglesi e Henry VIII e a ordinare la morte sul rogo, ma due mesi dopo venne egli stesso assassinato nel suo castello di St. Andrews da un gruppo di leader protestanti. John Knox fu arrestato per la sua partecipazione all’omicidio del cardinale, e condannato alla schiavitù in una galera della flotta francese, da cui fu rilasciato nel 1549 e si diresse a Ginevra, dove si dedicò allo studio con Calvino.


13 Teologo riformatore scozzese, vissuto tra il 1513 e il 1572, riconosciuto come collaboratore di Giovanni Calvino, il redattore della liturgia protestante The Book of Common Order e il fondatore della Chiesa presbiteriana scozzese.
14 Titolo onorifico del primogenito del Re di Francia.
nominarono i “Lords of the Congregation”, redassero il “First Covenant”, un solenne documento atto a proclamare l’espulsione della Chiesa cattolica dalla Scozia. La predicazione di Knox, ritornato dall’esilio, durante una messa a Perth originò una sommossa popolare contro gli edifici di culto che spinse Marie de Guise a inviare un’armata francese per portare l’ordine nella città e dimostrare la sua non tolleranza nei confronti dei seguaci del “Covenant”, i “Covenanters”. I protestanti chiesero per tutta risposta aiuto alla nuova regina d’Inghilterra, Elisabetta, la quale promosse una guerra che si concluse nel giugno 1560, in coincidenza con la morte di Marie de Guise. In una settimana il Parlamento scozzese emanò tre leggi: il disconoscimento del Papa, la proibizione di ogni dottrina contraria al protestantesimo e il divieto di proclamare messa. Ai protestanti fu chiesto di approntare una dichiarazione del proprio credo, che si manifestò nel First Book of Discipline. La chiesa presbiteriana divenne l’"official Kirk of Scotland", l’ufficiale Chiesa di Scozia.

Nell’agosto 1561, la cattolica Mary tornò da regina in un paese sostanzialmente protestante. La natura della diciottenne vedova, non più regina di Francia ma francese nell’aspetto e nei modi, subito mal si amalgamò con il carattere austero previsto per la gente di Scozia in seguito alla conversione. Nel 1565 Mary sposò il giovane cugino Darnley, cattolico e mal considerato dai suoi pari a causa del suo cattivo carattere, scatenando le ire dei protestanti e dando origine a una serie di complotti e trame che portarono presto alla morte del ragazzo, che fu ritrovato strangolato vicino a una casa presso il centro di Edimburgo chiamata Kirk o’Field. Il matrimonio seguente che Mary contrasse fu con James Hepburn, conte di Bothwell, un uomo implicato nell’omicidio del precedente marito. Questa mossa fece di contro arrabbiare i cattolici. La regina era così riuscita ad alienarsi il supporto di ognuno. A 24 anni, in seguito all’insurrezione di un armata protestante organizzatasi per costringerla ad abdicare, Mary dovette abbandonare il trono in favore del figlio neonato, subito incoronato James VI. Bothwell fuggì in Norvegia e James Stewart, duca di Moray e fratellastro di Mary, diventò Reggente. La decaduta regina fu tenuta prigioniera dai
nobili scozzesi a Loch Leven Castle\textsuperscript{15}, fino alla sua fuga e conseguente decisione di cercare asilo in Inghilterra, dove la regina Elisabetta non tardò a vederla come rivale per il trono, e la imprigionò. Una ribellione guidata dai "Queen's Lords", nobili fedeli alla regina, li portò in possesso di Edinburgh Castle per il periodo che coprì la crescita e l'apprendimento delle mansioni di governo di James VI, la morte per assassinio di due reggenti e quella per cause naturali di un terzo. Il quarto, Morton, riuscì a riconquistare il maniero prima di essere eliminato dal Duca di Lennox, sotto l'accusa di aver assassinato lord Darnley quattordici anni prima. Promosso Alto Ciambellano dal giovane Re e desideroso di educare il sovrano e il paese al cattolicesimo, per poi portare alla conversione l'Inghilterra con l'aiuto della Francia e della Spagna, Lennox fu costretto a fuggire in Francia quando un gruppo di nobili presbiteriani rapirono James il 22 agosto 1582, con l'intento di riformare il governo di Scozia a favore di una politica anti-cattolica. La cospirazione politica che portò al rapimento fu chiamata il "Raid of Ruthven".

Nel 1583, fuggito dai suoi rapitori e fattosi proclamare Re a Edimburgo, James ebbe subito grossi problemi a contenere le fazioni opposte dei cattolici e dei protestanti, nonché le trame dei nobili. Il giovane Re decise di rimanere protestante per poter più facilmente raggiungere un sodalizio con l'Inghilterra. Fermo e cauto nelle sue decisioni, anche quando la madre fu giustiziata da Elisabetta nel 1587, James pose fiducia nei consigli del gallesse Robert Cecil, primo ministro della Regina. Sposò così nel 1589 una principessa protestante, Ann di Danimarca. Protestante ma non presbiteriano, James desiderava restaurare la posizione dei Vescovi e di ridurre l'influenza della Chiesa negli affari di Stato, nonostante l'opposizione al riguardo della General Assembly e di Andrew Melville, successore di John Knox. Tentò inoltre, senza riuscirci, di impedire che i ministri si riunissero senza suo previo consenso, e costretto a permettere che presbiteri, sinodi e assemblee generali potessero avvenire liberamente.

1.5: L'unione delle corone

\textsuperscript{15} Un castello situato su un’isola in mezzo a un lago ("Loch Leven") nella regione di Perth e Kinross.
Nel marzo 1603, in Inghilterra era giunto alla fine il regno di Elisabetta, e James di Scozia venne indicato come suo legittimo erede. Il re giunse a Londra per essere incoronato come James I Re d'Inghilterra, e da lì si operò a lungo per favorire un’unione dei due regni. A impedire il disegno del re furono le numerose opposizioni che si sollevarono da entrambe le parti, dove un ruolo prominente giocò almeno all’inizio la componente ideologica: per gli inglesi avere un re in comune con la Scozia equivaleva a fonderci con una popolazione barbara, guerresca, poco civilizzata e precedente alleata della Francia e della Spagna. Che l’Inghilterra fosse un paese governato da un re venuto dal nord non era di per sé motivo di rancore, ma il pesante cambiamento di rapporti tra il re e l’apparato amministrativo in entrambi gli stati comportò misure, come l’aggiunta di componenti scozzesi agli uffici di governo inglesi, che vennero accolte con grande ostilità. Veniva così a nascere una situazione che nei piani avrebbe dovuto vedere una collaborazione tra inglesi e scozzesi per il funzionamento e il mantenimento di un sistema che portasse benefici a entrambi, ma che nei fatti si traduceva in costante rivalità e mutua mancanza di fiducia tra chi vedeva minacciata la propria società e chi si sentiva sgradito nel luogo che presiedeva. James desiderava fornire una politica aperta, basata sulla fiducia data agli ufficiali addetti all’amministrazione, sia che fossero vicini, sia, come naturalmente nel caso del trono in Scozia, che fossero lontani. Il suo desiderio di raggiungere un’unione sempre più concreta e meno legata solo alla funzione di legame della figura reale passava per un vero interesse nei confronti del suo regno scozzese, che – dichiarava - non voleva diventasse “as the northern shires, seldom seen and saluted by their king.”

Maggiori per James furono i problemi con i presbiteriani scozzesi. Per occuparsene, chiamò e in seguito incarcerò Melville, con il quale ogni tentativo di compromesso era stato infruttuoso, e si recò in Scozia per implementare più a fondo la sua politica religiosa. Il suo tentativo di imporre i “Five Articles of Perth”

---

17 cinque articoli di cui constava il tentativo di James di integrare la Church of Scotland con l’episcopaliana Church of England. Essi recitavano:
-kneeling (rather than sitting) during communion;
trovo però fortissima opposizione, e le sue proposte di riforma, presentate alla General Assembly di Perth nel 1618, furono sistematicamente ignorete. Durante il regno di James il regno di Scozia e d'Inghilterra rimasero separati, ognuno con un proprio parlamento che approvava le proprie leggi, una Chiesa nazionale e un proprio sistema fiscale. La Scozia stessa, all'interno, presentava una fortissima divisione tra le Highlands e le Lowlands, e i clan vivevano rifacendosi a usi ancestrali come la lingua gaelica, ed ostili verso ogni rinnovamento proveniente dall'esterno (come la fede protestante che James non riuscì a fargli adottare).

James morì nel 1625 e fu succeduto da Charles I. Il nuovo re era nato in Scozia, ma aveva poca conoscenza del funzionamento delle cose nel regno. Episcopaliano devoto, egli dimostrò in varie occasioni disapprovazione per i Presbiteriani e le assemblee democratiche. Si diede la missione, in qualità di re per diritto divino, di portare la Chiesa di Scozia più in linea con quella d'Inghilterra. Tramite l'“Act of Revocation” del 1625, Charles decretò che le terre e i possedimenti distribuiti tra i nobili durante gli anni della Riforma fossero restituiti alla Chiesa, privandosi istantaneamente di ogni supporto da parte di chi avrebbe potuto assisterlo nel venire incontro alle esigenze del suo regno. Pari esito gli portò nel 1629 il voler conformare la pratica religiosa scozzese a quella inglese. Per Charles, incoronato Re di Scozia nel 1633 nella cattedrale di St. Giles a Edimburgo tramite una cerimonia che la congregazione lì riunita trovò di carattere estremamente “papale”, il momento era giusto per introdurre una riforma della liturgia, ma la prima lettura del Revised Book of Common Prayer18 nel luglio 1637 gli dimostrò che per il resto del paese non lo era affatto: la sommossa che si

---

-baptism administered within one day, and privately when necessary;
-private communion for the sick or infirm;
-confirmation by a Bishop;
-the observance of Holy Days such as Christmas and Easter.


18 Un libro di preghiere commissionato da Charles ai vescovi scozzesi nel tentativo di estendere una forma di preghiera d'ispirazione anglicana in Scozia.

scatenò all’evento fu tale che il Privy Council dovette cercare rifugio a Holyroodhouse e il vescovo presenziente poté procedere solo puntando le pistole alla congregazione. Charles rispose al fatto con l’ordine di punire chiunque non avesse accettato l’utilizzo del libro, facendo sì che, di conseguenza, coloro che si riunivano per manifestare dissenso al riguardo furono fatti disperdere, e i nobili contrari furono obbligati a sottomettersi alla volontà del re. La situazione portò alla creazione di una commissione di rappresentanti del clero, della nobiltà, dei cittadini e dei borghi che, in un giorno da essi chiamato “the great marriage Day of this Nation with God”, stillarono a Edimburgo il National Covenant, un documento destinato a mantenere la “vera religione”, che di fatto fungeva da dichiarazione d’indipendenza dalla regola inglese. Di questo testo, chiamato anche The Tables, molte copie furono inviate per tutta la Scozia, e molti signori fecero uso nel prendere le decisioni, scavalcando i rappresentanti di Charles in Scozia.

Quando il re incontrò la General Assembly nel novembre 1638, egli fu posto davanti alla decisione dell’assemblea di deporre o scomunicare tutti i vescovi e di abolire il Prayer Book. Contrario a ogni forma di compromesso riguardo la sua posizione sulla Chiesa, il re invalidò tutte le decisioni dell’Assembly, e decise di contare sull’intervento militare per assicurare che i suoi ordini venissero portati a compimento. Tuttavia, quando si giunse allo scontro armato nell’estate del 1639, Charles, a capo di un’armata inglese, si trovò a fronteggiare un esercito nel quale militavano numerosi veterani di grande esperienza di ritorno dalle campagne d’oltremanica. La prima “Bishop’s War”, come fu chiamata, si risolse con l’armistizio di Berwick, in cui il re acconsentiva a deferire alla General Assembly o al parlamento scozzese tutte le decisioni riguardo le questioni che avevano scatenato la battaglia. Charles aveva istituito una commissione, chiamata Committee of Articles, che aveva il compito di sottomettere l’azione legislativa del

19 Concilio composto da fedeli alla Corona nominati dal Re o dalla regina, adibiti a fornire consiglio riguardo affari di stato. Con poteri consiliari, giudiziari ed esecutivi nel tardo quindicesimo secolo, il concilio divenne esecutore delle volontà del Re dal regno di James VI a quello di Charles II e James VII, con il periodo di Charles I come unica interruzione a causa dell’occupazione di Cromwell. Il Privy Council venne smembrato il 1 maggio 1708, poco dopo l’Unione di Scozia e Inghilterra.
parlamento scozzese al vaglio del re, ma la cui autorità era mal accetta in Scozia. Quando il parlamento scozzese intervenne per indebolire la, commissione che Charles aveva istituito e utilizzato per perpetrare la sua influenza, il re corse nuovamente alle armi e fu così che ebbe luogo una seconda “Bishop’s War”. Il re si trovò presto costretto a chiedere finanziamenti al parlamento inglese, ma il Long Parliament decise invece per la cattura e l’esecuzione di due dei suoi principali sostenitori. Con venti di guerra civile che minacciavano l’Inghilterra, Charles si recò in Scozia in cerca di supporto, e li dovette giocoforza accettare le richieste e decisioni della General Assembly e del parlamento scozzese. Il rapporto conflittuale tra il re e il Long Parliament in Inghilterra, con il primo non disposto a trattare sul suo diritto divino di regnare, creò le condizioni per lo scoppio della guerra civile nel 1642.

Grazie al supporto guadagnato, Charles collezionò numerose vittorie contro le forze del Parlamento. Anche questa volta la Scozia giocò un ruolo di supporto, ma stavolta sotto richiesta del parlamento inglese, e non dal re: volendo i Covenanters avere la possibilità di stabilire il presbiterianismo in Irlanda e Inghilterra, nel 1643 fu garantito, tramite un accordo chiamato il “Solemn League and Covenant”, l’intervento di un esercito scozzese che attaccasse le forze di Charles in Inghilterra in cambio di una riforma della dottrina, dell’esercizio e del governo della religione nei regni d’Inghilterra e Irlanda, e il pagamento di 30.000 sterline al mese. L’accordo prevedeva inoltre l’eliminazione dell’autorità del papato e dei prelati. Le condizioni dell’accordo furono rapidamente applicate al di fuori della Scozia, e altrettanto rapidamente trovarono ostacoli, solo in parte mitigati dalla sconfitta dei “Royalists”, i seguaci del re, a Marston Moor da parte di una forza parlamentare guidata dal comandante Oliver Cromwell e rinforzata da numerosi e capaci soldati scozzesi.

Nello stesso momento, in Scozia, un dibattito teologico aveva portato alla scissione in due frange distinte tra le fila dei Covenanters: gli estremisti e i moderati, questi ultimi aventi a capo James Graham, primo marchese di Montrose. Preoccupato dalle vittorie intellettuali degli estremisti riguardo il diritto divino dei re, e convinto sostenitore del fatto che i religiosi dovessero occuparsi unicamente di mansioni spirituali, il lord decise di radunare un’armata di Highlanders, a cui si
aggiunsero alcuni Lowlanders e irlandesi, per conquistare la Scozia in nome del re. L’esercito, privo di cavalleria e artiglieria, riuscì a sconfiggere un’armata di Covenanters a Tippermuir, e marciò poi verso Aberdeen, quindi invase Inverary con l’aiuto dei Macdonalds e dei Macleans, sconfisse nuovamente i Covenanters a Inverlochy, a Dundee, a Auldearn a Kilsyth. Mentre le forze di Montrose procedevano all’occupazione di Glasgow, Oliver Cromwell in Inghilterra mieteva altrettanti successi contro i Royalists. Dopo aver vinto un’altra battaglia contro Charles a Naseby, Cromwell si diresse a nord e riuscì a fermare l’avanzata di Montrose a Philipaugh. Quando, nel maggio 1646, al nobile scozzese giunse la notizia che il re si era arreso a Newark, egli decise di salpare verso la Norvegia mentre i suoi sostenitori si ritiravano ai loro paesi. L’esercito scozzese consegnò Charles al parlamento inglese e tornò in Scozia. La situazione, per quanto apparentemente sistemata, non appariva tale ai Covenanters: dubbiosi che Cromwell avrebbe effettivamente istituito il presbiterianismo in Inghilterra, essi decisero di accordarsi con il re, il quale avrebbe introdotto per tre anni il presbiterianismo in cambio di un esercito che lo aiutasse a combattere i Parliamentarians, le forze militari del parlamento inglese. Tuttavia, gli eventi presero una piega inaspettata quando l’armata scozzese guidata dal duca di Hamilton fu sconfitta da Cromwell a Preston. Il malcontento dei Covenanters estremisti di fronte agli scarsi progressi in Inghilterra sfociò in una marcia a Edimburgo, dove il governo moderato fu rovesciato e il leader estremista Archibald Campbell, primo marchese di Argyll, prese virtualmente possesso del potere. L’arrivo di Cromwell, ricevuto da eroe, portò con sé anche la notizia dell’esecuzione di Charles, generando grande costernazione tra gli scozzesi. L’avvenuto regicidio, atto ancora considerato sacrilego e per di più perpetrato contro uno che era stato il re di Scozia avrebbe facilmente potuto diventare causa di tensione, senonché Argyll fece sì che il diciottenne principe Charles fosse proclamato Re a Edimburgo. Nel 1650 Charles II giunse in Scozia per prendere ufficiale possesso del suo regno, e venne così a dover sfidare Oliver Cromwell, che aveva assunto il titolo di “Lord Protector”\(^{20}\). Per rispondere alla conseguente

\(^{20}\) Titolo onorifico, la cui versione estesa è *Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England,*

Con Cromwell al potere, fu istituito nel 1652 un “Treaty of Union” (trattato d’unione) per unire la Scozia al Commonwealth. Artefice dell’abolizione della monarchia, Cromwell si rese un governatore impopolare a causa della sua durezza e il suo carattere da puritano. Alla sua morte nel 1658, il popolo spinse il generale Monk, braccio destro di Cromwell, a invitare re Charles II a riprendere il suo posto come monarca del Regno. Disinteressato, come il padre, al regnare in Scozia, cosa per la quale si serviva del Privy Council a Edimburgo, Charles II aveva una bassa considerazione del presbiterianismo, e il suo non farne mistero di fronte ai Covenanters, i quali avrebbero battuto anche con le armi la previsione di un ritorno dei vescovi, gli avrebbe portato enormi difficoltà in tempi successivi.

Nel 1649, da re di Scozia, Charles si riprese la prerogativa di scegliere i membri della “Commitee of Articles”, con l’intenzione di rinforzare la propria posizione di fronte al parlamento, e di poter ripristinare il precedente sistema di selezione dei ministri, obbligandoli a dimettersi e richiedere il proprio seggio ai redivivi vescovi e ai lairds (i nobili locali). La cosa incontrò l’opposizione di un terzo del parlamento, quindi il re inviò dei soldati perché la sua volontà venisse rispettata. La cosa, di rimando, provocò un intervento dei Covenanters calvinisti, che nel 1679 assassinaron l’arcivescovo di St. Andrews James Sharp, che, da presbiteriano in origine, era passato a operare per la ristorazione dei vescovati in Scozia e perché la Chiesa venisse sottomessa all’autorità del re. Il governo intervenne allora organizzando un’armata che sconfisse e trucidò i Covenanters a Bothwell Brig. Nei primi anni ottanta del diciassettesimo secolo iniziò un periodo

_scotland and Ireland_, dato al capo dello stato durante il primo periodo del Commonwealth. Fu detenuto da Oliver Cromwell nel periodo 1653-1658, e dal figlio e successore Richard Cromwell tra il settembre 1658 e il maggio 1659. Il termine “protector” si riferisce al "Protectorate", la prima denominazione del Commonwealth fino al 1659.

ancora più intenso di persecuzioni, a cui lo storico Robert Wodrow diede il nome di “The Killing Time”.

1.6: La “Glorious Revolution”

Charles, morto nel 1685, fu succeduto dal fratello James VII (James II d’Inghilterra), cattolico dichiarato, il quale tentò di attuare una politica di pacificazione accordando tolleranza nei confronti tanto dei cattolici, quanto dei Covenanters e dei Quakers (movimento protestante puritano), con il risultato però di attirarsi i sospetti e il malcontento di tutti i gruppi. Movimenti di opposizione crebbero rapidamente, e il re dovette fronteggiare una ribellione da parte di forze protestanti guidate da James, duca di Monmouth, figlio illegittimo di Charles, che si proclamò re a Taunton ma fu sconfitto a Sedgemoor. L’impopolarietà di re James crebbe quando il suo favore nei confronti d’iniziative cattoliche lo portò ad alterare privilegi e diritti di proprietà da tempo concessi, in particolare la forte coalizione tra la Corona e la Chiesa anglicana. Concentrato sul cambiamento e disattento al sentimento anti cattolico che le numerose guerre contro i poteri del Continente avevano plasmato in uno stato nazionalista e protestante, il re vide tutti i suoi sforzi per ottenere l’approvazione di tutti i suoi cittadini concludersi senza successo. Intanto, nel Continente si profilava una battaglia tra il re protestante olandese William III of Orange e il re francese Louis XIV per il controllo militare e diplomatico sull’Europa Occidentale. Charles aveva in precedenza combattuto contro le forze olandesi per l’egemonia commerciale, ma i regni si erano riappacificati in occasione del matrimonio di William con la figlia primogenita di James, Mary, nel 1677. Il re olandese decise di intervenire in Inghilterra nel 1688, ma la sua prima invasione fu respinta, complice il difficile clima inglese, che nello stesso anno impedi alla flotta inglese di fermare lo sbarco dell’esercito di William a Birxam., Re James, malato e indeciso, preferì ritirare le sue forze a Londra invece di attaccare. Una serie di ribellioni che scoprirono a Nottingham, Hull, Durham e Derby, unite alla marcia su Londra che William guidò, spinsero James a fuggire in Francia, e l’esercito britannico, grande il doppio di quello olandese, a disperdersi.

Wodrow R., The History of the Sufferings of the Church of Scotland from the Restoration to the Revolution (Glasgow: Blackie, Fullarton & co., 1828)
Era stata così condotta la “Glorious Revolution” che aveva espulso gli Stuart dalle isole britanniche. William e Mary divennero i signori di Britannia, e i figli di James, cattolici, furono rimossi dalla successione. Tale successo per i nuovi monarchi in Inghilterra non si estese però anche in Scozia e Irlanda, dove si formò una causa degli Stuart esiliati, chiamata Jacobitism, da “Jacobus”, latino di James, che diede al re esiliato supporto tale da poter controllare tra il 1689 e il 1691 parte della Britannia e quasi tutta l’Irlanda. William intraprese una serie di campagne lunga la quale ebbe successo nell’allontanare i Giacobiti dalla Scozia e dall’Irlanda.


Il 12 febbraio 1692 una spedizione militare inviata da William con a capo il capitano Robert Campbell fu ospitata dai MacDonald a Glencoe, con l’ordine segreto di catturare ed eliminare tutti i membri della famiglia, accusata di ribellione giacobita contro la Corona. Nella notte seguente furono uccise 38
persone, in quello che venne chiamato più avanti “The massacre of Glencoe”, i cui responsabili, accusati secondo la legge scozzese del turpe reato di “murder under trust” (omicidio a tradimento), riuscirono a sfuggire alla condanna o, nel caso del re, non poterono essere formalmente accusati.

1.7: IL DISASTRO DI DARIÉN

Il 20 giugno 1695, William permise la creazione di una Compagnia scozzese delle Indie Orientali (“Scottish East India Company”), simbolica protagonista di un’avventura commerciale che un difficile ultimo quarto di secolo aveva spinto la Scozia a intraprendere: il paese si era trovato in una posizione debole nei confronti dell’Inghilterra a causa delle inferiori dimensioni della sua economia e delle sue esportazioni, a cui si erano aggiunti i limiti imposti alla, un tempo, fiorente industria navale e gli anni di carestia che portarono parte della popolazione alla fame. Se da un lato si sentiva la necessità di un’unione politica con l’Inghilterra che servisse a tutelare la Scozia da simili crisi, da un altro vi era il forte desiderio che il paese potesse crescere in una grande potenza mercantile e coloniale tale da poter rapportarsi all’Inghilterra da pari. Il parlamento scozzese prese così misure per procedere alla fondazione di una Banca di Scozia (Bank of Scotland), un’educazione pubblica e una compagnia d’iniziativa commerciale e scambio con l’estero (Company of Scotland). Vittima di pressioni e rivalità da parte dell’English East India Company, detentrice del monopolio sul commercio estero inglese, e ostacolata dal governo inglese, la cui mancanza di supporto (dovuta alla guerra con la Francia e al desiderio di non farsi coinvolgere negli affari della Spagna) aveva spinto gli investitori inglesi a ritirarsi, la compagnia venne presto costretta a rinunciare al finanziamento esterno da Londra, Amsterdam e Amburgo, e a dover contare solo sulle sue finanze interne. £400,000 sterline da ogni parte della società, un totale complessivo che raggiungeva quasi un terzo dell’intero capitale scozzese, vennero così raccolte e usate per finanziare un’iniziativa con lo scopo manifesto di favorire l’esportazione diretta di merci dalla Scozia, e quello segreto di stabilire una colonia di produzione e distribuzione a Darién, nell’istmo di Panamá, un luogo sotto l’egida spagnola in cui l’azione scozzese era con ogni probabilità sconosciuta a Re William. Il piano, ideato e promosso dal banchiere William Paterson e
conosciuto come “Darien Scheme”, si compose di due spedizioni. La prima fu composta da cinque navi che salparono dal porto di Leith, con 1200 persone tra civili ed ex militari a bordo, nel luglio 1698. Furono molti meno coloro che riuscirono a giungere al golfo di Darién, a causa delle malattie che avevano colpito l’equipaggio durante il tragitto. La zona raggiunta fu ribattezzata Nuova Caledonia, fu scavato un canale che connessse il porto della baia all’oceano, furono edificati di un fortino di difesa (Fort St. Andrew) e un insediamento abitativo (New Edinburgh); fu infine bonificato il terreno e posto a coltivazione di patate dolci e mais. Tuttavia, il maltempo rese ogni progetto di espansione edilizia e di efficienza agricola impossibili, e le tribù indigene, sebbene pacifiche, non s'intrattennero come sperato nello scambio di preziosi e spezie con le merci, usualmente di poco valore, offerte dagli scozzesi. La malattia e l’afa estiva portarono la mortalità a livelli estremamente alti (fino a dieci decessi al giorno). La cronica mancanza di cibo (che le colonie inglesi in America e nei caraibi erano state ordinate da William di non fornire) e gli attacchi degli spagnoli (presso le cui miniere e proprietà gli scozzesi si erano illusi di poter permanere indisturbati) segnarono il destino della prima spedizione coloniale scozzese: nel luglio 1699, a sette mesi dall’arrivo, 300 era il numero totale dei coloni sopravvissuti, e soltanto una fu la nave che riuscì a tornare in Scozia (una seconda sbarcò a Port Royal, in Giamaica, ma, su ordine del governo inglese, non gli fu data alcuna assistenza).

Comunicazione del disastro non giunse in Scozia, o comunque arrivò troppo tardi per fermare una seconda spedizione di quattro navi, la quale s’imbarca in un viaggio di due mesi (la metà del precedente), ma un livello di mortalità tale da causare la morte in mare di 160 persone. Coloro che raggiunsero Darién il 30 novembre 1699 vi trovarono solo “a vast, howling wilderness”. In seguito a una riunione tenuta nella Rising Sun per discutere della difficile situazione (che comprendeva la massima durabilità di sei mesi delle riserve alimentari), fu deciso che i nuovi coloni rimanessero almeno fino alla ricostruzione completa del forte, a seguito di ciò 500 sarebbero rimasti a presiedere nella colonia e i restanti sarebbero salpati verso la Giamaica alla ricerca di provviste. L’elemento della

---

22 Borland F., *The History of Darien 1700*, (Oxford University collection, 1779), p.29
Retrieved at <http://archive.org/details/historydarien00borlgoog>
scarsità alimentare divenne presto motivo di vari dissensi interni che misero i coloni l’uno contro l’altro. I ministri della Chiesa, riorganizzatisi in un presbiterio con membri nominati per l’occasione, avevano sin dai primi giorni stabilito un calendario di celebrazioni, e condannato la mancanza di moralità dei coloni per il loro “Atheistical swearing and cursing, brutish drunkenness, detestable lying and prevaricating, obscene and filthy talking”\(^\text{23}\). Furono fatti alcuni tentativi di evangelizzazione dei nativi Tule, senza visibili risultati, mentre l’ostilità crescente, dovuta alle condizioni sempre peggiori della salute, nutrizione e coesione decisionale dei coloni, portò a moti disperati di ribellione e diserzione. Nuovi attacchi da parte degli spagnoli furono respinti per oltre un mese, finché i continui e sempre più feroci assalti per terra e per mare non obbligarono gli scozzesi ad arrendersi. Il 31 marzo 1700 fu firmata la resa, e agli scozzesi furono date due settimane per prepararsi ad abbandonare l’istmo. Il prezzo in vite umane della seconda spedizione era stato ancora peggiore della prima: nella sua *History of Darien*, il ministro reverendo sopravvissuto Francis Borland parlò di 300 morti nei primi quattro mesi e dodici giorni, per una media di 2.3 al giorno, e un numero totale di vittime pari a 460, il 35% dei 1300 che erano partiti in agosto\(^\text{24}\). Il 12 aprile Caledonia fu abbandonata, e tre di cinque navi di sopravvissuti arrivarono in Giamaica dopo un viaggio in condizioni disumane, dove la concentrazione nelle stive di donne e uomini sani e ammalati aveva provocato 250 morti. Altri 100, tra cui il ministro Alexander Shields, trovarono la morte nell’isola per la mancanza di aiuti e mezzi di sussistenza. Di tutte le imbarcazioni solo la *Speedy Return*, nave di soccorso giunta dopo la resa agli spagnoli, e il mezzo di Campbell of Fonab tornarono in Scozia. La *Rising Sun*, il vascello più prezioso della flotta scozzese, salpò da Giamaica il 21 luglio, e riuscì a giungere sulla costa della Carolina prima di venire distrutta da un uragano il 3 settembre, causando la morte del capitano James Gibson, del politico ed economista Alexander Hamilton e altri 120. Alla fine del viaggio, 11 delle 14 navi della Company erano state distrutte o vendute, e il numero documentato delle vittime dell’impresa si aggirava sulle 1500.\(^\text{25}\)

\(^{23}\) Ibid. p.40  
\(^{24}\) Ibid. p.57  
\(^{25}\) Ibid. p.86
Il terribile disastro umano ed economico che l’avventura di Darién si era rivelata colpì duramente l’orgoglio nazionale, ed ebbe gravissime conseguenze in tutti i settori che ne avevano contribuito al finanziamento. Furono in molti a considerare gli inglesi come la vera causa del fallimento. All’apertura della sessione parlamentare del 21 maggio, Re William manifestò dispiacere per l’esito dell’impresa e si offrì di promuovere il commercio scozzese e fornire assistenza per tamponare le perdite economiche, consigliando tuttavia alla Scozia di concentrarsi da quel momento in poi sulla produzione interna, e rifiutandosi di intervenire con l’Inghilterra alla conquista di Darién (il Council raccomandò che il parlamento “Vindicat, Support and Protect” la Company per preservare il “just right and title” al possesso di Caledonia)\footnote{The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707, K.M. Brown et al eds (St Andrews, 2007-2013), 1700/5/40. Retrieved: 9/4/2013.}. Un’azione del re riguardo Darién avrebbe portato a contrasti con gli spagnoli che avrebbero potuto facilmente ingrandirsi fino a causare una guerra con la Spagna, ma ciò non fu sufficiente a giustificare la posiziona della corona agli occhi dei cittadini scozzesi, i quali trovarono sfogo ideale nel risentimento nei confronti delle decisioni del re e degli inglesi in generale. Il malcontento popolare raggiunse il suo apice in una serie di manifestazioni vandaliche il 20 giugno 1700, e ad esse corrispose un infuocato confronto tra le forze parlamentari il 14 gennaio 1701. In quest’occasione, furono approvate delle riforme della legislazione mercantilista, tra cui degli atti contro l’imprigionamento ingiusto, il divieto d’importare e indossare abiti di manifattura estera e vini e liquori francesi. Fu inoltre cercato un finanziamento per la ricapitalizzazione della Company, che non passò, in virtù di un’estensione dei suoi privilegi. Decisi a non ostacolare l’ondata d’odio contro l’Inghilterra anziché prendere atto delle responsabilità di coloro che avevano promosso l’impresa, i membri del Privy Council scozzese acconsentirono all’impiccagione del capitano, del nostromo e dell’artigliere del mercantile inglese Worcester che, secondo l’interpretazione di Roderick McKenzie, segretario dell’East India Company, avevano commesso un atto di pirateria nei confronti di una nave scozzese. La conseguente esecuzione sommaria fu l’ultimo atto di sfida che la Scozia lanciò all’Inghilterra prima di cedere la propria indipendenza politica.
CHAPTER II: L’unione d’Inghilterra e Scozia

2.1: Le conseguenze dell’esperienza di Darién

Darién aveva lasciato l’economia scozzese in uno stato miserevole, che il mancato sostegno di re William rese ancora più difficile da superare: il suo rifiuto di riconoscere come legale l’insediamento coloniale era motivato dal desiderio di non inimicarsi la Spagna, tuttavia era controbbattuto dal fatto che l’operazione scozzese aveva rispettato i termini dell’”Act of Patent”27. Quando, nel 1701 fu preteso che il re accordasse un risarcimento per le perdite monetarie subite dalla Scozia sulla base che la colonia di Darién fosse stata fondata legalmente, egli trovò il momento adatto per proporre un compromesso che prevedesse una possibile unione tra i due stati. La guerra con la Francia intrapresa per il controllo dell’impero spagnolo nel 1702 rendeva particolarmente problematica la possibilità che la Scozia, così economicamente e politicamente indebolita, finisse con il dare voce alle frange estreme e il procedere feroce mente a difesa della propria indipendenza, andando forse a rinverdire l’antica alleanza con il nemico d’oltremanica. Lo svantaggio militare nei confronti di un eventuale avamposto francese nel nord avrebbe generato una situazione minacciosa per la stabilità dell’Unione delle Corone e dell’Inghilterra, perciò neutralizzare il parlamento scozzese e garantire contemporaneamente un successore protestante al trono divennero gli obiettivi del piano di William e Anne, nella speranza di portare nuova stabilità in un contesto dove la disparità tra l’Inghilterra e la Scozia era ormai oltre ogni possibilità di lasciare le cose immutate.

All’inizio del diciottesimo secolo, la popolazione scozzese constava di un quinto di quella inglese, e, nonostante la geografia poco avesse da offrire oltre a zone da pascolo per quasi due terzi del territorio, era molto meno concentrata in aree urbane come Glasgow, Edimburgo e Dundee o zone fertili come le Lowlands di Aberdeen e Angus rispetto come lo sarebbe stata nei secoli seguenti. La società

era suddivisa in aree abitate da comunità separate, legate internamente da forti tradizioni, e tutte accomunate da un generale stato di ruralità basata sulla produzione e distribuzione di pelli, carbone, lana, grano e lino. A livello urbano si vedeva un costante flusso migratorio nelle città, che portò centri come Edimburgo e Dundee a raggiungere rispettivamente 30.000 e 10.000 abitanti verso i primi anni del secolo, il doppio rispetto al primo 1600. Al confronto, un’ampia maggioranza di borghi a malapena superava i 1000 abitanti, anche se in alcune zone, come le rive del Forth, i villaggi nascevano e crescevano fino a formare delle reti urbane di notevole densità complessiva. Il sistema urbano, già dalla metà del secolo precedente, dipendeva molto dall’esportazione di limitate varietà di prodotto: granaglie e aringhe verso i mercati baltici, e abbondanti quantità di carbone (di cui, nel decennio 1680-90, erano cariche quasi metà delle navi che partivano dalla Scozia) per l’Olanda, l’Irlanda e Londra. Giacché tali esportazioni erano molto suscettibili alle fluttuazioni di domanda, in quel periodo l’economia scozzese era dominata da insicurezza, scarsa mobilità, poca iniziativa.

La devastante esperienza di Darién aveva lasciato lo stato più che mai povero, già privo di risorse materiali come prodotti dell’agricoltura o dell’allevamento, in intere regioni appena sufficienti per la sussistenza dei contadini. I “seven ill years”, periodo in cui il protezionismo francese e una congiuntura climatica che causò quattro anni di raccolto povero, avevano generato severi cali della popolazione, per morte o emigrazione. Masse di gente abituata a spostarsi di poche miglia, tra le fattorie dei loro proprietari o verso la città in cerca di opportunità, affrontavano ora spostamenti molto più ampi, diretti principalmente da una parrocchia all’altra per ricevere assistenza (che poteva venire per iniziativa degli abitanti, come successse a Edimburgo, o non venire concessa a causa dell’elevato numero di poveri già presente, come avvenne a Glasgow). Vi fu inoltre una forte corrente di emigrazione all’estero, verso Inghilterra, America e Ulster, alla ricerca di opportunità lavorative e per sfuggire alla crisi economica e alimentare. La mancanza di un efficace sistema di scambi commerciali e culturali con l’estero aveva portato a una scarsa diffusione della

---

conoscenza e a un avanzare molto lento delle abilità tecniche, indispensabili per sviluppare competenze in campo militare o meccanico. Di fronte a tutto ciò si era posta a William la questione se muovere guerra alla Scozia allo scopo di conquistarla o proporre uno schema di unione, dove la prima ipotesi avrebbe avuto delle implicazioni capaci di rendere lo scenario ancora più incerto e difficoltoso: non solo la Scozia non sarebbe stata capace di resistere, rendendo quindi gli investimenti militari largamente inutili, ma non si sarebbero risolti problemi chiave, come la successione al trono. Quando gli ultimi eredi di William, il giovanissimo duca di Gloucester e l’ultima dei diciotto figli di Anne, morirono prematuramente, il regno si trovò senza un diretto discendente della corona. Con il prospetto che Anne avrebbe lasciato l’Inghilterra senza un erede, il parlamento londinese temette che il trono sarebbe passato al parente più prossimo, il cattolico esiliato James Edward Stuart, figlio di James VII e II, già “legittimato” dal re di Francia Louis XIV. Senza informare gli scozzesi della decisione, il parlamento inglese passò, nel 1701, un “Act of Settlement” che individuava come successore di Anne l’anziana Sophia, Electress of Hanover, erede di un casato protestante e nipote di James I, ignorando il diritto che il parlamento scozzese aveva preteso nel 1689 riguardo la determinazione di un successore al trono. Quando William morì l’8 marzo 1702, la corona passò alla cognata Anne. I cambiamenti alla costituzione seguiti alla Glorious Revolution, avevano sancito l’abolizione della “Commission of Articles” e dato vigore all’indipendenza del parlamento scozzese. Per questa ragione, oltre all’avversione contro gli inglesi per il trattamento subito dalla Company of Scotland e la stagnazione dell’economia, la Scozia fu un difficile interlocutore nelle prime discussioni riguardo una possibile unione dei due regni. L’occasione per aprire i negoziati arrivò durante una sessione aperta il 9 giugno 1702, senza rispettare un atto del 1696 che prevedeva la sua apertura entro 20 giorni dalla morte del re. La supposta illegalità della seduta, che spinse 74 membri ad abbandonare la camera, permise a James Douglas, duca di Queensberry e rappresentante della Corona nel parlamento scozzese (con il titolo di “High Commissioner to the Parliament of Scotland”), di ottenere consensi sufficienti per nominare dei commissari per trattare con l’Inghilterra.
2.2: Prime trattative con l'Inghilterra

Delle prime consultazioni iniziarono nel novembre 1702 nel Cockpit, a Whitehall. Furono raggiunti comuni accordi su temi quali il libero commercio tra i due regni (incluso il territorio coloniale inglese), l’impegno condiviso che le tasse sulle importazioni e le esportazioni fossero uguali in Inghilterra e in Scozia, e l’abolizione dei “Navigation Acts” (che limitavano la portata del carico nelle navi inglesi, allo scopo di limitare l’utilizzo di vascelli ausiliari in campo commerciale per averli, così, pronti per ogni evenienza di tipo militare). Nel 1703 i punti in comune si estesero alla decisione di concedere del tempo alla Scozia per godere dei benefici dell’Unione prima di aumentare la tassazione interna allo stesso livello di quella inglese. Il punto su cui non si riuscì a trovare accordo e a proseguire con le trattative riguardava la Company of Scotland, a difesa dei privilegi della quale i commissari scozzesi si espressero, chiedendo inoltre un contributo per incoraggiare gli investimenti e la produzione agroindustriale. La cifra dichiarata degli investimenti totali nella Company, frutto di una stima arbitraria, fu £200,000.29 Per gli inglesi, che sostenevano che la coesistenza di due compagnie per il commercio coloniale si sarebbe rivelata svantaggiosa, la questione minò l’interesse per l’Unione: complice il fatto che i whigs, i riformisti, che avevano appoggiato William e le sue decisioni erano ormai una forza debole in confronto ai tories, i conservatori, poco interessati ad un’Unione con la Scozia presbiteriana, il 3 febbraio 1703 gli incontri furono aggiornati al 9 ottobre, ma non avvennero a causa della mancanza del numero minimo di commissari per proseguire.

Allo stallo nella trattativa corrispose uno stallo nella questione della successione al trono: in seguito alle elezioni generali tenute nel 1702, il 6 maggio 1703 emerse un corpo parlamentare fratturato, frammisto di molte forze differenti. Il duca di Queensberry guidò un governo di minoranza nel tentativo di assistere gli inglesi nella guerra contro la Francia ma trovò scarsa collaborazione in un ambiente fortemente opposto alle politiche inglesi e alle loro decisioni. Un ministero promosso nel 1704 da John Hay, secondo marchese di Tweeddale, causò il distacco della parte moderata dell’opposizione e la creazione, da parte dei

---


Riunitosi il 28 giugno 1705, il parlamento scozzese si attivò al riguardo solo il 23 luglio, su sollecitazione della regina Anne al nuovo Lord High Commissioner, il duca di Argyll, e fu raggiunto sufficiente supporto dallo Squadrone per riaprire i negoziati. La susseguente indecisione su chi avrebbe dovuto nominare i commissari – il parlamento, con il rischio di inviare dei sabotatori, o la regina – venne superata in favore della seconda quando il duca di Hamilton, uno dei più eminenti oppositori, si pronunciò in suo favore di fronte ai suoi attoniti colleghi, che immediatamente abbandonarono l’aula facendo passare la decisione con otto voti.

2.3: Il prezzo dell’Unione

I commissari inglese e scozzesi si ripresentarono a una nuova tornata di consultazioni al Cockpit di Whitehall il 22 aprile 1706. Tre giorni di consultazioni portate avanti per iscritto, in stanze separate, portarono all’accordo sulla successione della dinastia Hanoveriana e sull’accesso al comune mercato coloniale. Furono concordati vari elementi come la bandiera ufficiale, la Union Flag, le misure
base di lunghezza, peso e conio monetario, la preservazione di diritti privati, l’ereditarietà di uffici e giurisdizioni, il numero di parlamentari scozzesi a Westminster. In totale furono 25 gli articoli del Treaty of Union, che vennero ratificati da due atti separati di Westminster ed Edimburgo. Il 23 luglio 1706 gli articoli recanti i sigilli dei commissari furono presentati alla regina Anne a St. James’s Palace. Degli articoli, i primi quattro trattavano gli aspetti essenziali del trattato: “That the Two Kingdoms of Scotland and England, shall upon the 1st May next ensuing the date hereof, and forever after, be United into One Kingdom by the Name of GREAT BRITAIN”\(^{30}\); che, come previsto nell’Act of Settlement, vi fosse un erede protestante del casato di Hanover al trono; che vi fosse un solo, unito, parlamento della Gran Bretagna; e che ogni abitante avesse libertà di accesso e mercato all’interno del regno e delle sue colonie. Dal quinto al diciottesimo si trattavano gli aspetti commerciali, mobiliari, fiscali e regolamentari per fornire uguale trattamento a tutti i soggetti del regno (il sedicesimo prevedeva l’introduzione di una valuta comune e un apposito nuovo conio in Scozia). Dal diciannovesimo al ventiduesimo si davano delle garanzie per determinati elementi del sistema scozzese, nello specifico il sistema legale separato (19), gli uffici e le giurisdizioni ereditarie (20), i diritti dei royal burghs (21), la rappresentazione in parlamento di 16 Lords e 45 MPs (22). L’articolo 23 stabiliva parità di trattamento per i peers inglesi e scozzesi, il 24 la creazione di un nuovo Great Seal per la Gran Bretagna, il 25 l’invalidità di tutte le leggi in contrasto con gli articoli del trattato.

Il parlamento scozzese discusse gli articoli nella sessione iniziata il 3 ottobre 1706, sotto la responsabilità del duca di Queensberry. Per assicurare che nell’occasione tutti gli articoli del trattato passassero il vaglio del parlamento scozzese, il governo inglese approcciò i parlamentari scozzesi con tecniche che il professore di storia William Ferguson descrisse come promesse di onori e ricche pensioni, fino alla più conclamata forma di corruzione nella forma di £20,000 sterline (stimate £2.8m attuali) distribuite dal conte di Glasgow a Queensberry

(che da solo ricevette £12.325)\textsuperscript{31}, Ormiston, Cromarty, Tweeddale, Argyll e altri nobili. Le somme di denaro “convinsero” circa 100 dei 227 membri del parlamento dalla parte della regina di votare a favore dell’unione, e 25 voti aggiuntivi vennero dallo Squadron Volante. Il risultato non tardò a manifestarsi: il 14 gennaio 1707, il 25esimo e ultimo articolo del trattato era stato approvato.

Il prezzo dell’Unione constò certamente di questa “donazione” alle figure principali dell’establishment politico scozzese, ma nell’insieme del discorso economico di cui gli articoli dell’Unione trattarono esso non rappresentò minimamente la somma totale del denaro che la Scozia (o i suoi rappresentanti) ricevettero. Nonostante il fallimento del tentativo del 1702/1703, si erano venute a creare delle condizioni positive per un futuro accordo, come dimostrò la consultazione successiva del 1706. Un elemento la cui risoluzione era rimasta in sospeso era il preteso pagamento del valore della Company, su cui si era fondato il contrasto che aveva concluso infruttuosamente la prima sessione. L’accordo che fu preso al riguardo è riportato nel quindicesimo articolo:

\textit{Whereas by the Terms of this Treaty the Subjects of Scotland for preserving an Equality of Trade throughout the United Kingdom, will be lyable to severall Customs and Excises now payable in England, which will be applicable towards payment of the Debts of England, contracted before the Union;}

\textit{It is agreed, That Scotland shall have an Equivalent for what the Subjects thereof shall be so charged towards payment of the said Debts of England, in all particulars whatsoever, in manner followingviz.}

\textit{That before the Union of the said Kingdoms, the sum of £398,085 10s be granted to Her Majesty by the Parliament of England for the uses aftermentioned, being the Equivalent to be answered to Scotland for such parts of the saids Customs and Excises upon all Exciseable Liquors, with which that Kingdom is to be charged upon the Union, as will be applicable to the payment of the said Debts of England,}

according to the proportions which the present Customs in Scotland, being £30,000 per annum [...].  

L’*Equivalent* a cui il testo si riferisce era inizialmente inteso dagli scozzesi come un compenso per la maggiore tassazione a cui il paese sarebbe stato sottoposto in caso di parificazione con l’Inghilterra, le cui tasse erano molto maggiori, e a inizio 1703 aveva assunto la forma di compenso per tasse e fondo per investimenti nella pesca e la manifattura, emesso ratealmente. A fronte dell’importo suggerito dagli scozzesi di £10.000 annui, gli inglesi proposero nel 1706 un pagamento unico e immediato di £398,085 e 10 scellini[^33]. Il significato politico dell’entità della somma era legato al desiderio da parte degli alfieri inglesi dell’Unione di assicurare un supporto chiaro e solido da parte della Scozia in un momento in cui la guerra con la Francia stava iniziando a volgere per il meglio. A prescindere da ciò, il discorso economico non era meno prioritario né meno ragionato: L’*Equivalent* poteva essere descritto come un indennizzo per la Scozia in cambio dell’accettazione di un livello di tassazione più elevato e della responsabilità di contribuire in parte al pagamento del debito pubblico inglese alla Banca d’Inghilterra[^34]; parte sarebbe inoltre servita come risarcimento per gli investitori scozzesi che avevano subito perdite nello Schema di Darién.

Nel volume 25 del *Calendar of Treasury Books* è annotato che il 25 giugno 1706 una commissione mista considerava la somma

[as the immediate or present value of the contributions which the Customs and Excise in Scotland would make over a period of varying times towards the pre-Union English debts].[^35]

[^33]: Watt, *The Price of Scotland*, p.228
[^34]: Alla fine della *Nine Years War* (1688-97) con la Francia, il governo inglese contrasse un debito di £1.2 milioni con la *Bank of England* (pari alla totalità dei fondi d’investimento sottoscritti fino allora dai privati con essa) per l’acquisto di un *Royal Charter*. Quella cifra, mai ripagata, crebbe nel Debito Nazionale Britannico.
Lo stesso volume riporta che non venne chiaramente espresso il principio su cui il calcolo per trovare l’importo era basato, ma solo detto che era

"according to the proportion which the present Customs and Excises in Scotland do bear to the Customs and Excises in England".36

L’autore qui sostiene che i commissari abbandonarono i tassi delle accise (Excise rates) perché troppo complicati, e rapportarono quelli dei dazi (Custom rates) scozzesi con quelli inglesi (rispettivamente £30,000 e £1,341,559), individuando così un rapporto di 1 a 44.7. Questa proporzione venne applicata al totale dei debiti dell’Inghilterra, ammontante a £17,763,842 e 17s, e da ciò risultò la somma dell’Equivalent37.

Arbitraria che fosse la composizione degli elementi usati nel calcolo, l’unico requisito che sembrava dover rispettare era di essere “abbastanza” sia per gli scozzesi, sia per gli inglesi, pena il fallimento del Treaty. Ciononostante, prima della sua approvazione, l’Equivalent fu esaminato da vari esperti assunti per avvalorare la conformità dell’importo, tra cui Sir David Nairne, il matematico universitario David Gregory e l’imprenditore e bancario William Paterson; fu inoltre visionato da una commissione parlamentare che vedeva la presenza di numerosi direttori della Company of Scotland, e, infine, da un concilio di figure eminenti della Company stessa. Sebbene la posizione di questi ultimi sull’Equivalent fosse che la cifra non era adeguata e che si sarebbe dovuto pretendere di più al riguardo, i dibattiti interni sul futuro della compagnia e le voci su un’inchiiesta parlamentare riguardo una sua supposta cattiva gestione dei risparmi degli investitori spinsero i direttori a non cercare troppa visibilità. Il risultato fu che i loro interessi ricevettero molta meno considerazione di quelli dei numerosi influenti beneficiari dell’Equivalent, il cui beneplacito sarebbe stato elemento chiave della riuscita del Treaty: nell’Act concerning the Publick Debts del 25 marzo 1707 erano riportati, in ordine, chi aveva subito perdite a causa del nuovo conio, gli investitori e creditori

36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
della Company (ai quali andarono i 2/3 della somma), l’industria della lana (a cui fu assegnato un sussidio di £2.000 annuali per sette anni), un numero non specificato di commissari che avevano partecipato ai negoziati e, infine, le liste civili e militari. In totale, il numero di scozzesi che ricevettero una parte della somma si attestò sui 4500, di cui 3000 investitori della Company of Scotland, 1500 delle liste militari e civili, più 200 membri dell’élite parlamentare. Data la grande maggioranza di presbiteriani tra gli intestatari del pagamento, si può assere che l’*Equivalent* rinforzò la fronda religiosa maggioritaria a svantaggio di episcopaliani e Giacobiti, creando nuove crepe nel corpo politico nazionale.

2.4: Motivazioni e implicazioni della firma del *Treaty of Union*

Nel 1707 avvenne in forma ufficiale l’unione di Inghilterra e Scozia. L’evento fu, in retrospettiva, più conseguenza di necessità politiche che di effettiva coesione sociale: si veniva difatti a rinsaldare un rapporto d’interdipendenza che, nella pratica, già da tempo esisteva. Entrambe le nazioni misero da parte la propria individualità per potersi aprire a nuove sfide e possibilità nel mondo, forti del supporto politico, militare ed economico che a vicenda si potevano offrire. Gli Inglesi avrebbero così ottenuto la sicurezza che non più gli avversari d’oltremanica avrebbero potuto usare la Scozia come base per attaccarli, mentre alla Scozia sarebbe stato accordato di mantenere il suo sistema legale e la Chiesa presbiteriana, più, a titolo di rappresentanza nel parlamento di Westminster, 45 seggi nella House of Commons e 16 nella House of Lords. Nell’atto fu proclamato che vi sarebbe stato “one United Kingdom by the name of Great Britain”, dotato di un re protestante, una legislatura unificata e un sistema di libero scambio. Il 28 aprile il Privy Council proclamò formalmente lo scioglimento del parlamento scozzese. James Ogilvy, Lord Chancellor e primo duca di Seafield, la dichiarò nell’occasione “an end of an auld sang”.

Che l’evento in questione e il periodo di transizione seguitogli abbiano presentato grandi difficoltà e siano stati per tutta la loro durata oggetto di forti

voci di dissenso e protesta non è cosa di cui dubitare; è invece ben più grande motivo di dibattito ciò che spinse la classe politica scozzese a votare nell’inverno tra il 1706 e il 1707 un trattato che, di fatto, scioglieva il loro parlamento e consegnava la sovranità nazionale a Westminster in cambio di una rappresentanza che in termini strettamente demografici era assolutamente riduttiva: al tempo delle prime elezioni la Scozia contava un milione di abitanti contro i cinque milioni di Inghilterra e Galles, per una quantità di seggi che non superavano il 10% in entrambe le camere; scelta controbilanciata dal fatto che l’unione non era basata su criteri proporzionali, quanto su potere economico e politico (che, in seguito a Darién, la Scozia possedeva in misura ben scarsa rispetto all’Inghilterra); inoltre, a differenza dei peers Inglesi, nominati con solo requisito il possesso del titolo nobiliare, i peers scozzesi accedevano alla camera dei Lords solo in funzione di un severo vaglio governativo, che nel periodo delle consultazioni fu usato per escludere dalla selezione ognuno che mostrasse tendenze indipendentiste. Le problematiche di rappresentanza non finiscono qui, poiché anche la selezione dei Commons, che prevedeva l’istituzione di trenta constituencies nelle contee e quindici nei royal burghs, fu sospettata di essere stata sottoposta per decenni a casi di corruzione a supporto degli interessi delle corporazioni mercantili. Ciò descritto poc’anzi, unito a un sistema in vigore da prima dell’unione che limitava significativamente il numero degli aventi diritto al voto, dipinge un quadro fosco su quanto i rappresentanti parlamentari fossero effettiva voce degli interessi del popolo scozzese40. Alla fine del diciassettesimo secolo, la considerazione popolare nei confronti della politica e dei suoi ministri era a un livello molto basso: l’intera gestione del disastro di Darién e, in particolare, l’incapacità di farsi concedere da re William la legittimazione della fondazione della colonia avevano reso i membri del governo scozzese invisi agli occhi della gente41. Tenendo in considerazione ciò, l’Unione non poteva essere vista altrimenti che come un ennesimo atto di debolezza, stavolta tanto profonda da sfiorare il tradimento. La grama convinzione dei critici più severi era che l’evento rappresentava il trionfo dell’Inghilterra che,

con l’arma della corruzione politica, “conquistava”, di fatto, l’avversario storico in un momento in cui quest’ultimo poteva offrire pochissima resistenza, mentre per la Scozia era una sconfitta, un’umiliazione subita da tutta la nazione. Quasi un secolo dopo, il poeta Robert Burns scrisse:

1.
Fareweel to a’ our Scottish fame,
   Fareweel our ancient glory!
Fareweel ev’n to the Scottish name.
   Sae famed in martial story!
Now Sark rins over Salway sands,
   An’ Tweed rins to the ocean,
to mark where England ’s province stands --
   Such a parcel of rogues in a nation!

2.
What force or guile could not subdue
   Thro’ many warlike ages
Is wrought now by a coward few
   For hireling traitor’s wages.
The English steel we could disdain,
   Secure in valour’s station;
But English gold has been our bane --
   Such a parcel of rogues in a nation!

3.
O, would, or I had seen the day
   That Treason thus could sell us,
My auld grey head had lien in clay
   Wi’ Bruce and loyal Wallace!
But pith and power, till my last hour
   I’ll mak this declaration: -
’We’re bought and sold for English gold’--
   Such a parcel of rogues in a nation!42

“We’re bought and sold for English gold”, riferito ai ministri del parlamento, non lascia molto spazio all’interpretazione nei confronti di coloro che, agli occhi di molti, non cercavano il bene della nazione, quanto il modo di guidare e alterare la situazione politica allo scopo di arricchire loro stessi, forti della loro privilegiata posizione. Bisogna osservare tuttavia che nel parlare dei responsabili del trattato d’unione si stanno indicando dei gruppi specifici tra i politici scozzesi, a partire dai membri della commissione incaricata di redigere il testo, scelti in virtù del loro supporto al piano unificatore della regina Anne, per proseguire con i nobili e i corporati, ai quali le condizioni di rinnovamento della struttura amministrativa garantivano accesso al denaro, nella forma di mercati inglesi, fonte sicura di promettenti affari, e di “compensi” diretti ai grossi investitori che avevano subito ingenti perdite di capitale a seguito del disastro di Darién. Non è esagerato pensare che simili prospetti siano stati più che sufficienti per spingere costoro a farsi firmatari della cessione dell’indipendenza della loro nazione, a prescindere da quanto svantaggiosi si sarebbero dimostrati altri elementi del trattato, come la riforma per il peggio del già malfunzionante sistema elettorale e la mancanza di garanzie sul futuro della Chiesa (kirk) scozzese che aveva gettato nel dubbio i presbiteriani. Vi fu una forte opposizione politica a tutto questo processo: il whig radicale Andrew Fletcher di Saltoun, già una delle principali voci anti-unioniste nei dibattiti che avevano seguito l’elezione generale del 1702, condannò in particolare modo la tassazione destinata a finanziare le guerre inglesi nel continente, in cui la Scozia avrebbe altrimenti intrattenuto scambi commerciali. Un altro soggetto d’importanza chiave in tutta la questione erano i cavaliers, parlamentari giacobiti che si erano espressi con tutte le proprie forze contro un qualunque accordo con l’Inghilterra riguardo la successione, e che fecero un’opposizione tanto feroce all’assunzione al trono di Sophia di Hanover e tutto ciò ad esso collegato (l’Unione fra tutte) da venire considerati tra gli autori delle più forti condanne per il “tradimento” perpetrato alla nazione scozzese. Infine, nel periodo successivo alla firma e applicazione del trattato, occorsero delle sommosse popolari nelle strade delle città di tutto il paese, con una concentrazione particolare a Glasgow. La difesa dell’indipendenza e la memoria troppo chiara dei disagi patiti sotto Oliver Cromwell pochi decenni prima spinsero migliaia di persone a manifestare il
proprio dissenso contro un patto stretto con l’"infido" inglese in cambio di grandi promesse di ricchezza che nessuno ancora aveva visto materializzarsi, come sarebbe stato per molti anni a venire.

Ridurre tutto l’ambiente politico a una situazione binaria di rivalità tra fazioni sarebbe però improprio, innanzitutto perché così facendo verrebbero ignore le ragioni per cui l’unione fu considerata una possibilità vantaggiosa, e sotto alcuni aspetti, necessaria, per intere categorie sociali o addirittura per tutta la Scozia. Le correnti di unionismo, esistite sin da prima dei tempi di James VI, avevano attraversato momenti di grande difficoltà durante l’epoca della conquista di Cromwell. I Covenanters erano rimasti i soli a supportare con continuità l’idea di un solo paese retto da un’unica monarchia presbiteriana; l’idea era riemersa sotto premesse differenti come progetto dei Royalists tra il 1668 e il 1670, e, in seguito, come obiettivo politico più diffuso durante e dopo la rivoluzione del 1689, anche se distorto in più punti dall’onda di anglofobia seguita a Darién.

Quando la Scozia giunse, prostrata, alle porte del diciottesimo secolo, molti erano coloro tra politici, nobili, affaristi e uomini di cultura che vedevano nell’Unione una concreta possibilità per aprire un futuro più prospero al paese. Alcuni guardavano alle innovazioni economiche dell’Olanda liberale, o alle infinite possibilità delle reti di commercio marittimo che s’interseccavano tra i mari sui cui si affacciava l’Europa. La Scozia era stata il porto di grandi spedizioni e fortunate esperienze per singoli imprenditori, ma anche un paese la cui scarsissima influenza nel panorama economico mondiale limitava pesantemente le potenzialità delle loro imprese commerciali. In uno scenario dove il dominio degli affari e della produzione apparteneva alle potenze nazionali nella misura della quantità di capitale finanziario, conoscenze tecniche e flotta navale di cui disponevano, la Scozia avrebbe avuto bisogno di una forte iniezione di liquidità per essere minimamente competitiva, mentre allo stato attuale era vulnerabile agli attacchi nemici e priva di un piano di breve periodo per recuperare competitività. Contare sull’aiuto dell’Inghilterra significava avere il supporto della Royal Navy per poter condurre le transazioni commerciali senza temere attacchi dalla marina francese o altri possibili avversari - ciò, specialmente durante gli anni della “Seven Years War” (1756-63), si dimostrò una tattica vitale per sopravvivere agli attacchi delle navi.
corsare nelle acque inglesi. Già dai primi anni del diciottesimo secolo la Scozia stava allargando il suo inizialmente piccolo mercato in Inghilterra (bestiame, carbone, lino, sale e grano) e nella comunità scozzese emigrata in Ulster. La produzione di lino, in particolare, avrebbe trainato l’economia scozzese per buona parte del diciottesimo secolo, raggiungendo 650.000 ells<sup>43</sup> inviati a Londra all’inizio del secolo. L’agricoltura di sussistenza, ancora dominante in molte aree del paese, constava perlopiù di piccole tenute di 20-30 acri, il cui prodotto era sufficiente per il sostentamento degli abitanti, ma troppo scarso per essere venduto sul mercato. Le varie crisi succedutesi, tra cui gli “ill years” e le perdite finanziarie a seguito di Darién, avevano dato al sistema agricolo ed economico scozzese delle fondazioni poco stabili, che, in un inevitabile confronto con l’Inghilterra, dimostravano una volta in più la povertà da cui la Scozia partiva: in media, un carpentiere guadagnava il 50% del corrispondente inglese<sup>44</sup>, e l’industria in generale non raggiungeva un terzo del guadagno di quella inglese<sup>45</sup>. Si trattava, in sostanza, di comparare un sistema di produzione manifatturiera, specialmente tessile, dalle fortune oscillanti con il sistema industriale più avanzato d’Europa. La Scozia si apprestava a diventare un fornitore per l’Inghilterra: di cibo, materie prime e lavoro a basso costo. Un possibile preludio ad un’assimilazione, che avrebbe visto l’Inghilterra fagocitare l’economicamente debole Scozia quale suo satellite, elemento periferico, colonia.

I politici scozzesi che si presentarono all’incontro per redigere il trattato si trovavano a dover decidere il destino di un paese dal cui ventaglio di possibilità era necessario escludere le due estreme (indipendenza o totale assimilazione), e scegliere cosa invece avrebbe potuto portare più vantaggio alla nazione. L’alterazione di un equilibrio ormai compromesso era necessaria, ma avrebbe presentato numerose difficoltà. Vi erano state varie proposte, alcune non considerate come la creazione di uno stato confederale con una costituzione

---

<sup>43</sup> 1 ell = 94cm  
<sup>45</sup> Ibid.
rinnovata46, altre invece ultimamente accettate, come la garanzia di protezione di determinate istituzioni come la Chiesa e il sistema legale47. La classe politica scozzese fu ideale emblema di una nazione ideologicamente frammentata: definire semplicemente “scozzesi” un popolo che nel primo decennio del diciottesimo secolo era soggetto a divisioni politiche e sociali (delle quali la separazione tra unionisti e oppositori era la più grande, sebbene non l’unica) è una generalizzazione. Al tempo dell’incoronazione di Anne, il parlamento scozzese era diviso in due gruppi principali, il “Court Party” e il “Country Party” (William Ferguson, professore di storia all’Università di Edimburgo, notò che, a causa della scarsa frequenza di elezioni generali in Scozia, non si poteva parlare di partiti in senso stretto, quanto di gruppi che si riconoscevano nelle proprie idee e le portavano avanti in maniera organizzata)48.

Il Court Party rappresentava l’insieme degli interessi dei magnati e del patrocinio londinese, i cui membri erano prevalentemente whigs e sostenitori della

46 Per contrastare la possibilità di un’Unione a totale vantaggio dell’Inghilterra, numerose furono le proposte avanzate: il whig Andrew Fletcher propose delle “Limitations”, garanzie sulla preservazione di un parlamento scozzese, di un esercito e di un potere giudiziario indipendenti; George Ridpath cercò di presentare le “Limitations” come un’estensione dell’interpretazione dei whigs presbiteriani dell’antica costituzione scozzese, mentre James Hodges propose la creazione di stati confederati ispirandosi all’Olanda, la Svizzera, la Polonia e l’antica Grecia. Argomentazioni contrarie a queste visioni constavano nel fatto che avrebbero richiesto radicali riforme istituzionali, e che un simile sistema avrebbe finito con il favorire Londra molto più di chiunque altro, dato che la sua centralità commerciale avrebbe assorbito la ricchezza di entrambi gli stati.

47 La Scozia possedette sino alla fine del diciottesimo secolo un sistema legale di Civil Law di derivazione romana, espanso e approfondito da studiosi di legge scozzesi educati per secoli nelle università dell’Europa continentale (da qui la similarità con i sistemi lì in funzione). Le differenze con il sistema legale inglese vennero a sfumare nel tempo, cominciando con il sistema di legge commerciale che, per venire incontro alle esigenze mercantiliste in Scozia, importò per via parlamentare, ora facilmente, ora con certe difficoltà, norme e principi inglesi nel sistema legale scozzese. Nonostante l’avvento di regole condivise per vari settori (tra cui scambio di merci, tassazione, lavoro e sicurezza sociale), importanti distinzioni rimasero salde, tra cui la composizione delle corti, la procedura civile e penale, e il sistema di suddivisione della terra.

Glorious Revolution, garanti del potere della Corona che consideravano il ruolo dei ministri solo la protesi esecutiva del potere sovrano (in apparente contraddizione con i principi della Revolution); il Country Party, dal canto suo, fungeva essenzialmente da imbuto per tutte le forze dissidenti nei confronti della corruzione dei ministri, e, in quanto tale, era un gruppo molto meno coeso, nel quale militarono alternativamente riformisti costituzionali radicali, investorì in grande debito di capitale in seguito a Darién, presbiteriani che temevano un cambiamento per il peggio a favore degli episcopali e dei Giacobiti alla ricerca di sabotare qualunque relazione internazionale andasse a svantaggio del “Pretender” James Edward Stuart. Il Country Party agì unitariamente in poche occasioni, spesso mossi da comuni avversari, come il commissario parlamentare Queensberry, che fu deposto nella sessione del 1703, o spinte ideologiche, come la paura che il parlamento scozzese perdesse ogni sua prerogativa e diventasse un semplice apparato del comando inglese, non diversamente da quello irlandese.

Il fatto che la natura del Country Party fosse così volatile che certi suoi membri come i Giacobiti figurassero ora tra le fila del gruppo ora tra quelle del Court Party è rispecchiato nell’elemento religioso, che nel nostro discorso assume un carattere di parametro culturale e ideologico, e complica ulteriormente il panorama politico: numerosi parlamentari che accettavano o supportavano l’unione erano moderati, mentre anti-unionisti erano quella parte di oppositori politici e di opinione pubblica che rispondevano ai dettami delle voci più forti del fratturato panorama religioso scozzese, i Covenanters presbiteriani e i Giacobiti episcopali. Al riguardo bisogna fare un breve approfondimento: il voto che portò al Treaty of Union ebbe come ispirazione la Glorious Revolution del 1688-9, e il conseguente desiderio di impedire il ritorno al potere dei cattolici Stuarts e della Chiesa episcopaliana (rimossa a favore della Chiesa presbiteriana). Ciò getta sotto una nuova luce gli interessi di chi supportò e ostacolò l’Unione: i moderati unionisti (presbiteriani ed episcopali) diedero priorità all’importanza di proteggere il protestantesimo dalla minaccia del cattolicesimo francese, i presbiteriani furono disposti a retrocedere sugli obiettivi della “Solemn League and Covenant” (tesi a procedere con forza nel riformare secondo linee presbiteriane l’Inghilterra), e gli episcopali a rifiutare il giacobinismo come
soluzione, e ad accettare piuttosto un’incorporazione con l’Inghilterra per poter assicurare la propria conservazione. Agli occhi dei moderati, l’Unione rappresentava un piccolo sacrificio che, avessero le cose funzionato, avrebbe ripagato garantendo un rafforzamento della cultura religiosa esistente al costo di qualche accettabile modifica, mentre gli anti-unionisti guidavano e organizzavano moti di protesta che, grazie alla pubblicazione e distribuzione massificata di opuscoli propagandistici, raccoglievano quantità considerevoli di seguaci e partecipanti. La pubblicità a mezzo stampa fu il mezzo principale con cui le posizioni dei partiti e dei predicatori extra-parlamentari avevano trovato diffusione, e con cui varie opinioni popolari (indispensabili, secondo il Country party, per una corretta ratifica del trattato) erano state raccolte. Gli estremisti presbiteriani e i whigs radicali avevano fatto della propaganda un potente mezzo di persuasione dell’opinione pubblica, sfruttandolo al punto da rendere necessario l’intervento di eminenti scrittori dell’epoca come Daniel Defoe per fornire pubblicazioni che argomentassero i pregi di un’unione e avvertissero contro il pericolo dell’estremismo radicale49. Al lavoro di Defoe si aggiunsero l’Essay upon the Union50 e le Considerations upon the union of the two kingdoms51, che prefiguravano la creazione di un Parlamento generale che trattasse di questioni comuni come diplomazia, commercio ed economia finanziaria, di un parlamento scozzese che gestisse gli affari locali, e la preservazione delle Chiese separate allo scopo di non forzare la maggioranza presbiteriana a scomodi compromessi (posizioni scettiche nei confronti dell’opzione di un incorporamento totale).

Stretta fra i contrastanti messaggi della stampa pro e contro l’Unione nelle sue varie sfumature, buona parte della popolazione si vedeva nella possibilità di essere rappresentata, sebbene in maniera limitata, attraverso petition pubbliche. Quasi tutte erano di protesta, mentre le poche intraprese a favore del Treaty videro la gente aderire più per paura di rappresaglie da parte degli inglesi, la diffidenza nei confronti dei quali faceva temere un possibile rinnovamento dell’“Aliens Act” del 1705, una nuova guerra di conquista (idea rinforzata dalle notizie pubblicate e

50 Trattato attribuito a James Hodges, pubblicato a Edimburgo nel 1706.
51 Opera di George Ridpath, pubblicata a Edimburgo nel 1706.
diffuse nel triennio 1705-1707), e la fomentazione di disordini civili in Scozia. L’intervento militare inglese e la formazione di una forza di opposizione grande abbastanza da fare pressione sul Parlamento si rivelarono tuttavia due ostacoli inesistenti. Il primo semplicemente non si manifestò, nonostante il pattugliamento dei confini inglesi da parte delle armate reali negli ultimi mesi del 1706 rischiò di venire interpretato diversamente dallo scopo dichiarato di difendere il corretto funzionamento del Parlamento dai sediziosi. Il secondo venne attuato, ma non riuscì a destabilizzare la sessione parlamentare del 1706-7 a causa delle inconciliabili differenze che separavano i promotori: le similitudini tra i Covenanters e i Giacobiti si limitavano infatti ad un generico patriottismo nazionalistico e alla condanna di specifiche misure adottate nel Treaty of Union (come il numero di seggi concessi agli scozzesi a Westminster), mentre le differenze andavano dal profilo nazionale che la Scozia avrebbe dovuto assumere in alternativa all'Unione agli interessi dei nobili posti a capo delle fazioni. Per i Covenanters era inconcepibile sostituire il Parlamento scozzese con uno britannico dove sedessero vescovi inglesi, e dove gli anglicani avessero una maggioranza netta. Oltre ai cattolici francesi, i Covenanters vedevano un nemico anche negli anglicani inglesi, possibili responsabili d’interventi intrusivi nella chiesa presbiteriana o concessioni agli episcopaliani. Altra argomentazione era che una posizione meno che intollerante nei confronti degli episcopaliani avrebbe incoraggiato il giacobinismo, e ultimamente affossato i valori e i traguardi della Revolution anziché preservarli. Dal canto loro, i Giacobiti ambivano a un regno episcopaliano in cui regnasse la dinastia degli Stuart, trovandosi così in contraddizione con gli ideali dei propri “alleati”. Nelle assemblee pubbliche le opposizioni facevano leva sul risentimento popolare, attingendo al mito nazionale di resistenza all'invasore, onore dei propri guerrieri e antichissima tradizione regale. Nel tardo 1706, con l’avvicinarsi di una concreta forma per il Treaty, Covenanters e Giacobiti giunsero ad abbandonare temporaneamente i propri obiettivi religiosi più particolari per agire come un solo gruppo nelle ultime campagne di petizioni e dimostrazioni antigovernative ad anticipare il voto finale del 1707. Le loro iniziative cedettero però all’apparentemente insanabile inconciliabilità di vedute dei due gruppi a livello politico quando il supporto del
duca di Hamilton, leader del Country Party, si rivelò insufficiente a dare un'impronta forte al movimento di fronte alla Regina e ai ministri. L'organizzazione di marce armate di protesta a Edimburgo e un'uscita pianificata dei deputati dalle aule del Parlamento (che Hamilton all'ultimo decise di non guidare prima che iniziassero le discussioni sulla successione degli Hanover) finirono con un nulla di fatto, sia per i Covenanters (nonostante la maggioranza delle frange presbiteriane più moderate avesse già, entro il periodo finale delle consultazioni, espresso cauta fiducia per l'esito) sia per i Giacobiti. Questi ultimi non entrarono mai in alcun processo di mediazione o pacificazione. Negli anni successivi, si sarebbero organizzati per sferrare attacchi militari lungo la Scozia e l'Inghilterra, forti del ritorno in patria del Pretender, James Edward Stuart.
CHAPTER III: Scotland after the Union (1707-1800)

3.1: Growing Pains

The Union was a difficult experience in its first decade: the problems concerning electoral representation and the trend of Anglophobia, reinforced by the various anti-unionist groups’ publications and initiatives, ensured the Treaty’s unpopularity from the very start. In addition, disillusion regarding the strong economic depression, which had not swiftly inverted its course as hoped, mounted up. Those with such expectations were investors who, probably too optimistically, were wishing for a fast recovery with the cash inflow coming from England. The problem Scotland had to face was that it was at a different stage of economic development from England. The textile industry was Scotland’s finest, but the country’s weak economy had left it vulnerable, incapable of competing with English industry, which was already the most advanced in Europe, and Scotland had was additionally burdened by increases in the linen duties in 1711 and 1715)\(^5^2\). The colonial ventures were not a wealthy business either: they were mostly small private initiatives, limited in scope, which would bring no gain to share.

When, in 1708, the Parliament abolished the Privy Council, the last executive bastion of Scottish independence, the issue concerning which entity would be entrusted with the administrative management of Scotland emerged. Provisions such as the introduction of Anglicanism in 1709, the official recognition of the Episcopalian’s rights via a “Toleration Act” in 1712, the Patronage Act and a succession of taxes on exported goods (including a widely despised Malt Tax in 1713) stirred up popular revolts which extended to Stirling, where petitions were organized against the “Insupportable burden of Taxation (which) all the grant of freedome of Trade will never Counterballance”\(^5^3\), and to the Parliament, where the

---


Scottish peers collectively seconded a motion of refusal of the Treaty which missed approval by 14 votes.

Industrial entrepreneurs feared the possibility of having their internal market (which absorbed 100% of the internal salt production, and twice the quantity of coal than what was exported) invaded, or even overpowered, by English imports, due to the abolition of the protective tariffs the Scottish had to comply with as regulated in the Treaty. United with an aggressive state, whose government invested an estimated 75-80% of the national wealth in military expenses or to cover debts contracted during previous conflicts, Scotland was afraid to come under strong fiscal pressure to pay for the military and economic expansion of England. Although Westminster had specifically aimed for a condescending fiscal policy during the first post-Union decades, the introduction of salt and linen taxes in 1711 and the malt tax of 1725 were regarded as politically aggressive breaches of the Treaty. Two consequences were smuggling and evasion on one hand, and direct confrontation on the other. The latter case was more of a small, albeit continuous, “low-level disturbance”, which found notable expression in the Malt Tax Riots which took place in Glasgow and Hamilton in June 1725, and the Porteous Riot which occurred in Edinburgh’s Grassmarket in April 1736. It was later estimated that the amount of money which actually left Scotland did not go beyond 15-20% of tax revenues in the fifty years after the Union. The riots in Glasgow did not end without important political consequences: a Board of Trustees for Manufactures and Fisheries was founded in 1727 in order to optimize the administration of the Equivalent-based revenue, which was meant to be invested for economic development.

While small-scale social turmoil did partially symbolize Scotland’s uneasiness within the Union, constant political unrest was no less of an indicator:

57 Ibid.
58 Devine T.M., *Exploring the Scottish Past*, p.43
59 Ibid. p.44
the British Walpole government had adopted a generally (but not completely, as seen above) indifferent attitude towards Scottish affairs, in order to promote governmental stability and to contrast Anglo-Scottish conflict, which was finding expression in Jacobite support. Such policy did not stop numerous illustrious Scotsmen from reaching for the young pretender James Edward Stuart in France, to show him that, should he return to his dynasty’s homeland, he could count on an army of backup supporters. Bringing the Stuarts back to the throne was a plan born out of discontent for the Union, whose reverberations included residual loyalty to the monarchs of old, economic concern in the Lowlands, a culture of pure-Scottish patriotism opposed to a rule which was British in name but English in substance. Jacobite restoration would have meant restoring an exiled, Catholic monarchy over a Protestant one, to the advantage of the strongest group of followers, the Episcopalian clans and the small Catholic communities of the Highlands. For the others to accept it, James’ return would have to be imposed through military force, with the help of no one else than France, Britain’s greatest enemy. Even though part of the Scottish people wished for the return of the Stuarts, the majority deemed their reinstatement inconceivable, especially considering the civil war that would almost surely have followed, and which France would use to its advantage. Starting with the French King’s blessing, James’ first expedition met insurmountable obstacles in the rough weather, which forced his French fleet to disembark in Dunkirk in the March of 1708, too far from the prearranged point, too late to avoid preparations for a land and sea British counterattack which forced the French to retreat. His first foray garnered nonetheless intermittent but growing support from Scottish local nobles (whose strategic power in national affairs was waning), from Highland clans and North-eastern Episcopalians.

When Anne died in 1714 and George, a Lutheran with little knowledge of the English and Scottish world, became King of Great Britain in accordance with the Act of Settlement, new insurgency movements surfaced. One of these was a Jacobite rebellion led by the Earl of Mar, a previous pro-Unionist, who gathered

---

60 Jackson A., *The Two Unions*....., pp. 123-4
12,000 people in a short time with no help from the French, and embarked on a campaign which ended in a defeat in Sherifmuir in 1715. The first Jacobite expeditions had been neutralized by timely governmental actions, but had ignited many small insurrections from those who expected James’ return to be a true revolution. Yet, after Mar's failure, followed by a missed conquest of Newcastle, a capitulation in Preston and an ineffective series of pleas to the English counties, James had to retreat to France again. In July 1745, a period which saw most of the British army fighting in the Flanders and Germany, James Edward attempted a new invasion, starting from the Hebrides. With France’s support, he marched southward, gaining the backing of thousands of Highlanders, capturing Edinburgh and Carlisle, and defeating a small British force in Prestonpas. His objective was London, but he was forced to stop at Derby, where an attack led by the Duke of Cumberland and a slow but steady series of defections, which had been plaguing his undisciplined army, made him hesitate. The French fleet’s withdrawal from the Channel meant for him the need for new loyal followers, so he headed toward Scotland. The idea that his army could defeat a British force was an illusion which had lasted for long, but came to an abrupt end when, after a brutal British takeover of Carlisle, and a Jacobite victory at Falkirk against a cavalry put at a disadvantage by the terrain, a British counteroffensive commanded by Cumberland completely defeated James’ forces at Culloden Moor in the April of 1746. Thousands of Presbyterians welcomed with joy the special edition of the Glasgow Journal, which reported Cumberland's victory on the front page.

3.2: Managing Scotland the Scottish way

Political unity and stability in Scotland developed slowly and among many hindrances: the Hanoverians had support coming from the big cities of the south and the southeast and from the most powerful Highland clan of the time, the Campbells of Argyll, but the actual administration of Scotland was not regulated with any degree of interest by Westminster. The absence of a local Parliament

---

<http://www.undiscoveredscotland.co.uk/usbiography/c/dukeofcumberland.html>
meant that the country had to resort to the political farsightedness of local magnates who had the power to exert it. Among those men, the most prominent were Archibald Campbell, Earl of Islay, and 3rd Duke of Argyll since 1743, and Henry Dundas, first Viscount Melville. Thanks to the power of his clan, Islay authored and managed an independent administrative system which found widespread implementation, and could easily reach in terms of economic and military influence every corner of the kingdom. Such system consisted in splitting political power into a network of selected recipients, chosen in an informal way, who would respond to Islay himself. His cosmopolitan upbringing and integration within the British political elite (a trait well exemplified by his friendship with the first minister Robert Walpole), made him extremely knowledgeable and influential regarding political developments in Britain. Islay promoted order in Scotland and Scots interest within the nation. From his residence in London, he shared correspondence with his great agent in Scotland, Lord Milton, to carry on his Scottish business. Milton arranged the appointment of Argathelians (from Argyll, the Campbell clan’s dukedom) as the heads of town councils, Church and other institutions. Thanks to Islay’s influence, in order to further and expedite Scottish economic progress, he founded the British Linen Company (to be later named the British Linen Bank) and the Commission for Annexed Forfeited Estates.

Islay’s system was described as a management aimed at invigorating the most promising businesses, such as fishing and linen, and maintaining a stable political order through encouragement of moderation in politics and religious offices. Conversely, the way it worked also greatly increased corruption and patronage, especially on the higher levels of political office: seemingly not by chance was Milton promoted to Ordinary Lord in the Court of Session in 1724, then to Lord justice Clerk in 1735; nor that Dundas was promoted Lord Advocate in 1775 under William Pitt the Younger as a patron. Similarly, after the Jacobite defeat in 1745, Scottish representatives in the Parliament were introduced to a vast dimension of British patronage networks, which allowed them to hold official

---

62 Devine T.M., *Exploring the Scottish Past*, p.44
63 Sher R.B., “Scotland Transformed” in Wormald (ed.), *Scotland. A History*, p.188
posts, sit in English constituencies, or be munificently granted with official pensions, salaries or supply contracts\textsuperscript{64}.

The successful inglobalation of Scottish members into the formerly English political elite was a phenomenon which found no correspondence among the lower strata of both the English and Scottish societies, and, as numerous cases testify, rather saw an initial hostility coming mainly from the English. When John Stuart, third Earl of Bute, was elected Prime Minister in 1762, his presence was welcomed as the realization of the possibility that Scots could ascent to such a position of responsibility; yet, such extension of the representativeness of Bute backfired in the light of too a manifest series of acts of favouritism and clientage. His brief office ended in 1763, under the attacks of the London press’ satire and populist English patriots such as John Wilkes, Charles Churchill, Horace Walpole and Samuel Johnson. The vocal and printed criticism extended to the entire Scottish nation, which was portrayed as “greedy mendicants, growing rich on England’s rich pastures”\textsuperscript{65} and “clannish, chauvinistic, and overly acquisitive”\textsuperscript{66}.

A lessening of ferocity in English satire more or less coincided with the American War of Independence, and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, when Scotland “gained” a place within the union to the detriment of the next in line, the Irish\textsuperscript{67}. After the fall of Bute, Scotland faced governmental instability (both internal and external, reflecting difficulties in the ministries in Westminster) from 1765 to 1780. It was Henry Dundas, an Edinburgh advocate, who rose to power with his nomination to Solicitor General in 1766, to Lord Advocate in 1775, and to Viscount Melville in 1802. Like Islay, Dundas could exert power with the help of a patron (William Pitt the Younger, Prime Minister from 1783 to 1801, then from 1804 to 1806) and through a network of loyal collaborators strategically sorted by his nephew Robert, Edinburgh manager.

Appointed First Lord of the Admiralty by Pitt in 1804, and impeached in 1806 under the suspicions of misappropriation of public money (ultimately acquitted), “King Harry”\textsuperscript{68} was the mastermind of a regime which controlled

\textsuperscript{64} Jackson A., \textit{The Two Unions (...)}, p.139
\textsuperscript{65} Devine T.M., \textit{Scotland and the Union, 1707 to 2007}, p.5
\textsuperscript{66} Sher R.B., “Scotland Transformed” in Wormald, pp.189-190
\textsuperscript{67} Jackson, \textit{The Two Unions (...)}, p.140
Scottish affairs from 1780 to 1806, ranging from Scottish peers to nominees in Church, court, the universities, boards and commissions\(^68\). With his death in 1811, came that of the “semi-independent” management system which Scotland was reliant upon for the entire 18\(^{th}\) century.

3.3: “Improvement”

The Jacobite campaigns had not gained London’s sympathy, but instead a perception that the basis of all their initiatives was Scotland, that British intervention had not struck deep enough and, as Oliver Cromwell had stated during his conquest, the only solution could be a to conduct more vigorously an extension of the English culture and laws. For Scotland, as Allan Ramsay’s portraits of Islay\(^69\) exemplify, the talk was about the exact opposite: to find establishment and legitimateness of Scottish culture (so that it could stand up to the English), and, at the same time, to achieve economic progress. “Improvement” and “transformation” were the keywords permeating the period following the first, difficult decades of the Union, encompassing all the rural and urban worlds.

3.3.1: Agricultural revolution

Not unlike many countries, agriculture was a sector where poverty was common. Scotland was plagued by a system of traditional and dated cultivation techniques applied to an unfertile land: only 10\% of the entire surface of the country was arable, and climate was uncongenial. Scarcity of production, which happened due to cycles of intensive growing of small areas in which all resources were concentrated, was dealt with slowly but drastically. Lord Kames, a lawyer and judge, published in 1777 a volume entitled *The Gentleman Farmer*, which he described as “an attempt to improve agriculture by subjecting it to the test of rational principles”\(^70\). This written contribution to the agricultural cause was joined by the intellectual work of the Honourable Society of Improvers and growing investments in the agricultural industry, which first concretized in the

\(^{68}\) Sher, “Scotland Transformed” in Wormald, p.190
\(^{69}\) Sher, “Scotland Transformed” in Wormald, p.191
\(^{70}\) Subtitle of the first and subsequent editions of *The Gentleman Farmer*. 
abolition or modification of old techniques like the “runrig”, which resulted in the exploitation of a much bigger percentage of the land. The demographic pressure, which absorbed most of the limited output of the sector, was the reason for the development of strategies to recover more resources and increase the efficiency of the existing ones, so that the resettlement of the population in urban areas would not correspond to essential goods being priced higher. The average price of cereals saw a 56% rise between 1725 and 1765, but people’s purchasing power was not irremediably affected (especially between 1760 and 1790, when various population brackets had their income significantly increased). The landowners were responsible for the process: they rented their properties to tenants, but had the legal power to influence their composition and operation at any time. By that, they would, conversely, guarantee them safeguard should debts or succession issues arise. The landowner-supervised reconversion of estates to host facilities for the extraction of salt and coal in the countryside, far from the rigid control of the city oligarchies, was regarded as the main cause for many historians putting agricultural innovation on the top of the list of the Scottish post-Union economic awakening\textsuperscript{71}.

Throughout the entire 18\textsuperscript{th} century, the prices of estates increased exponentially, with their proprietors entering a world of social competition that found expression in the creation or refurbishing of their properties into luxurious places, like the display of sumptuousness of Inverary, Mellerstain or Hopeton House demonstrated (and does now). The number of houses that underwent such treatment was more than 60 by the end of the century. Their interior design was no less subject to this philosophy: extremely refined and select furniture would fill the villas of the Scottish nobles, who enjoyed fast assimilation into the prestigious English aristocracy. The sum of refined tastes and trends which made up this world found their ideal raison d’être in the Illuminist philosophy as expressions of “improvement” of the human space and rightfulness of human intervention on nature.

\textsuperscript{71} Devine T.M., \textit{Exploring the Scottish Past}, p.17
Success in the tobacco, sugar and cotton trade was a key element in the agricultural revolution: especially in Glasgow, whose mercantile aristocracy acquired numerous estates in various counties, often for huge sums. Economists noticed that, among the various innovators in the period, merchants were the most willing to invest in any business which could lend to a profit, including their own estates’ reconversion to farmlands or industrial sites.

3.3.2: Urbanization and urban development

The agricultural phenomenon coincided with a migration to America so considerable as to evoke the fear of a dramatic drop of the Scottish population72. Yet, during the 18th century the Scottish saw a 50% increase of the population (from 1.100.000 to 1.625.000), especially in the country borders, in the fertile riverside valleys. The Highlands, which, along with the islands, were home to one third of the population by 1700, suffered strong out-migration. The Clan system was suffering a huge crisis caused by factors ranging from the decline of the Gaelic (which by 1765 still was the only language spoken by 25% of the Scots), to the Jacobite failures, to the modernizing initiatives of the government. In 1725 was proclaimed a Disarming Act that prohibited the Highlanders to carry weapons in public. That was decided in order to pacify the region as much as possible before the construction of a huge road and bridge network, so that the most important northern cities would be connected between themselves and the south, and the transportation of soldiers and goods would be easier. Westminster’s eyes were no longer blind to the Clan lords’ uses, command structures and prerogatives: hereditary jurisdictions, military land management, traditional vests and bagpipes were banished, but it was the Chiefs’ adoption of common commercial practices what demolished the pre-existing relationships among the various social strata, and what replaced them with a different distribution of properties and jobs which required far less middle-persons. That resulted in a mass southward migration of Highlanders, which generated a “urban Highlander” phenomenon and a considerable inflow of gaelic culture in the Lowlands. The urban world saw the

72 Sher R.B., “Scotland Tranformed” in Wormald, p.184
major demographic development: with migration towards the Lowlands rising (especially in the belt which included Edinburgh and Glasgow, a 15% of Scotland’s surface), 40% of the population settled in the Central Lowlands, to constantly grow in the following centuries.

Between 1750 and 1850, Scotland’s urban development was the fastest in Britain, and in entire Europe. The seven main cities (Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen, Dundee, Greenock, Paisley and Perth) had, by 1800, at least 10,000 people each. The apparently unrelenting expansion was well symbolized by Glasgow, which between 1800 and 1820 went from 80,000 inhabitants to 160,000. The greatest agent in the urban boom was the industrial and commercial development: to such premises as growing markets, access to the sea, coal and iron mines, low labour costs and renewed entrepreneurial mentality, there was a corresponding growing demand for food, raw materials and workers in order to sustain an increasing production, which involved every corner of the country, islands included. Whisky, wood, fishing and cattle markets flourished thanks to the concentration of the population in the big cities, the disaggregation of pre-existing territorial attributions and the Clan-based administration systems. Devine noticed in this process a passage, in the time of two generations, from tribalism to capitalism73.

3.3.3: New business ventures

The capital market started off at an apparently slow speed in the second quarter of the century: London’s larger business opportunities were an extremely captivating prospect for the Scots, who could now freely profit from a much more liquid market economy, from which no juggernaut like the Company of Scotland came into existence. Initiatives in the London markets, financed mainly through collaborations and small-scale trade, resurfaced in the Scottish world only in the 19th century, during the industrialization period. By the late 1800, the internal market had all the prerequisites for an expansion of industrial production. The greater demographic concentration in urban areas meant bigger numbers for the

traders and the professional workers, and for their wages. Scotland benefitted greatly from common trade, participating differently and, certainly, asymmetrically in the free movement of work and money. That was not because of the hardly quantifiable influx and outflux of capital (which, as Campbell reported, destabilized the Scottish balance of payments, notwithstanding the helping action of the successful trade with colonies74), but rather of the high mobility of workers, who would move within Scotland or to England, where their labour costs, much smaller than those of their English equivalents, would grant them an occupation.

Infrastructural development opened new routes for internal trade: three great channels were excavated (Forth and Clyde and Monlkand in 1790, Union in 1822) to facilitate fluvial transports, while roads and railways covered the land. Between 1780 and 1815, a sum between £2.5m and £3m was invested in roads and bridges, revolutionizing their otherwise primitive communication system. The Central Lowlands became the fulcrum of a network which would allow an exponentially higher exploitation of the Scottish geography. Despite coal not becoming a key resource until 1830, its use as fuel for steam-powered engines had it become a widely used energy source, alongside water mills.

The external markets, and especially the free trade area in Union territory, gave Scotland an extremely important outlet for linen (which was to give Scotland a strategic edge in terms of allocation of resources, manufacturing experience and business skills when the time came to switch to cotton, the primary product of the industrial revolution) and, most of all, for tobacco. The latter was, in the first twenty years of the Union, the most smuggled product in the entire Scottish trade economy. An illegal tobacco market had been thriving since long before, but it became common practice in light of the increases in taxation. The inefficiency of the custom system had, by 1720, the Clyde merchants paying only half the duties for their actual imported quantities of tobacco75. From 1740 on, the tobacco market saw a “golden age”: imports from Virginia, North Carolina and Maryland equalled to £8m, then £13m, then £21m in 1752. Linen found a bigger success in

75 Devine T.M., Scotland and the Union 1707-2007, p.100
the internal area, as two thirds of the product were bought in England and in the colonies on the other side of the ocean, also thanks to a series of subsidies from the government, which were activated in 1742-3.

Between 1770 and 1790 cotton replaced linen as the main manufacture, with imports from the Caribbean going from 2,700,000 lb in 1790 to 8,400,000 lb in 1805. Linen still enjoyed a solid offer, mainly from production sites in Perth, Fife and Angus: from 1760 to 1790 exports went from 1.85m yards to 6.99m, with America and the West Indies as the main recipients. After the tripling of the production volume between the 1773-5 and 1813-17 periods, exports increased to 44m yards in 1831, and to 79m in 1845. Throughout the entire 18th century, a solid export market reduced import expenses to Ireland levels. Industrial development owed much of its speed to the assimilation of technologies and experience from France, Netherlands, Ireland and, especially, England: a massive knowledge capital, flowed in from the South, gave the industry the ability to modernize and renovate itself up to the cutting edge of many sectors. Such a position gave decisive contributions to Scotland’s fame in the international cotton business, to the construction of blast furnaces (108 by 1867), and to the number of single inventions which exemplified the Scottish genius, among which there was James Watt’s separate-condenser for the steam engine76. The learning process which went to such advantage of the competitiveness of the Scottish products was not limited to the industrial dimension, but characterized in a wider, almost all-embracing way the nation’s path to social and economic prosperity: the autonomous management of the Education system, as regulated by the Treaty of Union, bred innovations like private funding for university professors by the students, which rewarded professionalism and competition for top level proficiency.

---
76 Conceived in 1763 and first prototyped in 1768, it allowed the steam to be condensed in a separate chamber, so that the continuous heating and cooling cycle of the cylinder of the previous Newcomen model was no longer necessary, and fuel efficiency was greatly improved. Source: "James Watt (1736-1819): Discoveries", Scottish Science Hall of Fame, National Library of Scotland. http://digital.nls.uk/scientists/biographies/james-watt/discoveries.html
3.4: The Scottish Enlightenment

The book trade was one of those sectors whose participants were being given increasing recognition and wealth, where interest in literary essays and the value given to literary property had local clients and Scottish publishing houses in London awarding considerable payments to the authors of the best publications. The first and general model for the business was Andrew Millar, a publisher who, from London, promoted the work of Scottish writers through stimulating orders, rich commissions, and collaborations with Edinburgh booksellers. Publications to become successful due to Millar’s activity included the philosopher and economist Adam Smith's first books, the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759, co-edited by Millar himself), and *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), which would bear his writer a fruit of £1,500 in fourteen years. Adam Smith's work stands among the greatest representations of the intellectual innovation fostered during the Scottish Enlightenment, the period of strong intellectual activity running from 1740 to 1800, in which the universities started a process of modernization aimed at developing skills in emergent subjects such as mathematics, medical science and law. Notable changes occurred in theology, whose chairs had been anchored to rigid and dogmatic Calvinistic conceptions, and in Philosophy, where, in 1729, was placed Francis Hutcheson, a liberal preacher regarded as father of the Scottish Enlightenment, and theorist of a conception of society in which happiness was the right and reward of those who worked for the common good. Hutcheson's preaching symbolized the current flowing through the scientific and literary fields of the Scottish intellectual landscape. Many scholars and thinkers contributed to the development of an internal knowledge, while finding space within a bigger British cultural life. Great opportunities came also from counter-thinkers such as David Hume, who was an opponent to Hutcheson and practical researcher on the nature of knowledge, scientific demonstration, the inner predispositions of humanity (basis of “the Science of Man”, a philosophical form of his creation) and the human mind as something bound to “experience.”

---

a philosopher of the human condition, who regarded morality as a human construct and excluded references to God in his reasoning method, his contribution extended to history, politics, and economic thought. He wrote an empirical argument against mercantilism, whose supporters followed an idea of economic prosperity based on the limitation on imports and the encouragement of exports in order to gather the maximum possible amount of gold in the home country. Hume’s opinion was that gold hoarding could not enhance wealth, as a bigger money supply would generate a rise in prices of goods in the country, causing a fall in exports and an increase in imports, a de-facto adjustment mechanism. This reasoning strongly influenced what, years later, would become his friend and fellow philosopher Adam Smith’s works on economics. Regarded as the father of liberal political economy, and one of the most famous and revolutionary moral philosophers and economists in the modern age, Smith (1723-1790) thoroughly represented the spirit of the Scottish Enlightenment: he received a cosmopolitan and multidisciplinary education, as demonstrated by his years as a professor of Logic and Moral Philosophy at the university of Glasgow, his travels to France, and his meetings with illustrious thinkers such as Samuel Johnson, Benjamin Franklin, Voltaire, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Francois Quesnay and Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot. In 1759 Smith published the Theory of Moral Sentiments, a work expressing his views on moral sensibility which, along with the rest of his work about morality, was extremely influential on his subsequent work about economics. On the 9th of March, 1776, after years of historical research, studies and comparisons between modern systems, Smith published his Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, one of the first and most complete analyses of the historical development of commerce and industry in Europe. It consisted in five volumes (I: Of the Causes of Improvement in the productive Powers of Labour, II: Of the Nature, Accumulation, and Employment of Stock, III: Of the different Progress and Opulence in different Nations, IV: Of Systems of political Economy, V: Of the Revenue of the Sovereign or Commonwealth). Smith wrote and contextualized his book(s) between 1767 and 1773, a period which was seeing America entering a
conflict with England over the latter’s monopoly on manufacturing and desire for an American industry not to be born. Smith advocated an economic environment of free market, where governments should not interfere in transactions between private parties. He theorised that free market would be a new and apparently chaotic economic environment, but actually guided by an “invisible hand” toward production of the right amount and variety of goods. Governments would still have a role, but directed to select and finance new, dynamic ventures and public works. In Smith’s words:

“The uniform, constant and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition, the principle from which public and national, as well as private opulence is originally derived, is frequently powerful enough to maintain the natural progress of things toward improvement, in spite both of the extravagance of government, and of the greatest errors of administration.”

Smith’s vision was a product of Enlightenment, shaped by his shared education with the Edinburgh philosophers (David Hume’s circle), and the French Économistes. His theories, method and exposition were heavily influenced by his studies of industrial and commercial practices in Paris during the years 1746-1766. There he witnessed the protectionist and heavily controlled industrial and commercial measures, as regulated by French laws, and the taxation system weighing too much on the common people. Smith dedicated Chapter 2 of Book V to taxation, criticizing the fallacies in the existing system (“Many of those taxes [...] are not finally paid from the fund, or source of revenue, upon which it was intended they should fall”). Smith embraced economic change as something that would create a society of richer people, saw division of labour as the main cause of prosperity, and reasoned about the way individuals can make the best use of their labour and resources, and get the highest possible return on it. His theory was that every use of resources must yield and equal rate of return, and, consequentially,

79 Ibid., II.3.31
80 Ibid. V.2.23
the more difficult the task in a trade, the higher the wage a worker would expect. Like Hume before him, Smith developed a strongly anti-mercantilist vision, arguing that trade could bring wealth from opening new markets for domestic products and providing commodities from abroad at a lower price. The sum of Smith’s theories constituting his preferred economic model (“the system of natural liberty”\textsuperscript{81}) is considered the basis of modern capitalism. However, Smith saw the importance of elements of moral and social significance in economic discourses. The Scotland he lived in (Glasgow, Edinburgh and, especially Kirkcaldy, where he wrote the majority of \textit{The Wealth of Nations}) was undergoing the Industrial Revolution, a massive change in structure and commercial economy which, in return, was heavily reforming the identity of the society. His vision and the scope of the society imagined in the \textit{Wealth of Nations} were admittedly beyond the class structures that Scotland was time and again rigidly divided in, and pictured a dimension of dynamic exchange:

"In civilized society he [man] stands at all times in need of the cooperation and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons. In almost every other race of animals each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature. But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages."\textsuperscript{82}

Predating the economic liberalism that would become the socio-economic standard in the next century, Scottish Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution heralded a period of social and philosophical renewal, in which a widespread value system grew among intellectual leaders. With strengths coming from a social dimension developed in clubs, societies, taverns, libraries and bookstores, rather

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid. IV.9.51
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid. I.2.2
than in closed academic environments, such system was a dynamic drive for a new Scottish identity in the modern world, expressed in terms of freedom of expression, religious tolerance, education to the use of good manners, opposition to slavery and faith in progress. Elements that contributed to the formation of this identity were numerous, and some of them contrasted with each other: on one hand, coexistence with England was reinforced through the sharing of scientific discoveries and artistic achievements. That was almost the opposite of the period before 1750, in which Anglophobic movements promoted by the nationalist opposition and the Jacobite rebellions had almost limited relations to the commercial sector, more specifically to desultory private ventures rather than full-fledged state collaborations. An important unifying trait was the use of the English language, widely favoured and spoken by a large percentage of the literate part of the population. Primary schools were instituted by the General Assembly to instruct the youth in the parishes (so that English would “overwrite” Gaelic, which was seen as source of “barbaritie and incivilite” in the Highlands and the Islands, and was at a sharp disadvantage in the academic world due to the scarcity of notable written material). An essential means of religious education (the key element for this being the 1611 King James’ Bible, which was adopted by every Scottish Protestant in the kingdom), English became the language of the schools and the universities.

Another binding agent was the situation of the sons of the landowners, who, during the century, were the most influential class. The traditional hereditary system regulated that family possessions were automatically assigned to the firstborn, while his brothers had to search for their fortune elsewhere. This longstanding method, which had been weaving a network of connections between families and sons gone abroad, found perfect application in the participation of Scotsmen in the colonial endeavours of the British Empire. In the 18th century, due to the improvements in lifestyle, the decline in infant mortality rate caused the

---

84 mainly the “Book of Deer”, which included the Gospels and a chronicle of the foundation of the monastery by S. Columba in the 11th century, and the 16th century “Book of the Dean of Lismire”, including 60 poems in Gaelic.
Scottish involvement in colonial conquests to amplify to significant proportions: expeditions to North America (until the 1776 Revolution), to India and to Australia (during James Cook’s settlement in 1788) saw a marked Scottish contribution. Despite the unfavourable proportion of Scots compared to English (the average ratio of citizens participating in military or commercial activities was 5 Englishmen for every Scotsman), their presence was comparatively stronger in terms of qualifications: a table reporting the proportion of Scotsmen in the imperial Elite during the 18th century listed them as 1/3 of the men from all Europe in the American colonies between 1680 and 1780 with University level education; 60% of the active doctors in Antigua in 1750; 78% of the Hudson Bay Company staff in North America in 1799. Being generally based on profit rather than occupation of territories, Scotland’s colonial business was likely to send home the money gained, if it was not already directed to London or to other investment or savings destinations. The estates of colonists who had become wealthy in India, and often had been killed by the diseases contracted there, amounted each to many times the yet abundant earnings of the transatlantic cotton and tobacco trade. A study by George McGilvaray on the figures of such capital fluxes highlighted that, between 1720 and 1780, there were 1668 active Scotsmen in the colonial world, whose total contribution to the Scottish economy could be quantified in an annual £500,000 between the 1750s and 1770s.

3.5: “Britishness” and the Scottish identity

Affinity in the intellectual world and the solid presence of Scotsmen at every level of the imperial economy were characteristic which had historians from three centuries analyse, with no common conclusions, what made up the “identity” Scotland developed in the period following the Union. Before the Pax Britannica, the conflict with France, which concluded with the Napoleonic Wars, came to a pivotal moment with the Irish rebellion of 1798. The ill-timed event, which could

have given France an opening to launch a decisive attack on Britain, exposed a
difference between Ireland and Scotland’s actions that could not have been
greater: 52,000 Scots (a 36% of all the voluntary recruits in the United Kingdom in
1797) volunteered to fight alongside their compatriots. Military loyalty went to
great lengths in uniting Scotland and England, along with religious affinity, which
historian Linda Colley prioritized as a fundamental element of the Union, although
another opinion stated that there were too big differences in the management of
the Churches for it to be a truly key factor87. Colley again stated in her Britons:
forging the nation, 1707-1837, that “Britishness” was a superimposed identity, a
cape which covered a series of pre-existing systems of political, religious and inter-
regional relationships. According to Colley, British identity was “forged” in cultural
and intellectual imagery, also thanks to the coinciding rise in literacy and the
spread of brochures and informative propaganda. Richard B. Sher considered this
“Britishness” as
grounded less in assimilation to England or in fundamental similarities among
England, Scotland, and Wales than in a growing sense of imperial solidarity and
common cause against France, Spain, and other continental rivals with whom
Britain was frequently at war during the second half of the century. The fact that
those rivals tended to be predominantly Roman Catholic added to the sense of
cohesion among British Protestant denominations which otherwise differed
substantially among themselves.88

The imperial and, more expressly, military aspects were regarded as superior to
the religious and political ones, with the latter being treated as even dangerous
due to the risks of assimilation, that is, the prospect that Scotland could end up
being absorbed by England.

Many distinguished authors and thinkers such as Henry Cockburn, Sir
Walter Scott and Sir John Sinclair feared that the cultural heritage of traditions,
institutions and habits would be eroded by Anglicization and the speed of
urbanization and the economic development. When the 18th century came to an

87 Finlay R.J., ‘Keeping the covenant: Scottish national identity’, in
Devine T. M. and Young J. R. (eds), Eighteenth Century Scotland. New
Perspectives (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1999), pp. 122–44.
88 Sher R.B., Scotland Transformed in Wormald, pp.178-9
end, not everyone in the kingdom could be optimistic about what Scotland would become in the following years.
**CHAPTER IV: Change and destabilization in the Workshop of the Empire (1800-1920)**

4.1: Electoral reform

The 19th century was the age which saw the biggest consolidation of a British identity in Scotland. The resurgent economy, for which Scotland was called the “workshop of the British Empire”\(^9\), was not the only cause, but rather one among a fortunate series of circumstances revolving around the country’s relationship with England. Of the Anglophobia which had arisen riots in Glasgow and Edinburgh in the years before and after the Union, seemingly little was still active: the feeling that the United Kingdom was a key element in Scotland’s prosperity and vice-versa was strongly felt. Britishness was being born out of a shared patriotism, comprised of common achievements and objectives such as anti-Catholicism, rivalry with France, imperial interests, and the unifying function of the monarchy. Communications within the kingdom were strong thanks to the advanced infrastructures and the widespread internal trade. Bound by no ethnic discrimination, or colonial-like exploitation, or any kind of encumbrance from the government, Scotland was left to grow under the care of the local administrative boards, out of the focus of Westminster and Whitehall. With the legislation taken care by the Lord Advocate (and, after 1885, the Scottish Secretary), and the social pillars of law, education and Presbyterian Church left untouched, all that Scotland could – and did – aim at was better representation within the UK. The nationalist activism of the 1850s, and even the movement for Home Rule started in 1886 had not (at least directly) separation or sabotage of the Union as objectives, rather more prominence where politics about the entirety of the kingdom were concerned. Scottish politicians were the protagonists of some of the biggest contrasts between England and Scotland: political representation, which, especially from 1874 onwards, favoured the Conservatives in England, did never find a proper match in Scotland, where the Whigs before and the Liberals later had

---

found fertile grounds both in the preserved and changing institutions. In the 1830s, the situation of the Scottish electorate underwent major changes due to the introduction of the Reform Act, one of the greatest political milestones in the history of Scotland: issued in 1832, roughly at the same time in which a homonymous act was passed in England and Wales, it contained dispositions to reshape the electorate and ensure bigger and better representation throughout the country. Before 1832, Scotland’s total number of voters was 4,500 out of more than 2.6m people, for a percentage of 0.2 of the population and a proportion of 1/100 adult males, against the 1/8 of England. Such narrow ratio implies that some sections of society were heavily underrepresented, and others were not represented at all. In the Counties, which could generally elect one member each, votes were linked to feudal rights, which didn’t automatically correspond to the actual ownership of land. Those in possession of feudal superiority could easily divide it among their loyal people so that voting power could be equally shared and directed to persons of choice. Town councils could – and would – elect Burgh MPs with virtually no democratic interference, thanks to their specific self-perpetuating composition. The Reform Act of 1832’s first feature was the expansion of the electorate from 4,500-5,000 to 60,000; there were also changes in the total number of eligible MPs (from 45 to 53) due to the different calculation applied to the constituencies. However, William Ferguson notes that the desired optimization of the representative function of the electorate was not written well enough to prevent the exploitation of holes and inconsistencies: for example, tenants with certain prerequisites were given the right to vote, but their decision would often be subjected to various grades of intimidation by their landlords (culminating with peremptory eviction), so that their vote would be forcibly cast at the landowners’ whim. Further enfranchisements in 1868 and 1884 extended the voting power to roughly 500,000 Scotsmen, reaching as far as the working class (women’s suffrage would be introduced only in 1918), and attempted to tackle the

91 a lease of at least 57 years on properties valued at not less than £10 per annum; or a lease of min. 19 years of property valued £50, or the payment of a grassum of £300 regardless of the lease.
The 19th Century saw radical changes in the socio-political structure. To a massive growth in the population, which went from 1,608,420 in 1801 to 4,472,103 in 1901, corresponded a strong shift from the outer zones (more than 30% of the population) to the industrializing midlands. In the same timespan, the proportion of people living in communities with less than 5000 people went from 4/5 to 2/5 of the total. There were two primary causes for this: the changes in agriculture and the fast industrialization. Scotland entered the Victorian Era at the forefront of the Industrial Revolution in many a sector: the rich development of cotton (whose production was carried forth by 168 mills and 1,363,000 spindles in 1850) and linen (which outlived cotton as a world-leading industry after the former lost the supplies of raw material due to the American Civil War) was flanked by a renewed coal and iron industry, which had evolved in the 1830s from a primarily Highland-based extraction industry to a cheap and profitable business thanks to the introduction of James Neilson’s hot-blasting technique. The process, which involved blowing pre-heated air into the furnaces in order to decrease fuel consumption, resulted in an increase in the furnace temperatures that allowed for the use of raw coal, and made it possible to harness the Black Band ironstone ores, deposits of which in the Scottish Lowlands only awaited to be put to use. Industry costs went down by 40%, boosting iron production from 23,000 tons in 1806 to 750,000 in 1852 (28% of total UK output), and coal production from 2m tons in 1800 to 33m in 1900, under a total operating workforce of 103,000\textsuperscript{93}.

Of all the economic successes, shipbuilding proved to be the greatest: the engineering improvements and the bigger quantity - and better quality of - raw

\textsuperscript{92} Ferguson W., “The Reform Act (Scotland) of 1832: intention and effect”, \textit{Scottish Historical Review}, 45 (1966) pp.105-114

material nourished on the Clyde the creation and development of a number of ships which, by 1900, would amount to half a million per year, for a total 1/3 of the world output. Lastly, marine, bridge and locomotive engineering were internationally recognized testaments of skill and use of steel (whose production had gone from 85,000 tons in 1800 to 1m in 1900, for a 20% of the UK total)\textsuperscript{94}.

The reasons for such economic success ranged from the wide belief in the values of Presbyterianism (belief that divine favour comes to the hardworking, audacious, independent elects) to the education system (which, by 1865, had been providing six times more university students than England, and possessed criteria of admission which rewarded the promising students from any social class); the cunning of businessmen (which went on irregularly, as some sectors like shipbuilding had considerably alternate fortunes under different guides) and the low labour cost of Irish and country immigrants (whose wages were 20% lower than their English equals in 1840). The disappearance of the agricultural techniques of old, begun in the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, was now giving space to techniques which allowed much more land to be used: the innovation consisted in open farming, consolidation of fields, 19 years leases (from the previous annual ones), fertilization of uncultivated soil, new crop rotations, new ploughing instruments and beasts of burden (horses).

In the Highlands a gradual emigration to the south took place, especially from the southern and eastern zones: the growth of industries and small towns attracted part of the wage-dependant left landless as the number of tenancies decreased, while the North-West and the islands saw an opposite increase of dependency on land. Some solutions for the land and its economic problems were found in the kelp business and potato supplies, especially during the embargo years of war in Europe (1790-1815). The situation lasted temporarily until the peace of 1815, which unlocked kelp trade with Spain and destroyed its internal stock value in Scotland (plummeting in 1828 from 20£ per ton to £5). The improving Highland economy and rising population stopped, followed by a bankruptcy spree among landowners, over two thirds of whose estates were took

\textsuperscript{94} ibid.
over by other businessmen, many of which coming from South. The new management mainly assigned the lands to sheep breeding, a business which needed a vastly lower amount of workforce than what existed before, that by 1825 was supplying 40% of the total British wool. As a consequence, many Highlanders were displaced to the coast-based kelp extraction points. The 1840s’ potato crop failures gave the landowners a chance to expel the poor classes from their lands, many of whom went south or overseas. It was historically known as the “Highland clearances”, the last action in a history of political repression of the Highlanders under the royal interest of Jacobite subjugation, which only in the 18th century had involved the Jacobite massacre in the Battle of Culloden, the Act of Proscription of 1746 (by which the Highlanders were ordered the surrender their arms to their government and were proscribed the use of kilts and tartans, the penalty being "imprisonment, without bail, during the space of six months, and no longer; and being convicted for a second offence before a court of justiciary or at the circuits, shall be liable to be transported. To any of his Majesty's plantations beyond the seas, there to remain for the space of seven years" 95 ), the Heritable Jurisdiction Act of 1746 (which abolished jurisdiction rights to Scottish clan chiefs, extending royal authority over the traditional system, to be exerted by appointed sheriffs and the High Court and Circuit-courts of Justiciary, after the Parliament took possession of the heritable jurisdictions for the sum of £152,000) and the Tenures Abolition Act of 1660. During the following decades, agriculture would not help the Highland economy recover, as it now was almost completely dependant on deer hunting and leisure activities held by the British nobles in the wake of Queen Victoria’s love of – and regular vacations to – upper Scotland. As a result, the local cultivations suffered from the conversion of roughly one sixth of the region’s surface into deer forests.

4.3: Religion and Disruption

The Irish were the biggest group of immigrants who settled in Scotland: while an average of 6000-8000 Irish temporarily migrated to Scotland for the

harvest season every year in the 1830s (aided by the low price of transport from Ireland to Greenock), their number rose to 25,000 in the 1840s (peaking at 57,651 in 1841, for a total number of Irish settlers in Scotland amounting to 126,321, a 4.8% of Scotland’s population), and, in the years of the Irish famine (1845-1852), rose to 207,367 (7.2% of Scotland’s population)\(^96\). For all their presence, the Irish had an apparently small impact on society, due to the segregation they were imposed by the Scots, but also by themselves, as they proved unwilling to be incorporated in their hosts’ culture. They usually settled in small, isolated communities, relegated to the worst sectors of the cities and the least desired jobs (mainly in coal mining and dock working). The Irish were met with great hostility by the Presbyterian Church: their being Roman Catholics was a determining factor of reciprocal hostility with a Protestant country where Catholicism was ferociously opposed. Although their discrimination stemmed not from ethnicity, but rather from the Irish’s poverty and unhealthy living conditions, the separation between them and the Scots also took place on religious terrain, with the Irish refusing to join Scots in anything Presbyterian (like schools, which until 1872 were largely an affair of the parishes). The conflict became harsher than ever when Scotland entered a period of internal struggle among branches of the Church: in 1843 a breakup called the “Great Disruption” caused 450 ministers (one third of the clergy and laity) to secede in order to form another congregation which they called the Free Church of Scotland. The conflict had a century-old origin in the Patronage Act approved in 1712 \(^97\), whose controversial dispositions were attacked by the Evangelical Party when, in 1834, it gained its first majority in a century in the General Assembly, and rapidly passed a Veto Act to allow rejection of ministers nominated by patrons. Such action caused a “Ten Years’ Conflict” between them and the Moderates, which ultimately ended in 1843 with a schism. The Moderates, who had embraced the patronage system, were accused of counting on ministers from the aristocracy, who had no part in the congregation’s interests and the pastoral mission; of mismanaging the social problems which had arisen with the


\(^{97}\) see Chapter 3, p.79
urban-industrial society (poverty, unrest and refusal of religious principles); and of ignoring the rise of Voluntary Presbyterian churches against intrusions from the state. When, in 1834, the Auchterarder congregation applied the Veto Act and refused the nominee chosen by a patron, he recurred to the civil courts, which ruled against the congregation’s decision. Faced with the situation of a de facto lack of decisional freedom, the Evangelicals chose to secede. As a consequence, by 1843 there were three main Protestant realities: the Church of Scotland, the Independent Church of Scotland, and the Voluntary Presbyterian Churches.

4.4: Trade unionism, Radicalism and Labour

The combined offering of the three split sects of the Church boosted evangelization and foundation of churches, but failed in attracting a significant portion of the working class. By the 1880s, with the spiritual message losing vigour to Darwin98, and the small but rising percentage of Catholics (mostly Irish) eroding the number of believers, the Presbyterian churches were looking more and more like a status-advancing career possibility for the middle classes. Such a shift in focus from a spiritual to a laboral perspective was by no means unfounded: well before the beginning of the Victorian Era, agricultural, industrial, demographic and religious changes were gradually reshaping the approaches and relationships within the social structure of Scotland. The country was slowly expanding from her rural origins, and innovative reforms were regularly opposed in the name of preservation of existing customs and privileges. The commonly perceived corrupt and antidemocratic landowners bet their prestige in military and imperial service,

98 A study by Church historian Nigel Scotland lays out the impact of scientific discoveries and the questioning of Christian doctrine as the two biggest sources of doubt in regard to the Church during and after the Victorian Era. Charles Darwin (1809-1882), who is “considered the first author to have conceived a scientifically respectable theory on evolution”, posed, through his work, the biggest challenge to the literal interpretation of the Genesis, with other scientists (especially geologists) expanding and enriching the scientific argument of the origins of nature. Church reactions in Britain ranged from complete agreement (mostly expressed by liberal churchmen), to hostility (largely coming from the high clergy of the Church of England), to a more generally adopted “middle ground” of partial acceptance.
two defining features of national pride. The rich middle-class businessmen (a state-wide majority in south western Scotland) were enjoying the possibility of ascending to aristocracy through marriage and possess of large estates, while a generally stable middle class of businessmen, bankers, merchants and lawyers was restlessly fighting both against the privileges of the upper classes, the immobility of customs (those accorded to the landowners especially) and the working class. Thanks to the expanded representation gained with the Reform Act and a Scottish Burgh Reform Act of 1833, many middle classmen could rise to the helm of local governments. They saw no menace to their social integrity in the divided, disembodied working classes, whose members, Irish Catholic or Scots, were factory workers or artisans who did not recognize themselves as a single, united block.

One of the consequences of industrialization was the formation and strengthening of unofficial workshop committees, associations of workers created to protect the social and practical aspects of their trade: control over the labour process and defence of the working community's interests. Although such kind of associations already existed, they gradually became more class-based as divisions between middle classes, skilled, and unskilled workers widened, starting to resemble the “trade unions” as they are, in principle, known today. One of the first occupational associated actions in the industrial history of Scotland be taken by the Glasgow cotton spinners in the first decade of the 19th century. Their aim was to keep control over the distribution and quantity of labour in the sector through membership and strict regulations on the passage of the craft, and the success of their initiative forced the employers to form an association themselves in 1810 in order to counter the union’s influence. The spinners were followed by the weavers in 1812, the Glasgow and Ayr miners in 1817 (who merged), and the Lanarkshire miners (who formed the Associated Colliers of Scotland) in 1825. Both miners’ initiatives ended shortly after with the arrest of their leaders, as a consequence of policies of social pressure by the employers. Later attempts of establishing a functional trade unionism surfaced with the Glasgow United Committee of Trades Delegates in 1830, in order to push what would become the 1832 Reform Bill in England and Scotland with the hope that it would grant better representation to
the disenfranchised working classes. After that, the GUCTD acted in sporadic occasions, while support boomed for another, much greater trade union, the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union, spearheaded by cotton manager Robert Owen (responsible for the revolution in the working conditions in the community at his New Lanark plant, where comprehensive nursing and education were implemented in substitution of child labour, and inspired his identification as one of the first socialists of Scotland), with branches in Glasgow, Paisley, Aberdeen and many other parts in Scotland. The general situation of trade unionism in Scotland worsened considerably with the failure of the Glasgow cotton spinners’ strike in 1837. The association, which was considered on of the strongest and best organized, counting est. 850-900 members out of 1000 spinners in Glasgow, and employing an efficient system of limitation of labour supply, lost to the employers’ association, had the strike recognized as a manifestation of violence and the leaders tried and convicted. Decrease in influence and bad publicity opened the way for major union breakups as the economic depressions of 1838-1842 surfaced, prompting workers to search better representation in political radical activism, which trade unions, as bodies concerned with the protection of the workers’ interests, had little direct involvement in (although at times were likened to in terms of manifest popular violence). The year 1838 saw the emergence of the Chartists, a movement which advocated social and economic reform in Britain, and used as a manifesto the Six Point of the People’s Charter devised by the London Working Men’s Association, which was presented as a petition to the

99 See paragraph 4.1
102 ibid., p.61
103 1. A vote for every man twenty one years of age, of sound mind, and not undergoing punishment for crime.
2. The ballot — To protect the elector in the exercise of his vote.
3. No property qualification for members of Parliament—thus enabling the constituencies to return the man of their choice, be he rich or poor.
4. Payment of members, thus enabling an honest tradesman, working man, or other person, to serve a constituency, when taken from his business to attend to the interests of the country.
House of Commons in 1839, to no avail. Adherence to the Chartist principles was very high throughout Britain in the 1839-42 period, with Scotland not being an exception, but, on the contrary, seeing artisans, skilled workers and middle classmen join and take the local leadership. Moral respectability and religious zeal were highly regarded values, as well as democratic organisation, which inspired the creation of Chartist Churches aimed to reconcile “Christianity with the message of social justice and political freedom [...]”\textsuperscript{104}

Throughout the years of crisis and conflict dotting the century, the movement saw itself split between a “moral” and a more “physical” face in the social battle it participated in, in connection to the radical heads of the overarching British movement. In early May, 1842, another petition, with three million signatures, was submitted to the Parliament, and, again, rejected. Chartist activism reportedly oversaw workers’ strikes in 14 English and 8 Scottish counties, leading to the arrest of 1,500 among which there was the almost entire Chartist executive, the majority of which were eventually released. A last series of mass meetings and petition signing in 1848 ended in failure, among accusations of forged signatures, and generated a streak of riots which extended to Glasgow, which saw the involvement of the (mostly Irish) unemployed, the colliers, the iron workers, whose revolutionary cries were later identified as only tangentially connected with Chartism. Class conflict ensued between the “respectable” middle classes and artisans on one side and the unskilled workers and radicals on the other, with middle class fears over the implications of enfranchising the considerable and growing numbers of unskilled workers alienating their support to their cause. Concern over private property put the middle classes closer to the “old enemies”, the landowners, which both created and locked a new class equilibrium which the Scottish workers, and the skilled artisans in particular, refused to break with the only radical alternative left, violence.

\textsuperscript{5} Equal constituencies securing the same amount of representation for the same number of electors, instead of allowing small constituencies to swamp the votes of larger ones.

\textsuperscript{6} Annual Parliaments, thus presenting the most effectual check to bribery and intimidation, since though a constituency might be bought once in seven years (even with the ballot), no purse could buy a constituency (under a system of universal suffrage) in each ensuing twelvemonth; and since members, when elected for a year only, would not be able to defy and betray their constituents as now.


\textsuperscript{104} Knox W., \textit{An industrial nation}...p.68
In the period of political stabilisation following the turbulent 1840s, private property and the industrial system started being recognized and accepted by British workers as something bound to last long. Improvements in the standard of living and wages helped workplace relationships to be redefined, with a surge in paternalistic, welfare-oriented approach from the employers, middle class efforts to reshape working class culture, particularly old customs such as drinking and rioting, and a general shift to institutional channels when it came to socio-economic struggles. Rising capitalist practices of work redistribution to improve productivity, paternalistic forms of control of the workforce, where protection, job security and a traditional aspect of moral authority defined the manager-worker relationship (although the system was mostly limited to stable, established workplace communities, such as Glasgow, Paisley, and Midlothian)\textsuperscript{105}, internal subcontracting and piece rate payments were methods of controlling labour, employed in the context of a workplace where a complex web of loyalties and antagonisms had the worker subject to inhomogeneous authority and reduced autonomy. Scotland, and the West in particular, was witnessing the rise of coal mining, ironworks and shipbuilding, and a fall in agriculture and textiles. The ideal worker model was the skilled, hard-working male Protestant, while female roles were mainly relegated to agriculture, clothing, domestic work and textile production. As female participation in weaving and spinning rose to comprise 2/3 of the sector’s workforce by the 1880s, radical militancy, broken by the new sexual division of labour, decreased, finding significant representation only in the mining sector, like in the west Lanarkshire pits (averaging 136.9 men per pit in 1873). The form of organization put in place in Britain by workers in the second half of the century was described by Sydney and Beatrice Webb as the “new model” unionism\textsuperscript{106}, a system fuelled by a bourgeois mentality, favouring conciliation rather than confrontation. As exemplified by Amalgamated Society of Engineers, which was founded first in 1851, and the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners, New Model Unions were organised around a single craft, promoted the respectability of skilled workers and anti-belligerent practices (like arbitration)

\textsuperscript{105} ibid. pp.106-107
\textsuperscript{106} Webb S., Webb B., \textit{History of Trade Unionism} (Barnes&Noble Digital, 2003) pp.180-190
for the resolution of disputes, sported each a full-time secretary with national visibility and access to parliament, had a priced subscription model for membership and put publicly effort on cooperation. The secretaries formed the “Junta”, a group identified and named by the Webbs, which held regular meetings in London and promoted New Model Unionism to the Royal Commission for the 1860-1870 period, and led to the creation of the Trades Union Congress in 1868. Scotland unions and branches saw relatively little application of that, due to their much more localised identity. The centralised model theorised by the Webbs did not correspond to Scotland’s situation in terms of localism and autonomy on choices regarding pay and working conditions. Nor did regarding the role of trade unions as working class defenders, as the immediate workgroup exerted that function with informal decisions which regularly overlapped the trade unions’ authority and responsibility. Official unionism was, in general, unrepresentative of the Scottish workers, to a level that it was outperformed by the sectarian-like Free Collier movement in the Lanarkshire coalfields during a strong wave of Catholic Irish immigration in that zone. That was a reason for strikes not diminishing in number, but also a symptom of weakness on the unions themselves’ part: general low wages in the Scottish industry meant impossibility to afford the subscription charge of the unions for many workers, with the consequence being mass disaffection. Survival of the trade was tied to the volatile fortunes of the industry sectors, encouraging money saving (at the price of abandoning the union) for the worker, but also solidarity within and among trade unions, which begat political participation of the trades councils in an effort to raise political consciousness among workers. The male urban working-classmen were not entitled to vote until 1867, and had virtually no proper political representation, excluding radicalism. It was this “missing link” to create connections between the moderate wing of labour and the radical middle class: Scottish support for Garibaldi’s struggle for unification in Italy saw wide cross-class participation from radicals, Chartists and Whigs alike, determined to bring the winds of revolution home to promote a political reform in favour of the people. The enfranchisement of the male urban

---

107 ibid. pp.233-236, 360-364
108 Knox W., An industrial nation...p.115-6
working class householders in 1867 brought the majority of their vote under William Gladstone's middle-class based Liberal Party, whose public emphasis on free trade, self-help, morality and respectability resonated with workers in the wake of rising prosperity, welfare reforms towards the neo-enfranchised skilled workers.

4.5: Liberalism and the rise of home rule movements

The entire social setup did not have little consequence on a governing level: the new agricultural and trade interests, the middle class local power, and the Voluntary and, later, the Free Church, were the protagonists of a shift in political ideology which caused, by the 1830s, the Conservatives to lose their power to the Whigs, who were reborn as the Liberal party. The Liberals' political philosophy was a funnel of values such as democracy, free trade and education, which appealed to the powers on the rise, and the middle classes in particular. Curiously, even the working classes would initially avail them in place of the newly formed Labour party. Scottish Labour's seminal foray was the 1888 by-election in the Mid-Lanark, where their representative Keir Hardie stood to advocate stronger health regulations and safer measures in the mining industry. He gained 617 votes (8.4%), setting the stage for the creation of the Scottish Labour Party, which lasted until 1894, its place taken by the Independent Labour Party. Until the First World War, Scottish Labour's performance was deemed as comparatively lacklustre compared to its more successful English branch, winning only three seats in Parliament and limited positions in local administrations. History professor Richard Finlay sees the party's main problem to have been its desire to cater to the working classes while maintaining an intellectual profile in the promotion of Socialism, without taking into account that the Liberals were also pursuing social reform, with the added strength of a much more established connections with the trade unions, and visibility among middle classmen and workers 109. Before WWI, socialist ideals, as taken in their general meaning of reconstruction of the society

based on rational principles to ensure the greatest benefit for the greatest number, enjoyed relatively little fame. Labour’s champions Keir Hardie and Ramsay MacDonald fostered a political ideology based on equality, both in favour of female workers (for which the former advocated suffrage) and common ownership. Nonetheless, the political and economic premises, along with the weakness of trade unions, presented socialism and the Labour Party with many obstacles: distrust towards state intervention (to which ad-hoc regulations in a localized space were comparatively much preferred and employed), and fragmentation of the working classes put socialism behind liberalism ideologically¹¹⁰.

In his On Liberty (1859), philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) discussed on the importance of freedom of religion, of speech, of assembly, criticising the presence of poverty and misconduct in the society, two causes of suffering contrary to the socialist view of the worker’s right to an equal share. That reasoning was coupled with another on the importance given to the freedom of the individual, an emancipatory right in line with the liberalist ideology. Such a point of contact had a precedent in Mill’s application of utilitarianism¹¹¹ on modern politics, which had led to the identification of the ideal political system in one able to guarantee both freedom of choice and action to its citizens and an efficient, harmony-preserving government. That was the Liberal Party’s offer during its high popularity period in Scotland (1870-1890), when elements of the society were being either preserved or transformed: the 1832 Act and the subsequent franchise

¹¹⁰ Ibid. pp.20-25
¹¹¹ The general notion of utilitarianism is that “an action is right if it tends to promote happiness and wrong inf it tends to produce the reverse of happiness – not just the happiness of the performer of the action but also that of everyone affected by it”. The classical utilitarianistic approach applied to politics was introduced by philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) with the concept of “the greatest happiness to the greatest number” as what a legislator should be striving for, by “creating an identity of interest between each individual and their fellows”. His ideology inspired his disciple James Mill (1773-1836) to advocate for a representative government and universal male suffrage, and his son John Stuart Mill, who in his Utilitarianism (1861) described it as “an ethics for ordinary individual behaviour as well as legislation”. His support for woman suffrage, state-endorsed education and other “radical” (at the time) proposals were conceived according to his utilitarianistic view.
extensions reshaped class relationships; the Disruption of 1843 was the culmination of a state-Church intermingling which could not continue as it was. Both events involved the rejection of a series of privileges that tradition had granted to specific “aristocratic” categories such as patrons and landowners. Popular discontent towards such privileges mounted as class dynamics shifted: the hopes for a reassessment of social advantages created rivalries among classes, between churches, and between churches and the establishment. More importantly, the contrasts among ecclesiastical authorities demonstrated that the “old rural society” and its leadership were not going to last: the fall in Church attendance among the people, the slow but steady rise of Roman Catholicism, the rise of Bible criticism and of corresponding evangelistic fervour movements sent the Church out of any immobility. On the other hand, the Free Church’s extension of primary education services was an example of eagerness that predated state intervention out of worries that it would imply privileges for specific categories. Liberalism was the dominant political force, and that was because of its continuous franchise reforming action, which had workers and tenants raise hopes for land reform. Land proprietors’ veto on the Free Church’s request to build places of worship on their fields and strong protest movements in the 1860s and 1870s by tenant farmers against harsh conditions had both the Whigs and the Liberals oppose the aristocrats’ side. The 1880s saw the Highlander crofters’ resistance\textsuperscript{112} inspire renewed commitment to land reform, which the Liberals championed in their battle for a single (land) tax and anti-protectionist policies which lasted well into the first decade of the twentieth century\textsuperscript{113}. The Scots strongly recognized themselves in the Liberal bastions of free trade, individualism, and the Victorian idea of success as something those who worked hard were bound to obtain. That did not only concentrate social stigma towards the “undeserving poor”, but also on the privileged and protectionist landowners, which were historically represented in politics by the Conservatives\textsuperscript{114}. The Liberals dominated the Scottish political scene until 1900, eventually giving the opponents an opening when they divided

\textsuperscript{112} See paragraph 4.2
\textsuperscript{113} Lynch M., *The Oxford Companion...* p.386
over Irish Home Rule in 1886: in that occasion, when the Liberal Prime Minister William Gladstone proposed a devolved management in Ireland and was subsequently defeated in the House of Commons, part of the Liberal Party led by Lord Hartington and Joseph Chamberlain separated from the main body to form the Liberal Unionist Party. Many in the Liberal Party had feared that Gladstone’s Home Rule bill would be a first step towards the independence of Ireland and the dissolution of the United Kingdom, and were ready to oppose such an eventuality in the name of the Union. Their worries became considerably more tangible with the birth of a Scottish Home Rule Association\footnote{The Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA) was formed in 1886 to counterpoint Scotland’s need and right of a home rule over the Irish, whose tendencies, reported by Liberal frontman Lord Rosbery, were disruptive and terrorist and, yet, didn’t stop the UK Government from giving them “special treatment” compared to Scotland and Wales. Scottish home rule was, thus, also seen as a matter of merit. Irish home rule organizations, and especially their branches in the Irish communities in Scotland, were seen as distorters of Scottish vote, determined by self-interest to endorse Gladstone’s Liberals (despite Irish Scots almost entirely pertaining to an estimated 40% of adult males of Scotland’s total population who still had no franchise). Irish home rule left the parliamentary debates after Gladstone’s defeat in 1886, then resurfaced during a minority Liberal government session in 1910, before being definitely abandoned in the first year of WWI. Source: Lynch M., \textit{The Oxford Companion to Scottish History}….p.346} which gained political significance after the debates about the Irish getting generally better treatment than Scotland by the UK Parliament during the Irish Home Rule phase. Scottish History professor Colin Kidd noted that the Scottish Home Rule Association’s aim was not to favour separatism or advocate for federalism, rather to bring Scottish business from the offices in Westminster to Edinburgh, as the UK Parliament was considered inefficient in working on both Scotland and the Empire. Out of the compartmentalized view of the political parties, the connection between the SHRA and liberalism was strong in the former’s four objects:

\begin{quote}
To foster the national sentiment of Scotland, and to maintain her national rights and honour.

To promote the establishment of a legislature, sitting in Scotland, with full control over all purely Scottish questions, and with and executive government responsible to it and the Crown.
\end{quote}
To secure to the government of Scotland, in the same degree as it as present possessed by the Imperial Parliament, the control of her civil servants, judges, and other officials, with the exception of those engaged in the naval, military and diplomatic services, and in collecting the imperial revenue.

To maintain the integrity of the Empire, and secure that the voice of Scotland shall be heard in the Imperial Parliament as fully as at present when discussing Imperial affairs.116

In those words, decentralization was meant as a functional provision to optimize governability. An additional layer of administration for each of the four members of the Union would translate into better management and, ultimately, preservation of the integrity of the Empire, and such an opinion echoed through the SHRA Treasurer William Mitchell’s idea that Home Rule could keep the same advantages “without sacrificing the inestimable benefits of self-government”, and the SHRA vice-president B.D. Mackenzie’s invocation of the Scots’ imperialist sentiment against ideas of separatism117. The question lingered on a broader theme of “reform” that Home Rule movements were only part of: since the first decades of the 1707 Union, State intervention had been intermittent and selective, and its occasional heavy intervention was likely to produce consequences which would not meet Scotland’s real needs. The Parliament’s institution of the Scotch Education Department of 1872 mirrored and expanded similar previous initiatives of the Free Church, generating popular social myths such as the “lad o’pairts”118, and was followed by the reconversion of University teachings toward greater specialization, as the commercial and professional classes had been demanding. The problem was that the shift from a broad, highly philosophical approach to an

117 ibid.
118 The difference in education between Scotland and England, mainly consisting in the thoroughness and intensity which comprised the former, was ideally seen in the “lad o’pairts”, the name given to young boys from a humble background but highly talented, who symbolized the notion that the Scottish education system was meritocratic enough to allow young men to achieve success regardless of their economic means. A 19th and 20th century myth, it celebrated the social opportunities in meritocratic, rather than egalitarian, terms, presenting numerous similarities with another educational myth, the American Dream.
empirical, practical one did not pay importance to the fundamentals of modern science, a quintessential building block of modern industrial technology, making Scottish education not aligned with the knowledge necessary for the industry to maintain itself competitive in the evolving markets. This course of action was not isolated, but instead amidst a series of administrative interventions aimed at moving social responsibilities from parishes to higher authorities. One of these was the foundation of a Scottish Board of Supervision in the 1840s, which gave the authorities a chance to strike city management problems with a standardised poor relief policy (1845), and the institution of Boards for prisons (1838), public health and lunatic asylums (1857) and education (1872)\textsuperscript{119}. Another was the entrustment of county administration from the Commissioner of Supply to appositely created county councils. The expansion of services granted by the State came at odds with the \textit{lasseiz-faire} spirit (according to which, individual initiative was positive as much as State “interference” was negative) of the dominant Liberalism, but did not bring the Liberals any challenge in politics, as no party among the opponents was actively promoting a State-centric policy: Socialism would remain unsupported until well into the twentieth century; Liberal Unionism, the separated Liberal cell which had sided against Irish home rule, was the ideological heir of a Whig unionist tradition harkening back to the creation of the 1707 Union itself, believed that the absolute necessity Scotland had had for reform with England as a model of progress was paralleled by the firm idea the Union had been, and still was, the essence of Scotland’s fortune. Liberal Unionists and Conservatives would soon decide, in the wake of the split over Irish home rule, to join and form the Unionist party, bringing unionism once again at the forefront, as Scottish politics entered the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.

4.6: Nationalism and Unionism

When the Liberal Unionists and the Conservatives merged in 1912, the resulting Unionist Party presented itself as the sum of “the great Scottish Whig tradition of unionism dating back to the inauguration of the union itself” and “a

\textsuperscript{119} Devine, \textit{Scotland and the Union} (…), p. 13
tradition of romantic, patriotic Toryism, which (now that the Stuarts were no longer an active challenge) was proud of its roots in Jacobite legitimism”\textsuperscript{120}. The “Unionist” in the name did not, however, indicate their status as vindicators of the Anglo-Scottish union of 1707, but, rather, the Irish Union of 1801.\textsuperscript{121} The reason was that the latter was perceived not only as a key component of Imperial unity, but also as strongly linked to the former, for there was fear that the controversy over Irish home rule would feed Scottish separatist movements, although Scottish Home Rule did eventually take a completely different position. Jackson sees the Unionist party as an “electoral machine with astonishingly sturdy and complex cultural roots and reach, [that] emerged with the largest number of Scottish seats in 1918, 1924, 1931 ad 1935, and (famously) won a plurality of the Scottish vote as late as 1955” \textsuperscript{122}. Unionism built its success on an uncompromising commitment to the preservation of the united Empire as the source of prosperity for all its participants, drawing from a combined unionist and nationalist tradition whose implications, Kidd argues, were not thoroughly explored. He wonders:

\begin{quote}
Have Scottish historians been in a state of denial about the strong British loyalties evident within the Scottish home rule tradition, or simply confused by the nationalist label into missing the unionist elements which co-existed with more obvious nationalist sentiments within the home rule tradition? \textsuperscript{123}
\end{quote}

The existence of an asymmetry of sorts between unionism, more concerned with contemporary issues (Ireland), and nationalism, more seriously committed to the Anglo-Scottish Union which elsewhere was taken for granted, was reflected in the greater dimension the past had in the nationalist discourse: from the critical consideration that the Union of 1707 had been imposed by the English and accepted by the corrupted Scottish political elite, to the opposite concept of the Treaty as a constitutional basis of the United Kingdom, to the outright rejection of the Union as a legitimate institution. Kidd sees such apparently contradictory positions as complementary, as nationalists were responsible for criticism of the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{120} Jackson A., \textit{The Two Unions...}, p.222
\textsuperscript{121} ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} ibid.
\textsuperscript{123} Kidd C., \textit{Union and Unionisms...}, pp.259-61
\end{flushright}
Union as much as participation within it, in defence of the nation within the Union (oppositely to Anglicisation).\textsuperscript{124} Scottish nationalism’s history from the 1880s to the 1930s was comprised of multifaceted objectives, from decentralisation to constitutional reform of the Empire, from dominion status for Scotland to a restoration of the Union of the Crowns, up to anti-imperialistic positions. The last one in particular was an extreme with limited representation, as mainstream nationalism had no desire in disavowing monarchy, but, on the contrary, would recognise it as a key element of the enduring Anglo-Scottish relationship: for the entire 17\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} centuries, Scotland was monarchical, her last experience with a different government, Cromwell’s Commonwealth in 1650, never accepted among the population. Differently from the Irish, in the late 18\textsuperscript{th} century, Scots were still loyal to the monarchy, with King George III and, especially, George IV being seen as active promoters of a British connection throughout the entire kingdom\textsuperscript{125}. Queen Victoria embodied a notable expression of cultural identification in wearing tartans, vacationing at her royal residence in Balmoral Castle, in Deeside, having a guard of Highlanders. The imperialistic position of Scotland did not concern only monarchy, but the Empire as well: it was common belief in the Victorian Era that the Empire was as much a creature of England as of Scotland. Devine cites John Hill Burton’s \textit{The Scots Abroad} (1864) and W.J. Rattray's \textit{The Scot in British North America} (1880) as publications able to show the impact of Scottish education, presbyterianism, medicine, trading networks and philosophical enquiry had on the colonies. Scotland would recognise herself in the narration of imperial experiences: in 1907 the Scottish Education Department had Scottish studies expanded to British and then international, with Scotland’s role in the Empire as a permanent starting point; an Empire Day was celebrated throughout the 1900s in which Scottish schoolchildren would exchange flags with others from other schools in the Empire; the heroics of General Gordon, Sir Colin Campbell, Mary Slessor and David Livingstone were widely read and known; the Scottish regiments, the military forces at the forefront of colonial expansion, were

\textsuperscript{124} ibid.

\textsuperscript{125} Jackson A., \textit{The Two Unions...}, p.168-9
universally celebrated and regarded as symbols of Scotland’s identity, despite its iconographic Highlanders being actually a minority.\textsuperscript{126}

The Scottish martial tradition they invoked and represented drove thousands of Scots to eventually form a reserve force called the Volunteer movement, whose fame and discipline inspired the voluntary conscription of an exceptional volume of recruits when WWI broke out.

\textbf{4.7: Narrations of Scottishness}

Since the beginning of, and increasingly until well amid the period of post-union economic expansion (1750s-1850s), the conspicuous changes to Scotland’s institutions and social structures were seen as steps of much needed progress of the country up to the level of stronger states in the expanding international trade market. Conversely, worries about the symbolic price to be paid for such change – the fall into disuse of traditional social customs, the possible assimilation within England – surfaced among some of the leading thinkers of early 19th century Scotland: Sir Walter Scott, Sir John Sinclair and Henry Cockburn all feared for the survival of the ancient traditions, institutions, and defining icons of Scottish national identity. In the late 18th century, enlightenment philosophers and academics put Scottish history through rational enquiry, judging it too mythical and fanciful to have any actual pretense of credibility. Consequently, the interpretation of Scotland as a feudal, backwards country that was absorbed by England, a state much more advanced in term of social development and historical accuracy, demoted Scotland’s past to a nebulous being, retained by the Scots as a spiritual legacy, but unable to explain the passage from the country’s past to the present. The adoption of a slightly neutered English constitutional history by the Scottish Whigs after the Union corroborated English historians’ treatment of British history as an incidental continuation of the English one. Compared to England, Scotland was “north-Britain”, a “sub-plot” in the great narrations of the history of Britain, an element which was not crucial in describing British society as a completely English-led system: that was Hume’s reasoning when he switched

\textsuperscript{126} Devine T.M., \textit{Scotland and the Union}..., p.110-2
from a *History of Britain* to a *History of England* (6 vol., pub 1754-61), and Dalrymple’s when opened his *Memories of Great Britain* with the phrase “The history of England is the history of liberty” 127. It was asserted that Scotland survived assimilation into the British state by holding on the active role of its most distinctive institutions (the law, the Presbyterian Kirk, the system of patronage); yet, by the 1850s, no one of these pillars was in the same state it had entered the Union more than a century before: the Disruption of 1843 and the Reform Act of 1832 had dramatically altered the balance the old society was based on, and Scotland had not “a single institution which could represent the character, the conscience, the soul of the nation, and no touchstone for the process of social and political renewal that was bound to continue” 128.

It was Sir Walter Scott who saw in the rediscovery of stories from Scottish folklore what would help the country reaffirm her cultural roots and identity. In his book *Scott-land: The Man Who Invented A Nation* (Polygon, 2010), the author Kelly Stuart described Scott as the inventor of an image of the country that would be adopted by the Scottish and the English as well, a “fulcrum” which would become the definition of Scotland herself. English professor Richard Zumkhawala-Cook elaborated on Benedict Anderson’s definition of Scotland as an “imagined community”, pointing at Scott’s endeavour being an answer to the need for “an unrelenting fiction of wholeness and unity to maintain a “self” that is at once different from other nations and sovereign in its own identity” 129. Devine retraced the evolution of Scott’s reinvention of tradition starting from *Waverley* (1814) and *Tales of a Grandfather* (1827), in which he

invested the Scottish past with a magical appeal and satisfied the powerful emotional needs for nostalgia in a society experiencing unprecedented change, [developing] a new set of national symbols and icons while at the same time renewing others of venerable antiquity in the contemporary image of Victorian Scotland.130

---

128 Jackson A., *The Two Unions...*, p. 239
130 Devine T.M., *Scotland and the Union...*, p.10
Scott took on Jacobitism in the same way his narrations covered actual events of Scottish history: after more than fifty years had passed from Bonnie Prince Charlie’s last stand, Jacobitism had a place in popular culture as symbol of defense of ancient traditions, of a pure, uncorrupted nationalism seen in a romantic and longing light. Jacobitism was also strongly tied with Highlandism, the undisputed centrepiece of Jane Porter’s *The Scottish Chiefs* (1810) and other tales of folklore and myth. Scott brought Highland-based imagery to life in the romantic interpretation of clan life, in the depiction of unsophisticated but passionate characters. When Scott was called to organize the festivities for the first visit of a British monarch to Edinburgh since 1707, he arranged the celebration so that king George IV presented himself as a Scottish chieftain, wearing Tartan. As a result, Tartan and kilts gained widespread fame. The publication of stories of the kilted regiments, the creation of Caledonian societies of Scottish migrants abroad, and Queen Victoria’s demonstrations of admiration and approval “elected” them to national symbols. Scott’s work was considered both a rewriting of Scotland’s past in order to preserve her identity and a way to settle national acrimonies by uniting the nation under the same vision. *Waverley* itself can be seen as a tale of reconciliation between romantic, misguided Jacobite ideals and Hanoverian unionism, with the latter being seen as the ideal solution 131. Highlandism was an element of distinctiveness that Scott balanced with expressions of his unionist ideology: his celebration of ancient Scotland co-existed with the idea of a 1707 Union as a “honourable bargain”, bringer of progress. Scott’s duality was completely reflected in Scottish unionism as a political ideology contrary to self-government but willing to preserve cultural national diversity, decentralization of administration and the distinctiveness of Scotland’s institutions 132.

Expressions of the recreation of a Scottish traditional identity did not stop at stories of myths and romantic Highland depictions, but extended to the revival of the architectural style of castles and towers which had seen no implementation since the 16th century. Following Queen Victoria’s interventions on Balmoral Castle,

131 Mitchison, Barrow, *Why Scottish History matters*, p.71
towers and ramparts started to appear in country houses, municipal offices, infirmaries and urban sheriff courts as models of the new Scotch Baronial style. Another reprised glory of the past were the heroes of the past, be them from recent times, like the poet Robert Burns, or from the medieval years of the Wars of Independence. William Wallace and Robert the Bruce’s heroics were revered in the heroes’ statues in Tweed (Lanark), the creation of the 67mt-high National Wallace Monument (Stirling, 1859-1869), the constant republishing of their tales in the local press. Wallace appealed to the most diverse strata of Victorian society: the middle class liberals saw him as a saviour betrayed by the nobles; for the working classmen, he was the epitome of struggle against the oppressor in the name of freedom. Such cult of national heroes who fought for Independence existed, again, in the nationalism-within-unionism perspective which Scott had striven for the renewed Scottish identity to be developed into: Wallace was the embodiment of a Scotland unconquered, a country that had entered the Union not by surrender, but as a peer of the other part, her contribution to the Treaty well visible in the prerogatives and institutions which were, and always had been, distinctively Scottish.

\[133\text{ Devine T.M., } \text{Scotland and the Union...}, \text{ p.12}\]
CHAPTER V: From the beginning of the Great War to the Devolution (1900-1999)

5.1: Politics and the economy before World War One

In the first years of the 20th century, everything that seemed well established started to change again. Many failed to realize it, though, for the changes started slow and only manifested themselves well into the century. In politics, Liberals faced unexpected defeat by the Conservatives in 1900. That was more of an omen than a lasting change: the following elections placed in the Parliament 58 Liberals and only 9 Conservative MPs, while the Labour party, although still not very successful nationwide, was gradually gaining votes in the local administrative elections. The decline suffered by the Liberals, although short-termed, came in a period that saw divisions in the party over themes ranging from the war in South Africa (which, coupled with the home rule bill, was the primary cause for the so-called 1900 “khaki election”, which, in British electoral jargon, stands for an election in which votes reflect specific war or post-war sentiments), educational reform, church disestablishment and other minor themes. With its coherence and credibility damaged, the Liberal Party could not conjure up a message stronger than the Conservative and Liberal Unionists’ British imperialistic and patriotic rhetoric. The results having shaken up the political scene, the parties at race saw the need to rethink their public profile and priorities. The creation of a youth-based Liberal political organization of thinkers called Young Scots had them produce thirty elected members by 1914, along with the promotion of the more radical and progressive candidates. The working class, whose support was seen as vital in order to prevent the expansion of socialism and patriotic jingoism, was looked into in order to find issues (like widespread poverty, house overcrowding and lack of legal and educational assistance) that, once tackled, would win their votes. Social reform was the help a large part of the society was expected to need, but with the Conservatives going back to the opposition after a period of unpopular management (mainly concerning slave treatment in South Africa and a programme of tariff protection on imports to fund social legislation), Radicalism started to gain foothold. Their influence on the Liberal Party provided the latter
with an ideal surrogate for Labour political thought: pressing on the need for social reform, prompted a thorough identification of the Liberals with progressivism in the articles of the national press, in spite of the liberalism of old which no few saw as politically doomed. Within the programme of social reform there was integration of home rule, a plan in the cards since the 1880s, which regained importance due to ever-growing suspicions about Westminster not being able (and willing) to dedicate time and effort to adapt laws and provisions to meet specific Scottish needs. By 1910, it was the Radicals again to lead the frontal Liberal propaganda, concentrating their efforts on the House of Lords blocking social and land reform. Anti-rich rhetoric composed a strongly anti-landowner and anti-aristocratic campaign invoking themes dear to Scottish workers and individualists. On the other hand, the Conservatives’ more imperial and “British” stance, much more in line with their English Conservatives’ message, failed to impress, despite the Liberal Unionists focusing on the dangers of Irish Home Rule, a theme which dominated the pre-World War I years. It was on the wake of that that the Scottish Home Rule movement was born in the first place, and it was in reaction to that that the Liberal Unionists and the Conservatives joined to form the Unionist Party in 1912, whose main objective was the defence of the Union and the Empire, in complete opposition to the radical push of Home Rule.

The economy had been seeing, by 1888, a decline in cotton spinning and weaving, although the industry, along with clothing manufacturing, accounted for 1/8 of Scottish workforce in 1911 (1/3 in the Borders and Tayside), and the fluctuations in fashions, international trade tariffs and competition had the phenomenon intended as an adjustment to changing market conditions. The textile industry, often subdued in notoriety, showed better understanding of consumer demand and trade association tactics than most other industries by adapting its productivity of linoleum, thread, worsted yarns, knitwear and carpets to the ever-accelerating diversity-driven market, coupling efficiency with production under small and big firms (from small local industries like Border Knitwear to

---

multinationals such as J. & P. Coats)\textsuperscript{135}. Coal mining, iron and steel-founding, engineering and, especially, shipbuilding were the industrial sectors which enjoyed the greatest employment rate: compared to the 150,000 of the textile industry, the workforce for the heavy industries consisted in 200,000 paid workers, with Strathclyde, Lothian, Central and Fife being the core industrial areas\textsuperscript{136}. Since the 1850s, the coal extraction companies had secured heavy investments, both in terms of capitals and technology, which helped the production rise from 7.5 million tons each year to 42 million in 1913, and fuel the work of collieries, limeworks, oil-shale works, tarworks and brickworks. The melted steel production reached in 1913 an output of 1.5 million tons (20\% of British total), more than \( \frac{3}{4} \) of which served the needs of the shipbuilding industry\textsuperscript{137}. By the years before World War I, the Clyde shipbuilding sector was the most resilient of the entire Scottish economy. During that period, it was responsible for the construction of 1/3 of the British ships, and almost 1/5 of the world's total production, with a record 750,000 tons of output in 1913. Not even this sector was invincible to industry and market upheavals, as, only 30 years later, its production crisis would cast down the nation's hopes for an instability-free economy, but for all its volatility, the industry was thriving like never before in the 1930s. Its management was in the hands of small independent family firms, who knew all too well that costs and investments were to be carefully regulated for the sector to survive both in conditions of excessive demand or excessive offer. Labour-intensive techniques were employed on a flexible labour force of 50,000, while specific components were created locally by small firms whose business consisted almost totally in making customized gears. All industries would work interconnected, giving employment to a total of 150,000 coal workers, 100,000

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid. p.14
metal manufacturers, 75,000 mechanical engineers, plus the 50,000 workforce employed in shipbuilding.\textsuperscript{138}

5.2: Migration fluxes

When the people living in the Highlands suffered the forced relocation which went down in history as the Highland Clearances, their migration was a not an isolated phenomenon in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, but, on the contrary, another stream bound to join a growing outflow of people who left their homeland in search of a better future in England, or in America, Canada, Australia, or other destinations within the British Empire. A land from which, by the time this outflow became significant, people not only migrated from, but to as well, Scotland did welcome and see go mostly poor people. Those who came were escaping famine, poverty or religious persecution, and, often, who could afford it would temporarily stop in Scotland before leaving again to America. Those with not enough money, such as the Irish, and those who saw in Scotland itself the land of opportunity, like the Polish or the Lithuanian, would stay. Scotland also saw a marked case of internal migration, which mainly consisted in mass movements from rural zones to urban. In the Lowlands, the division of the land in enclosures managed by a limited number of tenants, aided by labourers hired for a period going from six months to one year, reduced demand for workers in the countryside. Furthermore, the city was seen as an all around better life opportunity for the workers, emotional attachment to rural life losing in appeal against city life. By 1914, 65\% of Scotland’s people lived in the zone between the Firth of Forth and the Clyde. Only 14\% of the male workforce was employed in agriculture.

In the Highlands, the dislocation of workers would happen mainly due to the employment opportunities, concentrated in the central belt and the coastal zones. Highland lifestyle, especially in the southeastern zones, was “corrupted” by contact with commercialism and education, which allowed part of the population to integrate with the lowland society, and, possibly, settle there permanently. In contrast, the northwestern region and the Islands remained dependant on the land

\textsuperscript{138} ibid. p.22
(especially potatoes). Fishing and crofting were the activities of the population depended on by 1891. The partial resistance to commercialism and temporary employment enabled the Highlanders to stay true to their way of life until after the Great War, when strong Russian demand for herring ceased and mechanization of the harvest in the Lowlands eliminated the need for migrant workers. Masses of people from the Highlands reached by sea, and, later, by train, the Lowlands, and especially Edinburgh, Glasgow and the more commercial, industrial centres. In the 1921-1930 decade the number of those who emigrated abroad grew to 550,000 (1/5 of the working population), exceeding the entire natural population increase. The Highland Clearances, the landlords’ answer to the rising Highland population in the years of the collapse of their economy, worked as schemes of eviction of Highlanders incapable of paying rent, peaking in the 1840-1850 decade. Emigration schemes devised by landowners such as the Dukes of Argyll and Sutherland, together with the Highlands and Islands Emigration Society assisted, especially under the Emigration Act of 1851, 16,533 migrants between 1845 and 1857. After 1855, Highland mass migration was greatly reduced, with the fall in population between 1851 and 1891 at 9%, less than in Ireland and the rural Lowlands. However, measures like the Crofters’ Holding Act of 1886 did not stop the Highlands from depopulating from a population of 200,955 in 1831 to one of 127,081 in 1931.139 Migration abroad was the preferred answer to urban unemployment, often connected with housing problems and poor living conditions. Widespread economic depression caused the most dramatic mass departures in 1850, the mid-1880s and 1906-13. In the 1920s, emigration was so heavy it surpassed the natural population increase. The world trade depression of 1930 saw a reverse migration phenomenon which brought emigration at its lowest in the entire century. Canada was the chosen destination of the majority (70%) of migrants in the 1825-1835 period (mostly labourers, small farmers and landless people), while, by the start of the 20th century, with the percentages of skilled and unskilled migrants being 47% to 29% respectively, the former would travel to

---
139 Knox W.W., Migration: Scotland’s Shifting Population 1840-1940 (SCRAN), p.5
Retrieved: 17/5/2013
<http://www.scran.ac.uk/scotland/pdf/SP2_7migration.pdf>
South Africa and America, the latter to Canada or Australia. Emigration within the UK was also a popular option, with 749,000 Scots going to England or other sites in the British Isles in the 1841-1931 period\textsuperscript{140}. Such opportunity outpaced migration abroad in the inter-war period, although for too short time for the latter not to be the overall preferred possibility in the 1840-1940 period, especially as innovations in transport like the steamship made travelling faster and more secure than ever.

In total, between 1815 and 1939, 2 million Scots left for America and 600,000 went southward\textsuperscript{141}. On the other side of the coin, the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries saw Scotland also as a land of immigration, with the Irish being the undisputed major incomers. Of the concentration of temporary first and permanent communities after the Irish Famine, the industrial areas saw the largest, with Glasgow being the settlement of 29% of all Irish migrants in Scotland by 1850, and Edinburgh, in comparison, just hosting an Irish part comprising 6.5% of the total population in 1851. Irish immigrants were constantly in tension with the local population, due to their Catholic faith which did not bode well with the Presbyterians. Divisions occurred also between the Irish themselves, with Protestant emigrants from Ulster not having to sustain the same level of discrimination of the Catholics, but being forced to share the same city sectors. Their inability to vote until the 1918 franchise reform had the Irish communities withholding relatively little social importance; after, their allegiance went with the Liberal Party over their favourable position on Irish home rule. After the 1921 partition of Ireland, Irish support shifted to the Labour Party, helping it achieve unprecedented success in the Scottish political scene. After 1940, with growing opportunities in education opening up and the importance of religion in the workplace diminishing, the Irish, Roman Catholics included, were able to better integrate in the social structure of their host country. A minority of immigrants from other countries, mainly Jews and Lithuanians, settled in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century while escaping Nazism and Tsarism respectively. The former principally involved in tailoring, the latter in mining and agriculture, both communities faced hostility from local worker organizations, although anti-Semitism never took over in Scotland. The Lithuanians were briefly

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., p.6
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
put against mining communities for their willingness to work at lower wages, and Catholic faith, before being largely repatriated during World War I.

5.3: Social change during WWI and in the inter-war period

By the start of the century, unemployment was already a widely felt problem. Burdened with short-term tasks in the Clyde shipbuilding and small city jobs like street selling, many workers (a 25% of the total workforce) faced the grim reality of a life with very volatile gains. Furthermore, the average wages for Scottish workers were lower than in England, and the living costs higher. As migration to the cities became a major phenomenon by the second half of the 19th century, housing became an increasingly urgent problem. By 1911, 45,6% of the population of Scotland lived in the central industrial areas, in towns of at least 20,000 people. As the vast majority of internal migrants were poor people of the working class, their flux rapidly paved the way for house overcrowding. High rentals (16% more expensive than the average central-northern England ones) forced more than 2 million Scots to share their one or two-room abode with one or more other people, for a total percentage of 47,7% of the population in 1911 (in comparison, only 7,1% of the English lived in one or two room houses). At the same time, it was not rare that cities had hundreds or thousands of houses (20,000 in Glasgow) no one could afford to live in. The economy of industrial Scotland was not flexible enough for people of the lower classes to gain significant chances at improving their lifestyle. Furthermore, the current labour trend, which consisted in temporarily hiring low paid unskilled workers from an increasingly abundant workforce supply, couldn’t save enough of the entrepreneurs’ money when the winds of economy started to change. By 1914, the heavy industries were starting to fear the risk of international competitors, and the rising consumer demands of more specific and technological commodities (such as electrical household goods

143 Ibid.
or motor vehicles) needed an expertise the average workforce did not possess. The first shakeup came with the outbreak of war in August 1914, but it was not sudden.

In Scotland, the common enemy to unite against was welcomed as less of a threat and more of a treat: the economic, political and social unrest which were about to come out to the surface failed to materialize, leapt over by a wave of newfound British patriotism. The political heads started a recruiting campaign which garnered tremendous response, so much that a physical standard was set in September 1914 (to be lowered by 1915 in the wake of the casualties suffered). The Scotsmen made 22 battalions out of the 157 of the British Expeditionary Force. The reasons that brought so many Scots to enthusiastically sign up for the military were only partially of patriotic order, and included the more pragmatic wish of escaping from a boring (and largely underpaid) life and job, or the more practical prospect of a better and steadier income. The recruitment system was administered locally, so workers would share the same battalion with their work colleagues and community peers. Social pressure to enlisting was extremely high: those who expressed their refusal would face shame in the family and discrimination in the workplace. When the first death tolls started to roll in, the Scots began to realize the cost of the First World War: conscriptions and constant lowering of requirements were the government’s answer to the estimated 100,000 (out of 745,000) Scotsmen fallen, of which, due to the locally based battalion formation, entire communities and villages were emptied.\footnote{Finlay R.J., “The Turbulent Century” in Wormald, \textit{Scotland. A History}, p.235}

In the cities, class tensions surfaced when the working class, strengthened by their essential position in war economy and granted higher wages, but put at a disadvantage by the high inflation and the Taylorist approach of the government (which was to specialize skilled and unskilled workers alike in single actions in order to maximize production, to the detriment of the best crafters), caused wildcat strikes. What resulted in the armament production centre of the Clyde basin was the emergence of the mass socialist movement called Red Clydeside. Its organizers went on to pioneer a Rent Strike in 1915, in which residents from the overcrowded houses near the workplaces refused to pay the rents the landlords
had raised in order to have a gain from the workers’ higher wages. Enforced by a moral indignation for the landlords’ avidity towards those who depended upon the soldiers abroad and the scandals concerning their slowing down production in order to keep costs high, they saw aid from government intervention and the mediation of the Independent Labour Party, the rising political force behind the Red Clyde and the Rent Strike. Given increasing power by representing the working class (which with they dialogued through the trading unions’ sympathetic action) and syphoning its votes from the Liberals (who, in turn, had sided with the capitalists before the workers gained the upper hand in the strikes), Labour became a mainstay in the Scottish political scene.

**Table 5.1**

**Election Results in Scotland, 1918-1950**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELECTION RESULTS IN SCOTLAND 1918-1950</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1922</th>
<th>1923</th>
<th>1924</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1950</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coalition Conservative</td>
<td>Dec 14</td>
<td>Nov 15</td>
<td>Dec 5</td>
<td>Oct 29</td>
<td>May 30</td>
<td>Oct 27</td>
<td>Nov 14</td>
<td>Jul 5</td>
<td>Feb 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition Liberal National Labour</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Labour Coalition Labour</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Labour</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Conservative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Labour</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total seats</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority in parliament</td>
<td>Coal 239</td>
<td>Con 73</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>Con 209</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>Nat 493</td>
<td>Nat 243</td>
<td>Lab 146</td>
<td>Lab 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority in Scotland</td>
<td>Coal 37</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>Con 1</td>
<td>Lab 1</td>
<td>Nat 57</td>
<td>Nat 15</td>
<td>Lab 3</td>
<td>Lab 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: “United Kingdom General Election Results 1865-2010” (Almanac of Scotland), Retrieved: 7/5/2013*<br> <http://www.almanacofscotland.co.uk/generalelection.htm#RANGE!A137>
Labour breakthrough was favoured by the popular disaffection for the Liberal party, whose implosion over the decision to participate in the War, in opposition to the party’s historical pacifist approach, and subsequent internal division into separate factions guided respectively by Herbert Henry Asquith (the party leader who led Scotland into WWI) and David Lloyd George in 1918 opened the way for a socialist message which reached the more ideological-prone ears of the middle class and had them consider the possibility of a socialist revolution. When, on 31 January 1919, 100,000 protesters marched, red flag in hand, to George’s Square in Glasgow, the Scottish secretary sent in 12,000 troops and tanks to put a stop to any kind of Soviet insurgency, in an ideal demonstration of how the government perceived the implications of the Russian Revolution of 1917. The major contribution to socialism was however the franchise reform of 1918, which expanded the electorate to 2,205,000, including, for the first time, women over 30.

In the 1918 elections, Labour could count on a higher quantity of working class voters, but was assigned only seven seats, while the Unionist conservatives saw the biggest increase (32 MPs from the 7 of 1910). The Liberals won the overall majority (34), although their party was fractured in three parts: those loyal, led by Lloyd George’s plan of a coalition with the Unionists, those loyal to the Conservatives, and those loyal to Asquith. In 1922, Labour became the largest party in Scotland with 29 seats, and in 1924 led a minority government with a small social reform programme. By 1918, the resurgent right wing, which had endorsed the Liberal-guided Coalition government, had the Unionist party rapidly becoming the major anti-socialist force: guided by the Glasgow businessman Andrew Bonar Law until his death in 1932, they had been gaining favour over Liberals from the press (both The Scotsman and the Glasgow Herald), and the Church (undergoing unification and leadership shifts in the 1920s). The reunification of the Liberals under Asquith in 1923 had them win 23 seats in the following elections, but their fortunes shifted again when their decision to support the minority Labour government was called out by the Unionists as a failed

Retrieved: 3/5/2013
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/scottishhistory/modern/intro_modern.shtml>
attempt to keep socialism at bay \(^{146}\). The Liberal Party was subsequently cast off the political scene when both the left and right wings declared themselves as moderate, effectively depriving it of any political uniqueness it had left.

The post war period saw a dramatic decline in the economy: the focus on a short array of products from interconnected heavy industries, which were further homogenized for the production of war machines, weapons and ammunition, had neglected other products, like cars, chemical and machines, which were starting to show promise as exportable goods. As a result, international trade suffered: while Scotland had been contributing for 10% of the total exports from UK in the pre-war period, the post-war years up to 1948 saw the proportion decrease considerably. English industries such as motor-car, electrical goods and aircraft productions, were concentrated in the Midlands and Southern zone, and had the help of the protectionist tariff systems employed mid-war, but enjoyed small profits until the post-war period. When the market potential for these products translated eventually into a profitable venue in the internal and external markets, Scotland, which had only been investing in established industries, found itself able to provide only a limited output of specialized exports. Rising prices of freight transport and insurance rendered even more difficult to manage a decline of exports, textiles especially. As a table compiled with the data from the annual *Statements of the Trade of the United Kingdom* shows:

---

Table 5.2: Analysis of export shipments through Scottish ports, 1868, 1907 and 1948

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodities</th>
<th>Percentage of total shipments through Scottish ports in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food, drink and tobacco:</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whisky and beer</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class II</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw materials:</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufactures:</td>
<td>82.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron and steel products</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unallocated and other exp.</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The increasingly smaller trade of textiles over the 1868-1948 period is apparent, as is the rise of metal export, confirming that a shift in the offer and employment levels was indeed taking place. An important factor was that Scotland had become almost entirely dependent on war economy. The mining workforce was consisting in workers either too weak or old, as the more fit had been set for conscription. To the steady collapse of the shipbuilding industry, trampled under cheaper American products and German war chest, corresponded drops in the steel industry. Coal could not compete with the new-born petrol engines, and the colonies could not raise enough money with the increasingly cheapened raw materials to afford new machinery. Miners and other unions announced a General Strike in 1926, which ended six month later with their defeat. The falling purchasing power of the Scots, the notoriety of movements like Red Clyde-side and the wavering approach of the local industrialists kept away from Scotland industrial and capital investments. Wishfully thinking that a revival of the pre-war industrial glory might happen, the Scots fell into the Great Depression of 1929 among increasing mass unemployment, southward migration, takeovers from competitors, the closure of
four banks, loss of control over the railway system and part of the steel industry. Scotland was missing many of the key components which light industries in England had been using to conduct a better business: the inability to procure low cost raw materials, semi-finished goods and electricity was coupled with the lack of a sufficient number of workers with the right skillset and of appropriate marketing strategies. The repositioning of companies from Scotland to England became common practice as the divide between the two regions intensified: the English had been working in the field much earlier, and their experience was deeper and applied to a wider range of activities. Scotland was seeing too little opportunity, and the fall of local industries due to small demand often meant lack of a job for the entire community inhabiting the area. What was closed was not to be opened elsewhere, as in the inter-war period Scottish entrepreneurship seemingly slumbered, with no incentive both for Scottish and for English to set branch plants up in Scottish land. As Carol Heim noted, “[these] areas had no significant cost advantages to offset barriers to entry”. Unemployment rose from 14% of the populace in 1923-30 to 28% in 1932. In specific sectors the figures for that year were much higher: 34% in coal mining, 48% in iron and steelworks and an astounding 62% in shipbuilding.147 The myth of the hardworking, disciplined and skillful Scotsman made the unemployed see their condition as nothing short of a bane, and try everything in their power to prevent or correct the situation, including forced reclusion of women in their house, away from the workplace, and cuts in public expenditure which mainly affected education and childcare. A level of migration that surpassed the (yet growing) birth rate was coupled with the never-ending Irish immigration to create a wave of collective panic for the supposed job-stealing invasion, which was never suppressed, but often ridden, by the authorities and the Presbyterian Church. Shattered after the Disruption of 1843, the United Free Church (created in 1900 by the joint Free Church and Voluntaries) and the Church of Scotland reunited in 1929, after clashing over the claim of the former for spiritual and material independence from civil authorities.

147 Cameron E.A., Impaled Upon a Thistle: Scotland since 1880 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), p.52
in contrast with the Westminster Confession of Faith\(^{148}\), one of the fundamental laws of the United Kingdom. Their agreement on the legally dubious subject came with the Church of Scotland Act of 1921, and the legal consequences that could have surfaced were nullified through further ecclesiastical legislation during the decade.

In the 1930s, an imperative necessity, even for the Labour party, was the survival of the Union, whose assets were fundamental for achieving a minimum level of prosperity. Although promotion of Home rule was generally low, the birth of the National Party of Scotland (NPS) in 1928 added a radical political approach to the question, which, however, did not survive an early electoral debacle: the party joined the Scottish Party to form, in 1934, a right wing Scottish National Party (SNP) with an imperialistic vision, but votes still did not reward their claim. The Labour minority government had been encouraging regional industrial development, leading to the foundation of the Scottish National Development Council and, later, the Scottish Economic Committee, but, in addition to not finding incisive solutions for the economic slump, they had incurred in a financial deficit for the rising expenses on social security. The creation of a "National Emergency coalition" government, led by the prime minister Ramsay MacDonald, did bring economic reforms such as the designation of regions of high unemployment as "special areas" and the foundation of light industries in Dundee, Hillington near Glasgow and the Vale of Leven. With the Labour party left to reorganize itself and face defections, the Unionists steered governmental action to join a common British policy that was, however, focused on protection of tariffs, low interest rates and subsidies for farmers: a solution tailor-made for England, but hardly effective for Scotland’s necessities. With a resurfaced need for some kind of devolved administration, it was devised, under the statement that Scotland was not in any way seceding from the Union or searching for independent power, the transfer of the Scottish Office to Edinburgh in 1939. This was a measure aimed at giving the

various boards (evolved into departments in the 1920s) that oversaw Scottish administration (agriculture, health, prisons, asylums, crofting system) a unified infrastructure under the Office, granting it authority over them and a proper local form of government. The strong advocacy for that was emblematic of Scotland’s vacillating faith in Whitehall, and a hint that the Scots were starting to find themselves no longer in their proper place within the Union. Attempts to enliven the national morale focused on state-driven industrial revival and displays of Scottish talent and national glory: two vessels, the Cunard liner and the *Queen Mary*, were funded, the latter launched in September 1934. The Glasgow Empire Exhibition was inaugurated in 1938, with the aim of showing all of Scotland’s achievements.

In 1940, when France was invaded and Britain began to perceive the true stakes of the Second World War, the heavy industries saw a fast increase of orders, and the Clyde became the primary anchorage point for convoys of merchant ships which brought food, materials and soldiers from America, Canada and other countries. As British sustainability depended on the state of the Atlantic routes, Greenock was made a strategic shelter for incoming and outgoing ships. The national economy saw a massive state intervention, which regulated conscriptions in the military and the industries, civil defence services, resource rationing and emergency provisions. The gradual differences in local policies like housing, insurances and pensions, which had permeated the society since the start of the century, were absorbed into “the government’s business”\(^{149}\). Road, railway and, partially, air, made connections and communications throughout the country faster and more incisive than ever: national radio broadcasts, phone calls, newspapers and movies were shared among communities kilometres away. Thomas Johnston, from the Labour party, was appointed by the Churchill coalition as the new Secretary for Scotland to supervise war regulations, and licensed with the power to bring substantial reforms. With a declared dream of a “Scotia

resurgent”, he planned to introduce Edinburgh meetings and access to the Office for the Scottish MPs, unaltered confirmation from Westminster for laws approved in Edinburgh and the creation of a “Council of State” with former Scottish Secretaries as its members, whose advice, especially after the creation of the Scottish Council on Industry in February 1943, was no small contribution to the post-war policies for the sector. Johnston was the applicator of the 1942 Beveridge Report, planning a welfare state sustainable for both the war and post-war period. Johnston’s welfare tactics were promising, but had limited resources to be pursued with. Because of that, many of his innovations did not have the impact many had anticipated. Scotland saw itself as hardly a prominent member of the Union, and the location of most of the war factories in the English midlands (with the Scottish ones used as storage facilities) did not help, despite Johnston’s effort to redirect war contracts to Scotland (13.6% of the total by the end of the war).

Nationalism re-emerged in the by-elections of 1944 when the SNP candidate Douglas Young gained 41% at Kirkcaldy, and when, in April 1945, Robert McIntyre triumphed over Labour at Motherwell. SNP’s foray in the Parliament was a chance to signal the southward migration of workers and industries, but it was over soon enough to consider their position not what Scotland might have really felt in regard to the Union, and the SNP’s low results in the political scene until the 1960s extend this sentiment to the entire post-war period. The 1950 elections split almost all the votes between Labour and the Conservatives, pushing Independent Labour Party, Communist, Liberal and SNP representation to almost nothing. The thoroughly “British” political climate translated into welfare and rebuilding policies too general for Scotland to have its problems specifically and efficiently addressed: the reconstruction had to be

---

151 A report presented by Sir William Beveridge in 1942, focused on a series of proposals to conquer “five giants on the road of reconstruction” (Disease, Ignorance, Squalor, Idleness and Want), which included a system of social security aimed at banishing poverty and promoting assistance to categories at risk. It is considered the basis upon which the Welfare State came to be developed.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/timeline/factfiles/nonflash/a1143578.shtml>
conducted notwithstanding the state bankruptcy, and the industry could not take the opportunity to renew itself and diversify production, although traditional products were successful both as a market (especially because of low competition from an Europe in a ruined state) and as a source of employment. By 1958, productivity, growth and income rates were, however, falling. Government intervention was deemed necessary as the standards of living were again below average and the cuts on public expenditure, coupled with the end of national service, were rapidly drying out jobs. Public housing was an important point in the 1945-51 Labour government's agenda, which partially reflected the English Labour centralization of control over industries and transport in London, but were ultimately limited in scope as the costs required to meet the standards were largely unsustainable with the scarce resources available. As a result, the years after 1951 saw the planning and introduction of low-cost accommodation solutions like tower blocks and prefabricated houses. The following years had the Scottish welfare fluctuate in accord with the dominant party in Britain. Conservatives and Labour both had their chances to win a majority, and, even if the working class was abundantly supportive of the latter, the 1955 elections saw the Unionists triumph for a little amount of votes. Social identity well reflected that: the after war period saw in both major parties the opinion that Britain was and was to be considered a centralised unitary state, without place or need for Scotland to carve a specific identity of her own. Conservatives were anchored to British patriotism, while Labour, more apt to reason in terms of class than of nation, rejected its past support for Home Rule as something not needing commitment in that moment 152.

5.4: Toward Devolution

The second post-war period was not one of the easiest times for Scotland: the downturn of the economy, rising unemployment and hopes that the state could intervene to guarantee the existing standards of living were directly tied to the

---

state of the industry, where local diversification was very small, consumers fidelity was scarce (as buying imported household items was more convenient), and traditional products were, again, meeting low demand. That was a disadvantage Scotland was bound to incur, as the industries, which had been undergoing a progressive downward production trend since the late 50s, were organized the same way they had been at the start of the century, and were facing increasing competition from abroad. As recognised in the 1961 Toothill Report, the development of new industries focused on scientific research, engineering and commercial innovation was necessary. The degradation of the Empire and the loss of colonies meant unavailability of cheap raw material supplies, so the solution for the likely rise in prices and widespread fall of purchasing power was the creation of a lively domestic economy. In order for that to be possible, an efficient state apparatus had to be put at work. The Scottish Office, already undergoing a surge of workforce, was coupled with an empowered Scottish Secretary to bring governmental policies to fruition, regardless of the electorate’s preferences. Scottish initiative was already on its way, though: the fact that English and Scottish interests had started to manifestly diverge in the after-war period had been emblematic in the sudden rise and decline of the Conservative Party in the 1955 and subsequent elections, in complete contrast with the English, whose support for the Conservatives had started to rise from 1951 onwards and would not show a sign of faltering until much later, in 1997. The British Treasury imposed restrictions on the economy as Labour policies had been meeting crises and inflation, but the collateral damage (unemployment, chiefly) entailed by the strategies employed caused widespread discontent in Scotland. Repairing action from the government came in the form of special favours, including a series of incentives to restart the car industry (the Rootes company was persuaded to open a car factory in Linwood, in the proximity of Glasgow, so that it could benefit from the nearby steel manufacturers), and long promised infrastructures.

Labour rose to UK government again with Harold Wilson in 1964, gaining a solid majority in Scotland over the Conservatives (19 seats), while advantage in the rest of UK was much less pronounced, leading to a total of only 4 seats over the opponents. As a result, the new Labour government was expected to be short-lived, and the solution the party decided to offer was a strong, state-assisted policy of improvement largely targeted at Scotland (the Highlands and the Islands especially). Dedicated boards were established and tasked with bringing social development and effectively securing job levels through public employment, but their action was hampered by the periodic loss of budget due to recurring financial crises. The small Labour majority pursued the idea that a lively consumer market would attract new industries to Scotland, even when the optimistic predictions clashed against the real economic situation. Fearing that retreating would cost the party a bad electoral performance, Labour and the Secretary of State Willie Ross concentrated their efforts in directing as big a public share as possible to Scotland, raising public expenditure to a peak of £192.3 million in 1973, and leading to the “National Plan”, a series of prestigious but costly projects to be developed in all zones of the country. Work begun for the Dounreay fast-breeder reactor in the North, the coal pit of Longannet, the Forth Road Bridge, and the Universities of Strathclyde, Heriot-Watt, Dundee and Stirling. In addition, the period saw the introduction of comprehensive schooling for 98% of the population. Scotland received funds from the Union, which translated to regional assistance in the North and support to the industries. It was a sort of demonstration that the Union’s support was essential, but flexible enough to be mostly administered internally. Labour’s expensive National Plan did, however, meet serious budget problems, the worst of which was a £800m deficit in the Balance of Payments, inherited from the
previous Conservative government\textsuperscript{157}. Data from an analysis of international trade in the 1950-70 segment show the following:

**Table 5.3:**

(Selected) Balance of payments statistics -£m, 1958-70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports fob</th>
<th>Exports (incl. re-exports) fob</th>
<th>Merchandise trade balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>3,377</td>
<td>3,406</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>3,642</td>
<td>3,527</td>
<td>-115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>4,138</td>
<td>3,737</td>
<td>-401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>4,043</td>
<td>3,903</td>
<td>-140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>4,103</td>
<td>4,003</td>
<td>-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>4,450</td>
<td>4,331</td>
<td>-119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>5,111</td>
<td>4,568</td>
<td>-543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>5,173</td>
<td>4,913</td>
<td>-260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>5,384</td>
<td>5,276</td>
<td>-108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>5,840</td>
<td>5,241</td>
<td>-599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>7,145</td>
<td>6,433</td>
<td>-712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>7,478</td>
<td>7,269</td>
<td>-209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8,142</td>
<td>8,128</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Retrieved: 3/6/2013
<http://dev3.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/1/1671/papers/Bordo_Mac_Oliver.pdf>

As the table displays, Britain was in the middle of a period when imports were regularly higher than exports, meaning a situation of low internal demand due to either insufficient internal offer or excessive home prices. Where imported goods reduced the demand for those produced in the home country, causing unemployment as a consequence, the government was required to intervene with measures aimed at encouraging production and exports. Higher prices for imports

Retrieved: 2/6/2013
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/19/newsid_3208000/3208396.stm>
were applied, but, as trade deficit figures rose, the Scottish government decided to provide a major stimulus to exports through devaluation of the pound. The decision was repeatedly delayed over fears that speculators would anticipate the devaluation and change their pounds into dollars, effectively generating an “attack” on the pound that the UK reserves were inadequate to counter without the assistance of the Bank for International Settlements or the International Monetary Fund\(^\text{158}\). On 12th November 1967, in the midst of severe reserve loss, after a failed attempt at requesting financial aid from the US, Prime Minister Wilson, the Chancellor of the Exchequer Callaghan and the Treasury decided to devalue the dollar/pound exchange rate from $2.80 down to $2.40 (~14%)\(^\text{159}\). The rumours of new loan deals being struck with world banks, which Callaghan was not able to de-confirm, spread through the markets and led to a massive sterling sale, causing a £1.5bn loss in the Balance of Payments. The sterling was eventually devalued on 18th November 1967. The action reduced very slowly the reserve losses (going from $6.3bn in 1967 to $3.5bn in 1968, and $2.4bn in 1969)\(^\text{160}\). As Callaghan resigned, the new Chancellor Roy Jenkins raised taxes by £923m to support Scotland’s export industries, bringing the Balance of Payments to record a £550m surplus\(^\text{161}\).

Labour strategies ended up ultimately unrewarded, as the advantage of 21 seats in Scotland in the 1970 elections was not enough to avoid a Conservative victory in Britain with Edward Heath\(^\text{162}\). That was the context in which young SNP candidate Winifred Ewing won a seat in Hamilton in 1967, a traditionally Labour stronghold, bringing nationalism to the forefront of the political scene. Although such a result garnered incredible fame, coverage by the British press, and firmly

\(^{162}\) Ibid.
put the SNP on the British political map (with Heath, the Tory leader himself, declaring that nationalism was the “biggest single factor in our politics today”\textsuperscript{163}), it did not come completely unexpected: Scotland’s history of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century is not devoid of examples of a never truly curbed strain of nationalism, as demonstrated by SNP success in the 1968 local elections (34\% of the total Scottish votes), but also by a reinvigoration of national culture, which had already found ideal expression in the 1947 Edinburgh Festival of Music and Drama and, even before, in the “Scottish Renaissance” literary movement spearheaded by Hugh MacDiarmid\textsuperscript{164}.

In the 1970 general elections, the SNP doubled their vote but lost the Hamilton seat under a shared Labour and Conservative attack on the SNP campaign for independence, in which they claimed Scotland was not in sufficiently good economic and social conditions for that to happen. The SNP’s misfortunes worsened with the realization, through opinion polls, that only a small minority of their voters were actually pro-independence, the others supporting the party as an


\textsuperscript{164} The “Scottish Renaissance” was a literary movement begun in the 1920s, which came to encompass other sectors such as art, music, and politics. Its universally recognized key member was the poet C. M. Grieve, who often signed his works as “Hugh MacDiarmid”. A radical nationalist, co-founder of the SNP in 1928, expelled in 1933 for his excessively extremist views, MacDiarmid took on himself a mission of cultural reawakening, to take Scotland out of its sentimental traditionalism. Along with the publication of a literary magazine/anthology, Northern Numbers: Being Representative Selections from Certain Living Scottish Poets, MacDiarmid’s work is noted for having employed Gaelic and “Lallans”, a hybrid Scottish language with lexicographical characters, which all comprised the author’s effort to create a standard Scots language for literature. His most famous work was the poem A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle. Taking inspiration from the national icon revival of the 19th century, the work of the early poets William Dunbar and Robert Henrysou, as well as more modern ones like T. S. Eliot, the writers and artists of the movement included George Douglas Brown, Marion Angus, John Duncan Fergusson, Lewis Grassic Gibbon, Sydney Goodsr Smith and William Souter.

act of protest against the government. The upturn was, theoretically already present in the form of the gas and oil discovered in the North Sea, 110 miles off Aberdeen. Scotland was the closest nation to the extraction point, and Britain was the internationally recognized proprietor of that sea sector. The prospect of royalties and taxes to be rightfully exacted from the extraction companies spurred the SNP to captain in 1971 a national claim for "Scotland’s Oil"\textsuperscript{165}. After the SNP’s takeover of another Labour stronghold, Govan, with Margo MacDonald in 1973, the Nationalists conquered seven seats and 22% of the vote in the 1974 General Elections, losing to a Labour force which, in the light of the results, had to take a devolution project into consideration, despite having pushed against it during the electoral campaign. In a later election in 1974, the SNP surpassed the Conservatives, with 30% of the vote, and the second place in 42 constituencies. It was the dual culmination of two complementary trends, the rise of SNP and the decline of the Conservatives: retainers of a “Unionist” profile that was the voice of British patriotism in Scotland, the Conservatives (renamed as such after the “Unionist” Party’s dropping ratings from 1959 to 1966) had gone from representing unionism, imperialism and Protestantism in the first half of the 20th century to going under the perception of being an anglicised elite, unable to grasp Scotland’s problems, in the 70s. Their unchanged position badly survived the disintegration of the Empire, the nationalisation of the industry and the falling influence of the Church in an increasingly secularised Scotland, which by itself had led to a major lessening in the religious discrimination of workers\textsuperscript{166}. Now there was a sizable Catholic working class supporting the Labour, while a vast majority of Protestants were backing the SNP. The British Conservatives’ victory in the 1970 elections could not hide that the party had become a minority in Scotland. Prime Minister Ted Heath had to admit taking devolution into consideration in his \textit{Declaration of Perth}. It would always be Heath to assign a Constitutional

\textsuperscript{165} Brocklehurst S., "Who has a right to claim North Sea oil?", (BBC Scotland News, 16/5/2013). Retrieved: 12/5/2013
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-20042070>

\textsuperscript{166} "20th Century Scotland – An Introduction (II)", (Modern Scotland, BBC). Retrieved: 12/5/2013
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/scottishhistory/modern/intro_modern2.shtml>
Committee to Lord Home in order to plan out a devolved Scottish Assembly. Commitment to the plan was short lived in light of the SNP’s 1970 poor performance, and the idea would be resurrected in November 1975 by the Labour government.

The Conservatives’ 1974 downfall was the price paid for their attempts to invert the policy of state interventionism in the economy: low rents and subsidies, which had been characterising post-war housing programmes, were raised and stopped respectively with the Housing Financial Provisions Act of 1972; the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders company was brought to the brink of failure, prompting a resistance campaign peaking in a protest march of 80,000 workers in June 1972; the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 was issued in order to sap the trade unions’ power, and caused the outbreak numerous rebellions the most famous of which was conducted by the National Union of Mineworkers. In 1974, many of the seats which ended up in SNP hands had been Conservative.

When, in 1974, the British Labour majority published a White Paper, *Devolution in the UK – Some Alternatives for Discussion*, with five options listed, the way was opened for a Bill to grant Scotland a devolved Scottish Assembly. British constitutional change was not the main objective, rather the search for a solution to the risk of separatism. The Scottish executive rejected every one of the points, prompting a debate in the Co-Operative Halls in Glasgow which had devolution pushed forward. That came roughly mirroring the vast Scottish popular opinion about the Union, which was what had seemingly brought so many Scots to vote SNP in the first place: in Scotland, “Britishness”, the concept dear to the Unionist Party which had reached the peak of its fame in the 1950s, was fading, as the British Empire was rapidly crumbling following India’s independence in 1947 (the African and other ex-colonies following suit 10 years later), and the Suez crisis in 1956. In 1975, Labour published another White Paper, *Our Changing Democracy: Devolution to Scotland and Wales*, in which was proposed a Scottish Assembly of 142 members. The new institution would not have the power to raise taxes, and Westminster would retain sovereignty. Divisions and disagreement over the question, the exact powers devolved and the small Labour majority’s fears over parliamentary disaffection urged the proponents to re-adapt the bill as a
referendum, which a motion by anti-devolutionist MP George Cunningham, required to reach 40% of favourable Scottish votes to pass. A possible strong reason to vote, the rights over North Sea oil, was played out as the closest islands, the Orkney and the Shetlands, were to be excluded from the plan had they voted “no”. When issued on 1 March 1979, the referendum missed the minimum number of voters, with 51.6% (1.23 million Scots, 1/3 of the total voters) answering “yes” and 48.2% answering “no”\footnote{Lynch P., Bromage S., “The 1979 Devolution Referendum in Scotland”, (The Scottish Political Archive, University of Stirling), pp.1-21. Retrieved online in 16/5/2013 <http://www.scottishpoliticalarchive.org.uk/wb/media/1979%20Referendum.pdf>}. Such narrow support meant not only division by the electorate’s part, but also low exposition to coverage on the subject and disinterest among Scots and among the political forces in charge of raising popular awareness of the initiative. Distrustful over Labour management of the referendum, the SNP issued a motion of no confidence. For one vote, the Labour government fell and the Conservatives won the following General Election, 13 uninterrupted years of government awaiting them. The SNP suffered the loss of nine out of 11 seats, and Home Rule fell off the British agenda.

With the British economy burdened by poor productivity and high inflation, call for a new economic strategy found its answer in Margaret Thatcher’s free-market liberalism, an anti-state based action which swung a powerful strike to the autonomy of the Trade Unions and local municipality councils, which were strongly obstructed in their strikes-calling action and policies adverse to the government respectively. Thatcher’s policies for Britain included stabilization of the pound thanks to North Sea Oil sales (which made imported goods cheaper, but exporting more difficult), raising interest rates and lowering income taxes in order to encourage investments, cuts for government programs (police, defence and NHS excluded), housing (boosting council house sales in Scotland) education and local governments (to put a hold on excessive expenditure). The plan to cut public spending and, possibly, taxes, cemented the Conservative domination in the English public opinion, but in Scotland, cities and other labour-intensive centres
saw a massive rise in poverty and unemployment\textsuperscript{168}. The ever-increasing adversity that Scotland grew against Thatcher’s policies was not intensely backed by Labour, the force historically opposed to social indifference, as the party was not in a position of sufficient strength to counterattack the British Conservative consensus. As it became apparent, Scotland’s electoral preference little mattered if the rest of Britain had decided otherwise. In essence, if the Scots wanted a parliamentary representation proportional to their vote, they would need their own parliament. During the years of Conservative domination, the Labour leaders reaffirmed the party’s unionist stance, but the SNP saw the occasion fit to advocate Home Rule once more, in parallel with the formation, after 1979, of a Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, which devised an initiative open to all parties and public bodies to form a Constitutional Convention. In 1988, the SNP sent their first representatives to the Convention, only to retake them over a lack of ideological communication. In 1995, the Scottish Constitutional Convention published \textit{Scotland’s Parliament – Scotland’s Right}, a project detailing the creation and functions of a Scottish Parliament, which would exert sovereignty power over Scotland, with the exception of international relations, defence and the general economic policy. It was the fruit of a series of cross-party and cross-organization meetings and consultations started in 1989. With optimism over the support showed in opinion polls, Labour declared their commitment to it should they be elected. Campaigning for constitutional reform began in 1995, two years before the elections, with the SNP particularly active in order for the Convention’s scheme not to overlap them in the electorate’s eyes. Their parallel campaign failed due to insufficient support, the SNP joined the Convention backers in hope that devolution could eventually evolve into a request for independence. A 26.11\% of overall votes in the 1995 local elections, as well as Winnie Ewing and Allan Macartney’s mandate in the European Parliament for the 1979-1999 and 1994-1999 periods respectively, were encouraging steps into the

\textsuperscript{168} As paragraph 5.4 deals with Britain’s political steps which brought Scotland to claim for a devolved administration, this thesis provides a separate paragraph (5.5.3) detailing Margaret Thatcher’s policies and the way they affected Scotland’s society and economy, from the forced industrial shift to the fight against inflation, the experimental fiscal policy (the Poll Tax in particular) and the popular backlash which led to the eventual political demise of the Conservative party in the 1997 elections.
arena of the 1997 elections, in which the Labour was expected to win, the Liberals to not recede and the Conservatives unable to delay a defeat any more\textsuperscript{169}. When Tony Blair and the Labour Party triumphed in the 1997 elections, devolution for Scotland and Wales (although the two were treated separately) was put into motion. The first tangible step was the publication, on June 24, 1997, of a White Paper titled \textit{Scotland’s Parliament}, which pictured the creation of a Scottish Parliament with legal and fiscal power over Scotland. On September 11, 1997, a referendum on the proposal was held: 60.4\% of the voters, far more than the 40\% required in the Cunningham Amendment, came to express their preference, with support for the Government’s proposal reaching 74.3\% and 63.5\% agreeing to the cession of limited power on taxes to the Scottish Parliament. Thus, the Scotland Act came to receive the Commons’, the Lords’ and, finally, the Royal approval in November 1998. On the 6\textsuperscript{th} of May, 1999, the first general elections for the Scottish Parliament were held\textsuperscript{170}.

\section*{5.5: Scotland’s economy in the second half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century}

\subsection*{5.5.1: Corporatism and takeovers}

The after-war period saw the impact of a marked Socialist Labour impromptu on British society, with the unifying effect of wartime social solidarity on the people being prolonged with strong state planning and reliefs for the victims. Between 1946 and 1951, a massive nationalisation process placed under the government the Bank of England, coal (1947), infrastructures, gas, railways and electricity (1948), and the steel and iron industry (1949). Who gained the most from the procedure were the Trade Unions, now able to act in conditions of effective monopoly of their trade, while a wide standardisation of the businesses ensued from the state takeover of companies and small firms. Scotland applied centralization mainly as a mean to reinforce and amplify the existing industrial

structure, without taking on a model of diversification. Few were the exceptions, like the hydro-electric industry pioneered by Tom Johnston, which began in the 1970s. An example of innovation, it was also an uncommon case of industry built in specific sites to draw from their particular territorial characteristics, when the vast majority of the homogenised, centralised industries were planned by Labour to fill the indistinct context of a “Scottish Development Area” (consisting in Glasgow, Lanark, Renfrew, Dumbarton and parts of Ayr, Stirling, Dumfriesshire, West and Midlothian and the city of Dundee)\(^\text{171}\). Largely unexploited regional development was theoretically to be counterbalanced with the creation of a stronger infrastructure network which would have enabled a more efficient connection between centralised governmental action the enterprises, but the small car market (which supplied only 9% of Glasgow’s population in 1966) made the construction of roadway systems an expense without a tangible short-term payoff. Further problems came from increasing competition from UK industries relocated in Scotland (235 between 1937 and 1950)\(^\text{172}\) over sectors Scottish businesses had not established a strong market yet. Regional initiatives following the Local Employment Act of 1960 and the Industrial Development Act of 1966 boosted the creation of the strip mill at Ravenscraig, the motor vehicle assembly plant of Bathgate (which followed another manufacture built in Linwood), Fort William’s pulp mill and Invergordon’s aluminium smelter, none of which did push their respective business enough to avoid their failure. The Ravenscraig mill was the emblematic product of a nationalisation strategy which was, at its core, dictated by economic politics rather than the state of the market: the case, advanced by Secretary of State John Maclay and placed unto the Colvilles company, concerned the production of a strip mill in a time, 1958, of no market demand. Justification for its construction was that the facility would advance motor production and light engineering, and that the projected loss of £4.5m per annum would be inferior to public assistance for the otherwise unemployed people working on that. Too little demand for the mill caused the company, which was under a £50m Government


\(^{172}\) Ibid.
loan, to risk bankruptcy from 1963 till its nationalisation in 1967. The mill itself was closed in 1992. It was only with the discovery of the North Sea Oil that Scotland managed to invert the downward course of her rate of growth compared to the UK, realigning to the average in the 1970s. Although attempts at region industrial policies, upon devolution of the authority on the matter, were attempted by the Secretary of State, mainly through the action of the Scottish Development Agency founded in 1975, little geographic advantage was effectively exploited out of the Central Belt, the western side especially. Glasgow was at the centre of the heavy industry zone, while Edinburgh was the cultural and intellectual centre around which a net of professions more afferent to the service sector had been developing. Among those, particular relevance gained service sectors, while others saw a clear decline, as the following table demonstrates:

**Table 5.4:**

The Structure of the Scottish Economy, by distribution of Employment by Sector (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy and Water Supply</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metals, Minerals and Chemicals</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal Goods, Engineering, Vehicles</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Manufacturing</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution, Hotels, Catering</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport/Communication</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking, Finance, Insurance, Business Services, Leasing</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration and other services</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Classified</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---


The old industrial staples of mineral extraction, agriculture and manufacturing saw a downward trend, mirroring the rise of public and private service sectors. The shift is most notable in the 9.5% decline of the food sector, counterbalanced by the 11.4% rise in accommodation and food delivery services, and 7.9% in banking and financial services, which were undergoing a substantial expansion: in the 1950s, the banks started to extend their lending services to individuals for consumption: going after the US, the Scottish bank expanded what had been accorded to business customers to finance their venture to a service offered for the purchase of personal durable goods, via the subscription of personal loans, generally repayable monthly in fixed amounts. The acquisition of hire purchase companies was the Commercial Bank of Scotland’s leading move in 1954, which other British banks followed. Such moves allowed the banks to broaden their services so that they came to accommodate the building societies and national savings, which were competing for deposits. Those were ideal solutions for a sector that, by 1965, had been relying on accounts subscribed by only 16% of the Scots (saving banks excluded).\footnote{Kerr A.W.; \textit{History of Banking in Scotland}, retrieved online on 18/5/2013 at \texttt{<http://www.electricscotland.com/history/banking/chapter28.htm>}} Between 1950 and 1960, the sector saw growth in business thanks to the deregulation of governmental control on money lending and, in the 1970s, the optimism generated by the possibilities concerning North Sea Oil. Attempts to enlarge the customer pool were constantly expanded: along with the introduction of taxation, investment, trustee and insurance services, cheque cards were introduced in 1965-6, and credit cards in the 1970s, for both of which standardisation among participating banks was collectively applied. Bank expansion was long on its way: in the post-war period, an English acquisition campaign had resulted in a series of mergers with four of Scotland’s eight banks, which were able to retain their national profile and board of directors. Other mergers in the 1960s-1970s reduced to three the Scottish banks, of which the Clydesdale, the only property of an English bank (the Midland Bank), was sold to the National Australia Bank in 1987. A parallel opening of branches of Scottish banks in England took place in the 1970s, in the wake of the increasingly
competitive nature of the sector: the Royal Bank of Scotland, the first to offer house purchase loan schemes, merged with its subsidiaries in England and Wales to create the first British bank to offer free banking to its accredited customers. The extension of the innovations and services offered by Scottish banks was reviewed by the Parliamentary Committee in the Functioning of Financial Institutions in 1977. In that occasion, 92 services offered to personal and corporate customers were listed. The business services’ (including both banking and insurances) contribution to Scotland’s GDP was 5-6% in the 1970s (the UK average being 7-8%), and rose to 15% by the late 1980s (UK average: 17%)\textsuperscript{175}. It was a notable growth for a sector which had long lagged behind the rest of UK: in the 1970s, employment in commercial services was absorbing workforce from manufacturing activities in Britain except Scotland, which would not be part of the phenomenon until the 1980s, when the percentage of people involved in services started to rise, in contrast to the waning percentage employed in manufacturing. Much of the responsibility for Scotland’s delay was attributed to the low average income of the workers compared to the rest of UK (estimated at 10% below UK level in the 1980s). Low income was coupled with a relatively high amount of savings pro capita. Business History Lecturer Peter L. Payne provided an analysis of the situation, which was representative of the Scottish citizens’ fears of a repetition of the economic sufferings of the inter-war depression period, and their wide unwillingness to invest in projects of high financial exposure corresponded to their preference for high liquidity assets such as bank accounts, banknotes and securities\textsuperscript{176}. As a result, Scotland’s business and industrial economy was vulnerable to takeovers from multinationals, and the creation of industries bringing the diversification Scotland’ could not produce in its years of decline took the form of branch factories of English and American property, which by 1970 made up for 60% of the employment in manufacturing. There was a positive outcome of the industrial change: the electronics industry, which by 1983 was employing 10% of the manufacturing workforce. Originated with the creation of a Scottish division for the English gunsights producer Ferranti in war times, it

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Payne P.L., "The economy" in \textit{Scotland in the 20th Century…}, p.23
\item Payne P.L., "The economy" in \textit{Scotland in the 20th Century…}, pp.35-6
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
became the largest electronics firm in Scotland by the 1980s, before going into receivership in 1993. In 1960 Scotland acquired semiconductor plants from Hughes Aircraft Corporation and National Semiconductor, along with microelectronics plants for Motorola, General Instrument Microelectronics and NEC. The institution of “Silicon Glen”, an electronic industrial zone from Ayrshire to Dundee, was made possible thanks to low start-up and labour costs, the availability of skilled workers, government aid and collaboration with Universities (Stirling, Livingston, Edinburgh). Scotland became the biggest western European semiconductor producer in the early 1980s, its output of integrated circuits comprising 79% of the UK and 21% of the western European total, even if employment rate was not high (4,400 in 1985)\textsuperscript{177}.

Two processes in the Scottish industrial environment – the establishment of branches of new overseas industries and the rise of multinationals (as conglomerates of activities located in different countries all over the world) – resulted in a strong loss of share of ownership for Scotland in the industries operating within its territory. The initial post-war English control over Scottish branches evolved by the 1970s-80s in a much ampler internationalisation process which, by 1990, saw Scotland own 64% of the top 200 firms at work there, while 18% were owned by UK and 11% by the USA\textsuperscript{178}. Professor of historical economics Clive H. Lee noted that the phenomenon of external ownership was already strong with the Railway mergers in the 1920s and the Bank mergers of 1918 (Lloyds and the National Bank), 1919 (British Linen Bank and Barclays) and 1921 (Midlands and Clydesdale, and, in 1924, the North of Scotland Bank), followed in the post-war period by further bank and shipbuilding mergers: by the 1980s, local control over the five fastest-growing sectors was less than 14% (7.8% in electrical engineering, 9.8% in vehicles and 11.8 in chemicals), while the traditional Scottish industries, although firmly rooted in Scotland, had to arrange mergers in order to survive. Following the bankruptcy of Fairfield yard, the shipbuilding sector saw the creation through fusion of Scott Lithgow in 1967 and the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders.


\textsuperscript{178} ibid.
(out of 4 companies) and Robb Caledon in 1968, along with a Government funding aimed at containing rising wage costs, inflation and tendering. However, the lack of harmonisation of their organisational structure and financing system caused management conflicts, redundancies, and a general failure of rationalization which translated in a £110 million loss for the nationalized British shipbuilding sector by 1979-80, more than half of which was attributed to the Scottish yards\textsuperscript{179}. Other mergers involved the textile sector, which saw the firm Coats, which took over Paton and Baldwins (itself the product of a merger in 1920), and was eventually bought by the Eastern-textile-importing corporation Vantona Vynella in 1986. The jute industry went, because of mergers or closures, from 39 to 12 companies between 1955 and 1990, losing 18,000 of its 19,000 workers. The effect of external takeovers in Scotland ranged from short life for the unsuccessful small branches of multinationals, which were relocated in the middle East for the presence of cheaper labour, to lack of power over management, marketing and R&D (total expenses on which were only 45% of the UK average in 1997)\textsuperscript{180}, with the few completely positive effects stemming from the amplified industrial environment, made ultimately more competitive and able to secure investments.

5.5.2: North Sea Oil

The oil industry was the major bringer of competitive advantage in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century for Scotland: early gas field discoveries in the North Sea in the 1960s (Groningen in the Netherlands in 1959, West Sole by BP in UK in 1965, Balder Field by Esso in Norway in 1967) had prompted an international agreement between Britain, Denmark, Germany, Norway and the Netherlands concerning the economic rights over delimited zones in the North Sea. The 1958 Continental Shelf Convention and the subsequent UK Continental Shelf Act of May 1964 brought regulation to the economic zones, the British one being the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS), i.e. the waters surrounding the British Isles whose boundary lines were

\textsuperscript{179} ibid. p.95

\textsuperscript{180} Pittock M., The Road to Independence? Scotland since the Sixties, (London: Reaktion Books, 2008), p.32
defined through a median line\textsuperscript{181}. The UKCS was divided in quadrants of 1 degree longitude and 1 degree latitude, further divided into 30 blocks each.

The Arbroath field, the first oil field in the UKCS, was found in December 1969 by the Amoco company, 217km east of Aberdeen. It was the start of an exploration which would result in the discovery of the Forties field in October 1970 (BP), and the Brent oilfield east of Shetland (Shell Expro). The findings made oil production a pressing matter in Britain’s economic agenda, prompting the development of fabrication sites and production platforms. Offshore oil production began in June 1975 with Hamilton Bros. on the Argyll field, and on the Forties field in September of the same year. A figure showing the UK oil production in the 1975-2007 period can be seen below:

\textbf{Figure 5.1}  
\textbf{UK oil production 1975-2007 (’000 bpd)}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{uk_oil_production_1975-2007.png}
\end{figure}

\textit{Source: BP Statistical Review 2009 in “North Sea Oil” (Oil Finance Consulting Ltd.)  
Retrieved: 17/5/2013  
< http://www.oilfinance.co.uk/northseaoil.php>}

\textsuperscript{181} A line planned in order for all its points to be equally distant from two coastlines. Used not only to divide British waters from other countries’, but also English and Scottish waters. An approach also used for regulating fisheries after the 1999 devolution.  
\textit{Source: Brocklehurst S., ”Who has a right to claim North Sea oil?” (BBC, 16/4/2013).  
Retrieved: 12/5/2013  
< http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-20042070>
As the table displays, large scale oil production started in the mid 1970s, and rose by 1980 to the point UK had no need to rely on oil imports any longer. By 1983 total oil production was 50% more than what Britain required, and, by 1985, it reached a quantity superior to 2.5 million barrels. In 1989, oil related sales comprised 6% of Scottish manufacturing gross output. By the end of 1991, the North Sea had produced 1,400 million tons of oil.

National goals were given unquestioned priority over local development, generating a series of cases in which small, peripheral locations such as Arderseir, Kishorn and Nigg saw a massive transformation in short time. Not rare were the cases that saw State interests not coinciding with regional ones, and the companies’ as well. Oil extraction and production was a highly capital intensive activity, where labour payments made up no more than 3% of total expenses, and where intervention to control costs did not come until a drop in oil prices and reduction of fields endangered the North Sea to the advantage of other places less harsh to operate in. As proximity to the platform was strategic, the Grampian and Highland regions benefitted particularly from the surge in employment. The regional population had been falling from 468,000 in 1951 to 436,000 in 1971. As the overall production was enjoying a faster rate of growth of the sector than in any other petroleum province, and new fields were being discovered (Forties, Brent, Ninian and Piper being the most important), Grampian inverted its downward demographic trend, going from 436,000 inhabitants in 1971 to 480,000 in 1981, and 533,000 in 1995.

The machines for extracting and refining crude oil, like the mobile drilling rigs and the fixed production platforms, were, in the majority of cases, not of British manufacture. Of these, the platforms were built as close as the extraction location as possible: steel platforms were installed in Ardersier, Methil and Nigg Bay; concrete platforms at Hunterston and Loch Kishorn. In the mid 1980s, only

---

182 Lee C.H., *Scotland and the United Kingdom...*, p.103
184 ibid.
16% of North Sea oil was estimated to be refined in Scotland (at Grangemouth); 40% in UK, the rest exported crude to the USA, Germany, and the Netherlands. Scottish workers’ contribution resulted in a transfer of personnel from other sectors in traditional North-East industries (fishing, fish processing, papermaking, textiles, engineering). Their number peaked in 1985, with 50,000 people employed in the Grampian region, and 40,000 in the rest of Scotland. Wage-wise, the average male earning went from 85% of UK in 1972 to over 100% by 1978. Due to almost insurmountable entry barriers, Scotland couldn’t exert dominance in the sector: the majority of small companies founded next the extraction and production points dealt in basic support services (which flourished long the east coast, in Aberdeen and the Shetland), and increasingly complex engineering infrastructures. Technological and capital-intensive aspects were largely conducted by foreign companies, with small exceptions like the Wood Group.

Oil extraction provided Britain with £20,000m in revenues by the mid 1980s, but the sector demonstrated its vulnerability in the international market when they became subjects to price fluctuations: after an encouraging rise from 2.50$ per barrel in 1972 to 40$ in 1981, the oil glut of 1986 caused the price to fall sharply of 46% in the same year, down to $8 per barrel. The fall in price generated a slump in revenue and consequent cuts in expenditure on exploration and drilling. The industry moved to the development of satellite fields, which bore lower development costs. The fall in prices and revenue impacted employment, which fell by 14,000 (15%) from mid 1985 to 1987. Maintaining facilities became disadvantageous, as the redundancies generated by the fast expansion of the sector increased, but the number of working plants was not greatly reduced due to the expensive procedures of shutdown. Small companies, lacking financial

---

185 Lee C.H., *Scotland and the United Kingdom…*, p.103
186 Kemp A., “North Sea oil….”
187 The OPEC (Organization of the petroleum Exporting Countries), founded in 1960 as a representative of crude oil producing countries against economic dominance of the western multinationals, reacted to declining oil demand worldwide and rising non-OPEC production with production cuts in the first half of the 1980s, to which followed Saudi Arabia’s attempt to gain market share by increasing production, creating a surplus which caused a sharp fall in oil prices. Source: Cleveland C.J. (ed.), *Concise Encyclopedia of the History of Energy*, (waltham: Academic Press, 2009), p.217
188 Lee C.H., *Scotland and the United Kingdom…*, p.104
resources, failed, while foreign multinational branches which saw no profit abandoned the zone. Recession in the sector impacted the economy of the cities around the plants, Aberdeen in particular, which saw a steep increase in the housing market. Mergers ensued among the active large companies, which by 1989 had flown into three main conglomerates, each of them with headquarters in US. When, in 1988, the price stabilized, drilling and exploration resumed, although the process of rationalisation caused by the recession had reduced Scottish involvement, fostering limited possibilities concerning control and development of the local industry. Nevertheless, the strategic role of geographical proximity awarded the Grampian region a high employment ratio (52,000 of the 64,000 workers in oil related companies in Scotland in 1990) and one of the highest pro capita average income levels in the UK. By 1991, the peak in local employment comprised 20% of the workers in the Grampian region, to gradually decrease in the following year due to the depletion of mature fields and the small size of the new ones discovered, both causes of increases in the cost per barrel.

5.5.3 Thatcherism

For the entire 20th century, manufacturing in Scotland went through a series of painful transitions, either connected to economic circumstances or resulting from deliberate policy making. Of the agents at work, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s intervention pertained to the latter case, although the former contributed in no small measure in defining her reforms. The first years of the 1980s saw the British economy fall into recession, unemployment at 12% and private investments down to 11%. However, by 1982, inflation went down from 21% to 8,6%. Thatcher's reforms subsequently targeted the Trade and Labour Unions, with the establishment of an agency tasked with directing police against illegal strikes (that wasn't applied to the private sector). That started her battle

---

189 Kemp A., “North Sea oil....”
with the National Union of Mineworkers, which she called “enemy within”\textsuperscript{191}: the government’s plan to close 23 pits led to menaces of strikes that had the effect of delaying the plan indefinitely, until the creation in 1984 of the National Coal Board, guided by Ian MacGregor, which took action to close 20 coal mines, to the price of 20,000 workers. Marxist Arthur Scargill directed a national strike of NUM members in all the coal fields, ending in 1985, one year later, with the miners’ defeat. Triumphant, Thatcher proceeded toward a plan of privatization of electricity, gas, telecommunications and railways (the only sector left untouched being the national healthcare service).

Among the retrospective analyses published in British newspapers upon her death (on the 8\textsuperscript{th} of April 2013), particularly abundant in quantity and detail were the Scottish ones, which generally focused on one aspect of the Iron Lady’s career: her role in reshaping Scotland’s economy during her 1979-1990 Prime Ministry period. The leading opinion among representatives and politicians about it was that Thatcher’ had been “divisive”: as a BBC article reported, the current Prime Minister of Scotland Alex Salmond (SNP) said that “[her] policies defined a political generation” and “No doubt there will now be a renewed debate about the impact of that legacy”. In the same article, John Sergeant, former chief political correspondent of the BBC, recalled her unsuccessful commitment to Scotland, despite the application of economic and social policies which she herself considered “Scottish” in principle\textsuperscript{192}. Such policies consisted principally in the fight against inflation, that, in her vision, discouraged business investing, and the complete rejection of the “nanny state”, where in its stead privatization and deindustrialization had to be promoted in order to bring diversification to a compartmentalized heavy-industry-based economy. It was a move that did not

\textsuperscript{191}Ross T., “Margaret Thatcher: Lingering legacy of hate after battle with “enemy within” curbed union power and saved economy”, (The Telegraph, 8/4/2013). Retrieved: 24/5/2013

take into regard Scotland’s tradition as a market reliant on heavy industry and as a country where industriousness and production were defining characteristic of the (overwhelmingly male) model. The consequence was a dramatic wave of unemployment, which cost Scotland 1/5 of its workforce in the first two years of Thatcher’s government, and peaked at 15.6% in 1985. The entire north-British industrial sector was rendered unable to cover its losses without intervention from the state, and, consequently, saw a dramatic fall in production: through the 80s, the coal pits went from 15 to 2, the jute trade in Dundee, the Invergordon aluminium smelter, British Steel’s mill at Gartcosh, the Corpach pulp were closed, and the steel plant of Ravenscraig was shut off in 1993. The social cost paid for the restructuring, coupled with the poor economic performance, caused a slump in the consensus of the Conservative party, which a tactical vote in 1987 condemned to underrepresentation in Scotland (10 seats), where the opposite was happening in England.

If Thatcher’s economic intervention enjoyed no popularity among the people, it was, however, her fiscal policy what turned Scottish disaffection into aversion, and the key element in the occurrence was the Community Charge (or Poll Tax), that was introduced in Scotland in April 1989 as an “experiment” concerning local revenues: the previous property tax (“rates” in Britain) was calculated as a proportion of the value of properties. Thatcher introduced the principle of an equal, “neutral” tax, and made it correspond not to income, but to voting power: one man, one vote, one tax. The tax rapidly showed many weak points: its being required from every person on the basis of their very existence meant ideally that life was being priced; furthermore, various social categories, with little to no possibility to pay, and much richer people were charged with the

same amount. The tax levels were left to the local councils to decide, and, as a result, local high-spending policies were to be financed with substantial rises in taxation. Protest for the tax found expression especially in the “Can Pay, Won’t Pay” campaign for civil disobedience, and was violent to the point that fortified gates were erected in Downing Street, Edinburgh to protect it from protesters.\(^{197}\)

The Poll Tax was introduced one year before England and Wales, under the pressure of the Scottish secretary George Younger in order “to avoid an expensive review of the old rates, which the government was legally obliged to do”\(^{198}\). The lack of common knowledge about the fact meant that responsibility for the move was completely Thatcher’s in the eyes of the Scots, who accused the government of treating Scotland as a testing ground for a manifestly unpopular measure. The Poll Tax is considered to have been a major contributor to Thatcher and her party’s downfall: the backlash suffered by the Conservative and Unionist parties resulted in a defeat in the elections which radically changed Scotland's political scenery in the 1990s and 2000s, and that the Conservatives, as of 2013, still have not recovered from:

\(^{197}\) Maddox D., “Margaret Thatcher: Poll tax was the beginning of the end” (The Scotsman). Retrieved: 25/5/2013; <http://www.scotsman.com/the-scotsman/uk/margaret-thatcher-poll-tax-was-beginning-of-the-end-1-2884066>

Table 5.5:
General Elections Results, 1979-2010, Scotland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Share of vote (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The table shows Scotland’s share of vote in the elections for Britain, where the Conservatives, by losing to Labour and the SNP from 1997 onwards, were increasingly pushed to the fringe of the political scene. The tactical voting that, between 1987 and 1997, drastically reduced Conservative representation from Scotland in the General Elections was a direct consequence of Scottish disaffection to Thatcher’s economic policy, but her legacy is believed to be strongly tied with the evolution of Scotland as a society: Thatcher’s relationship with the Scots was a turbulent one, for which she herself confessed not to understand the reason. In her memoirs, she lamented that a “Tartan Thatcherite revolution” had never happened, and that the balance sheet of Thatcherism in Scotland was a “lopsided one”, “economically positive but politically negative”.

Aberdeen, the rise of financial services in Edinburgh and the innovative electronics production centre in Silicon Glen, all happening during the Thatcher years, were some positive counterarguments to an otherwise compact wall of hostility, ranging from the claim that she destroyed the industry, to the suspects that she wanted to attack the Church of Scotland, to the general idea that she hated Scotland. Journalistic research in recent times took a look a posteriori to Thatcher’s actions and the reasons behind them, highlighting the fact that industry in Scotland was in a process of decline which had not started with her policies of market liberalisation. Writer and journalist David Torrance argued that, as too strong an intervention would have destroyed the Scottish system, Thatcherism saw limited application when it came to halt public investment in “lame ducks”. The Church argument concerned a sermon she held to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in Edinburgh on 21 May 1988. In that occasion, during what would be known as the “Sermon on the Mound”, she addressed her philosophy of individualism with theological connections, stating that the values of Christianity stood for spiritual redemption, rather than social reform, and that money making was separated from love of money (forbidden in the tenth commandment). The sermon, which included a remark to the Church’s past and possible meddling with laws and legislation, was followed with the Rt Rev James Whyte, who had acted as moderator, giving her church reports on the damages caused by her intervention to the welfare system. That was the most famous of a series of clashes between

---


201 Torrance D., “Debunking the myths about Margaret Thatcher and Scotland”, (Conservative Home, 2/5/2009), Retrieved: 15/5/2013

<http://www.scotsman.com/the-scotsman/uk/margaret-thatcher-s-sermon-on-the-mound-1-2884187>
Thatcher and the Church, particularly over the effect of Thatcherism (privatisation, deindustrialisation, social policy) on the poor.\textsuperscript{203}

Thatcher’s legacy in Scotland was, and is, considered to have been massive, both in the claims of those who called it devastating and of those that, in hindsight, expressed a more neutral stance. In his lecture at a SNP conference in 1987 (“Stands where Scotland did?”), writer William McIlvanney accused Thatcher of trying to “destroy” the nationhood and values of Scotland, basing his reasoning on a tradition which had been, and had increasingly become, in pursuit of justice and morals.\textsuperscript{204} The fact that the author of the article citing McIlvanney’s lecture regarded his argumentations as a little too myth-based delves, perhaps unknowingly, into a matter of social identity that under Thatcher saw changes not inferior in size to those inflicted upon the industry and the welfare state. The standard concept of Scottish society, a male-dominated, industrial collective which treasured sense of community and belonging, was shattered, affecting the way society interacted and the way politics faced it: Labour came to occupy a more centre-left position as internal organization was reformed from the inside out; the Liberals merged with the Social Democratic Party. The SNP made of Thatcherism the negative example out of which a renewed image of Home Rule established through notions of civic nationalism and civic society was developed. The Scottish Constitutional Convention, which published in 1988 its \textit{Claim of Right} with the endorsement of various parties, the Churches, the trade unions and other organizations, was an ideal protest to Thatcher’s “Sermon on the mound”, a declaration that civic interest stood before what the Scots had perceived as disinterest and lack of comprehension of their society.\textsuperscript{206} Thatcher's relationship with nationalism was conflicting, she considering herself a strong Unionist.

\textsuperscript{203} West A., "Mrs Thatcher and her clashes with the churches", (ABC: Religion and Ethics Report, 10/4/2013). Retrieved: 17/5/2013
\textsuperscript{206} Finlay, “Thatcherism and the Union” in Devine, \textit{Scotland and the Union}”..., p.164
Thatcher reportedly retained a dogmatic idea of alignment in Scotland, where the Scots were standing either for Unionism or Nationalism. Devolution was often ignored and regarded as an attempt to sabotage the structure of the kingdom. Additionally, what Thatcher regarded as “independence” was the possibility she was giving to the businesses to “escape” the clutches of the state. Yet, her policies were what indirectly generated new strength and interest in Home Rule movements, to the point that it was widely theorised that devolution in 1999 was possible only thanks to the collective hatred she generated upon herself and her policies. The campaign for Home Rule has been identified as a unifying element behind which an increasingly divided society, many of whose members were drifting into social irrelevance, put itself. Thatcherism brought together the components of the Convention: from the Liberal Democrats being not gifted with significant percentages of voters, to the shrinkage of membership in both the Trade Union Congress and the Churches, to the local administrations largely deprived of autonomy and the various strata of state-financed employers threatened to incur in privatization207. Yet, the economic side of Thatcherism, although cause of widespread disarray in the Scottish industrial scene, was never repudiated by the Iron Lady, who, on the contrary, defended her choice both upon triumph and defeat of the Conservative party with the Scottish electorate, nor by contemporary Scottish politics, some of which recently came to confess not to completely disapprove of her economic policies, differently from the social ones they actually despised208.

Thatcher held office until November 28, 1990, when, after the national economy witnessed a rise in the recession and unemployment once more due to declining North Sea oil sales and the ailing electronics market, an internal Conservative party reshuffle caused her to be replaced by Conservative fellow member John Major, who would later guide the party to electoral defeat in 1997. Eleven years had passed since the 1979 general election, which had created what

207 ibid. p.166-7
<http://www.scotsman.com/the-scotsman/opinion/comment/david-torrance-margaret-thatcher-and-the-scots-1-2882885>
Richard J. Finlay called a “democratic deficit”\textsuperscript{209}, a political rift between the two big sides of the Union which the fast rise of free market ideology (which was rendering British business a lesser entity before the European Union and the multinationals) did all but enlarge. The start of the 21st century was a pivotal period in the life of the United Kingdom, as faith in the current constitutional relationship with the rest of the UK as a cornerstone of stability and prosperity started to vacillate and home rule, won in the 1999 devolution referendum, started to pave the way for chances of independence.

\textsuperscript{209} ibid. p.157
CHAPTER VI: Toward Independence?

6.1: Devolution and the Scottish Parliament

Devolved governmental action in Scotland started after the first elections for the Parliament of Scotland were held on 6 May 1999, and 129 Members of the Scottish Parliament (or MSPs) were elected. The following table reports the percentages of votes and corresponding seats assigned to the various parties both in the constituencies and the regional top-up circumscriptions:

Table 6.1:
Elections to the Scottish Parliament, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Top-up</th>
<th>Top-up</th>
<th>Total seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote %</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>Vote %</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNP</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib Dems</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Retrieved: 23/5/2013

Labour resulted the dominating party with 21 more seats than the runner-up, the SNP, while the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives proved unable to regain representation above 20%, standing respectively at 19 and 20 seats below Labour. The Parliament was officially opened by the Queen on 1 July 1999, after the first parliamentary meeting was reconvened on 12 May 1999, on the Mound, in
Edinburgh, where Winnie Ewing, the oldest MSP, said: “The Scottish Parliament, which adjourned on March 25, 1707, is hereby reconvened”\textsuperscript{210}.

According to the Scotland Act 1998, Scotland was to be administered by the legal authority called “Scottish Executive” (changed to “Scottish Government” in 2007 by the SNP administration\textsuperscript{211}), and the official Gaelic title of “Riaghaltas na h-Alba”. Powers were divided between “devolved”, as to indicate those given to the Scottish Parliament to decide about, and “reserved”, concerning the matters the UK Parliament still had the power to legislate on. There was no precise list of the devolved matters: what was not present among those “reserved”, was automatically to be considered devolved. Reserved matters comprised the schedule 5 of the Act, and included general constitutional aspects such as the Crown, the Union and the UK Parliament (which maintains sovereignty); the registration and funding of political parties; international relations; civil service; defence forces; economic matters such as the fiscal and monetary policy, the currency, the financial services; home affairs like part of the Criminal Law and data protection, UK and EU Parliament elections and national security provisions; trade and industry matters in the form of creation and operation of business associations, rules on insolvency, competition, intellectual property, consumer protection and product standards, telecommunications, postal services and protection of trading and economic interests; energy production and management for electricity, gas and oil, coal, nuclear energy; transports; social security schemes; employment; health and safety. Almost all the reserved matters included exceptions to accommodate specific cases or to honour previous provisions\textsuperscript{212}. The list was not meant to be definitive, as it was amended by the Scottish Parliament (Constituencies) Act 2004, the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and, most largely, by the Scotland Act 2012. As of now, devolved matters include agriculture, forestry


and fisheries; education and training; environment; health and social services; housing; law and order (including the licensing of air weapons); local government; sports and the arts; tourism and economic development; transport (including drink-driving and speed limits).\textsuperscript{213}

Under normal circumstances, elections were, and currently are, scheduled to take place every four years, on the first Thursday in May, unless the Parliament was to be dissolved early by royal proclamation, either because of 86 MSPs agreeing to conclude it or the First Minster missing for more than 28 days. Members of the Parliament, the MSPs, are elected through a form of proportional representation called the additional member system: 73 of the 129 MSPs are elected from an equal number of individual constituencies, the same instituted for the UK General Elections. Likewise, voting works the same: the system used is “first-past the post”, in which he or she who polls more votes than his/her rivals is elected. 56 “Additional Members” are elected through a more complex process: from each of Scotland’s eight regions (Central Scotland, Glasgow, Highlands & Islands, Lothians, Mid Scotland & Fife, North East Scotland, South of Scotland and West of Scotland) seven MSPs are returned. Before the elections, every party create a list of candidates for their region, arranged in the party’s order of preference. The number of MSPs elected per party in each region is calculated proportionally to the share of vote received by every party. As a candidate can concurrently run for the constituencies, those elected among the 73 exit the list, the subsequent candidate in which takes their place. Voters go under the same requirements needed to vote for the local government: to be resident in Scotland, to be 18 or more on the polling day, and to be British, Commonwealth or European Union citizens.

The Scottish Government consists in the First Minister, two law officers (the solicitor general and the lord advocate) and the ministers. The executive is formed by the party or coalition which wins the majority of seats in the elections; The First Minister, normally the party or coalition leader, is elected by the MSPs. Generally

the elections don’t produce a disproportionally strong party, so coalitions are common practice: as demonstrates the fact that in both 1999 and 2003, Labour formed the executive with the Liberal Democrats\(^ {214}\). The First Minister nominates ministers and junior ministers among the MSPs, which are to be confirmed (or rejected) by a vote in Parliament. He then proposes two law officers (often not among MSPs) to be appointed by the Queen.

Legislative action follows legally regulated steps, starting with draft laws called bills, which can be introduced by the Government, a committee (concerning subjects within its area of expertise), private members of the Parliament or private citizens. After a pre-legislative consultation open to interested and related subjects, the bill is sent to a Parliamentary Committee, which fills a report on it. The Parliament, taking the Committee’s report into consideration, votes in confirmation or rejection of the bill’s principles. If accepted, the bill enters a phase of more precise scrutiny by the Committee or the Parliament, which can propose amendments to it. Lastly, a final consideration on the bill is made by the whole Parliament, which considers the amendments and how they influence the principles of the bill, then the bill itself. If the bill is passed, the Advocate General, the Lord Advocate, the Attorney General or the Secretary of State have four weeks to challenge the bill, usually over suspicions of having the Parliament exerted power outside of its devolved competences\(^ {215}\). On the expiration of the four week period, the Presiding Officer submits the bill to the Monarch for Royal Assent. After having received it, the bill becomes an Act of the Scottish Parliament.

Under the legislative system introduced with Devolution, the Scottish Parliament introduced a total of 180+ Acts, with the most prominent among them significantly changing Scotland’s regulation of the devolved matters from the general UK standards. In the paper *Devolution and the implications of Scottish independence*, the Scottish Government trusted the following Acts with the task of exemplifying the provisions created to address specifically Scottish issues with Scottish devolved powers: the Smoking, Health and Social Care (2005), which


introduced first the ban on smoke in public places; the Forth Crossing Act (2011), which gave Scottish ministers the power to oversee the construction of a crossing over the Firth of Forth, a major reinforcement of an infrastructural connection in the country’s peculiar geography; the Land Reform Act (2003), which introduced the right for the public to stay on private land for selected purposes, instituted locally-regulated accession on and over private lands, and managed representation and acquisition of land, with special regard to the Highlands.

Since September 2004, residence to the Scottish Parliament is the Scottish Parliament Building in the Holyrood area of Edinburgh, an edifice appositely designed by Catalan architect Enric Miralles. The office temporarily occupied for parliamentary action before and during construction of Miralles’ building was primarily the General Assembly Hall of the Church of Scotland on the Royal Mile in Edinburgh. A long sought dream of those who saw it as a symbol of a strengthened Scottish identity, it nonetheless was, since its inception, as much a target of praise as of criticism. The first parliamentary years were reportedly difficult: the first First Minister, the Labour Donald Dewar, died in office and his successor, Henry McLeish, resigned following a constituency office scandal\(^\text{216}\); general discontent surrounded for years the Parliament’s reason to exist, as, by the start of the second term, it was time and again considered not to have changed the policies regarding Scotland enough for devolution to be justified in the eyes of the people, when “yes” had been voted in the 1997 referendum exactly to accomplish that\(^\text{217}\). Holyrood was a major addressee of general protest: the costs of construction of the Parliament Building were initially estimated in the 1997 White Paper to not exceed £40 million, although, by that time, it was though that the definitive settlement would have been the old Royal High School in Edinburgh. Once it was later acknowledged that the School was too small for its purpose, negotiations began for a new building, whose construction costs ended up being far superior to what was initially planned: following First Minister Dewar’s provisional estimate of £109m on 17 June 1999, cost increases were announced in April 2000 (£195m),


November 2001 (£241m over major design changes and arrangements devised to meet the 2003 deadline), December 2002 (£300m over increased security needs and further expansion), September 2003 (£400m), February 2004 (£431m), with the final costs announced by the Scottish Parliament Corporate Body to amount to £414.4 million as of February 2007). A major public inquiry concerning budget handling for the building was announced by the First Minister Jack McConnell in May 2003. Lord Fraser of Carmyllie was tasked with collecting testimonies and evidence concerning the case. The resulting document, the ”Holyrood Inquiry”, was presented on 15 September 2004, with a special focus on the scarce perception the MSPSs had demonstrated regarding the costs, impossibly low at the start, unnecessarily high in the end; the contract form decided by the Scottish Office over alternatives better at keeping expenses in check (the original decision being that construction would have to be as fast as possible, but without impacting on quality); a series of recommendations including more transparent records, more rigorous project evaluations, risk management, a more primary role of security requirements in the early stages of projects and a more defined role of the civil servants, architects, and consultants involved. The popular criticism gathered on the aforementioned and other Parliamentary issues was largely the product of media coverage, the action of Scottish journalists which, since Devolution, saw their role progressively evolving to watching over the reaffirmed Scottish constitutional political body. With a stronger editorial dedication to Scottish politics, weakened only by the crisis caused by the shift from paper to digital news delivering, the Scottish press was able to detect and record the evolution and change of factors and customs in the Scottish society and the way people


participate in the democratic life of the country. Regarding that, it was reported that, along the years, public involvement in politics decreased: in the first Scottish parliamentary elections, 58% of the people voted. The figure went down to 49.4% in 2003, slightly rose to 51.72% in 2007, and fell to 50.4% in 2011, while, in comparison, voter participation in the UK Parliament elections was 58.16% in 2001 and grew to 60.8% in 2005 and 63.8% in 2010\textsuperscript{220}. Among the reasons were listed a similar trend in UK and US elections, a diminished interest in Scottish politics (and, consequently, the enthusiasm surrounding a Scottish-focused constitutional body) and, especially, the treatment politics received from the press: the numerous scandals concerning the Parliament Building costs and multiple discoveries of illegal practices authored by prominent politics were constantly reported by political journalists as emblematic of a sleazy and corrupt political body. In his review of *Open Scotland?*, a book published in 2000 analysing the entanglement between politics and media, BBC Political Editor Brian Taylor traced a connection between the voter disenchantment with partisan politics and the invitation to scepticism towards political rhetoric promoted by the Scottish press\textsuperscript{221}. In the same article, Taylor exemplified the politicians' uneasiness with the press with a speech to the Scottish Parliament held by Tony Blair on 9 March 2000, during which the then Prime Minister expressed his perplexity at the Scottish press criticising his supposed lack of commitment to the devolution settlement and, later, the Parliament created thanks to that. “Scepticism is healthy. Cynicism is corrosive”, he declared\textsuperscript{222}. Almost at the same time, the prime minister's chief spokesman Alastair Campbell echoed his principal's thoughts in an interview with The Herald newspaper, where he accused the Daily Record of putting a “spin” on his intentions and provide a distorted coverage of his Party's actions\textsuperscript{223}.

<http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/ElectionResults/2011%20election/2011_Election_Analysis.xls>

<http://www.scottishaffairs.org/onlinepub/sa/reviews/rev_taylor_sa38_winter02.html>


<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/676821.stm>
One of the matters most subjected to scrutiny has repeatedly been financial administration, and, more specifically, the spending attitude of the new Parliament and the policies which gained priority over the course of the governments. As of 2006, it had been noted that changes in the fiscal system would not be very advantageous for Scotland, for reasons concerning the way tax collection had been devolved: the government’s actual power to raise or decrease basic income tax rate by three pence in the pound\textsuperscript{224}, and to change local property taxes for businesses (“business rates”\textsuperscript{225}) has never been put to practice, as Scotland receives funds from a pool of general revenues that the Treasury of London draws from in a quantity regulated by a mechanism called the Barnett formula\textsuperscript{226}. Under this “block grant and formula system” arrangement, the devolved administrations of the United Kingdom, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, receive a proportionate share of spending on “comparable” functions in England, adjusted to population. In case of Scotland, the proportion is at 10.03%. The funding Scotland receives is free for the administration to use, with no specific limitations or guidelines. Responsible for the grant is exclusively the UK Treasury, which uses the Barnett formula to calculate changes in the base grant (not the grant as a whole) from year to year: in its spending review, the Treasury identifies which individual programmes are devolved and are “territorially identifiable”, i.e. they benefit only

\textsuperscript{224} ”Pence in the pound” is the name given to the percentage points of tax rates in Scotland. Basic income tax rate for 2013-2014 is 20% (10% for company or unit trust dividends).

\textsuperscript{225} Business rates are taxes charged on shops, pubs, offices, warehouses, factories and other non-domestic properties. All these properties are assigned a rateable value, which is a legally-defined valuation broadly based on an analysis of annual rental values by appointed Assessors. The business rates are based on a proportion of the rateable values, with a percentage, called “poundage”, set annually by Scottish Ministers. The poundage rate for Scotland in 2013-2014 is 46.2 pence in the pound (47.1 for England), with small variations for large businesses (supplements) and small ones (reliefs).

a specific part of the UK, and, on the other hand, which programmes concern the UK as a whole. In one case, they contribute to changes in the formula; in the other, they do not. Part of the “territorially identifiable” public spending in Scotland, primarily comprised by state pensions and welfare, comes from the UK Government, while the other 60% comes from the Scottish Government\textsuperscript{227}. As a result of this provision, no government so far has needed to raise taxes at the risk of damaging its popularity.

By 2006, devolution was bearing not enough evidence of its importance in the evolution of Scotland’s economy, as some of the situations in need of specific interventions, like the decline of the heavy industry, did not see noticeable changes in their downward trend\textsuperscript{228}. A series of economic statistics collected by the Scottish Government in 2006 showed among the economic accounts four industry sectors with a particularly large annual negative growth: mining and quarrying (-11.0%); textiles, footwear, leather, etc. (-8.4%); paper, printing and publishing (-4.9%); and Electrical & instrument engineering (-3.4%)\textsuperscript{229}. On the flipside, the block grant provided, by 2005, 16% more public spending per capita in Scotland than in the rest of UK (£7,597 to £6,563), and net borrowing (a measure that includes government spending benefitting the Scots, North Sea Oil revenues excluded) at 13% of GDP in 2003-4 compared with the 4% of UK\textsuperscript{230}. Many commentators and critics argued that such a system put Scotland in a position of relative lack of strength in terms of fiscal power, contesting alternatively the amount of money loaded unto the Scottish Executive being exaggerated and well beyond Scotland's actual needs\textsuperscript{231}, and the devolution settlement bestowing money grants, but also limitations to fiscal power, thus depriving Scotland of security over potential cuts.

\textsuperscript{227} ibid.
from the UK Parliament, and of incentives to develop a proper fiscal system of which the Scottish Parliament would take responsibility. A figure emerging from a 2011 Treasury review was that, in a public spending comparison between England and Scotland, state spending in the latter had averaged £10,212 per capita in 2010, while spending in the former was ay £8,588 per head. The results prompted a debate on whether the subsidy accorded to Scotland, the block grant, was unfair or not, and Scotland received more than what it needed. The Barnett formula, which regulated changes in a grant set at £32bn, was criticized by its own creator, Joel Barnett, for having been kept for too long since its inception, giving increasingly unfair advantages to Scotland, but the Scottish Government Expenditure and Revenue exercise’s figures for 2009-10 showed a borrowing total of £14.9bn (13.4% of GDP), which, were North Sea oil and gas revenues to be included, would decrease to £9bn (6.8% of GDP), compared to a UK wide 9.8%, demonstrating both that Scotland would need the grant, but also be not at a complete loss of resources without it.

6.2: Devolution practices and independence theories

On May 2007, the SNP won the elections for the Scottish Parliament. It was a narrow victory, of one seat over Labour (47 and 46 respectively), and, thus, was addressed as a problem needing to be solved through a coalition with another party in order to avoid a parliamentary deadlock and prioritize governmental

---
action. After a proposed but not realized pact with the Liberal Democrats, the alliance was made with Scottish Green Party\textsuperscript{237}. The result of the nationalist party was caused by a multitude of factors: a practical issue concerning the voting system, which had produced more than 100,000 spoilt ballot papers\textsuperscript{238}, was reported, but deeper forces had allegedly been at work for such a result to have occurred. The SNP’s position was a critical element: since the advent of devolution, it was common opinion among politicians and analysts that the SNP’s never-ending strife for independence would finally lose appeal, with Scotland promoted to a nation able to create self-tailored laws and to assess (and accept) its political position within the greater framework of the Union. Pro-Union parties, including the Labour Party in charge until 2007, had never ceased to be worried about the fact that, should faith in the Union decline, the SNP would be the biggest beneficiary and instigator of a wave of nationalism among the people. That the SNP won, devolution notwithstanding, stimulated a theorization of the existence of trends in national identity which moved the people’s sense of belonging: the possibility that devolution had actually reinforced a sentiment of Scottish national identity, according to which complete independence would be the logical next step, was coupled with that of a waning sense of Britishness to form a hypothesis of Scottish disaffection with the United Kingdom\textsuperscript{239}. It was also assumed that Scotland might be not satisfied with the existing regulation of devolution, which, by 1999, had not by chance seen proposals of amendment, mainly aimed at reinforcing the power of the devolved institutions\textsuperscript{240}. The SNP itself recognized, upon victory, that Scotland might prefer a midway solution between devolution

\textsuperscript{237} Carrell S., “Greens offer to be go-between to end Scottish coalition deadlock” (The Guardian, 9/5/2007). Retrieved 30/5/2013
\textsuperscript{240} McEwen N., “From devolution to independence? Scots elect the first national government” (IRPP, 6/2007). Retrieved: 30/5/2013

and independence, so that stronger power would benefit the nation without any lasting consequence on the existing concept of national identity. And such concept has been proved to heavily tend to the Scottish side of the spectrum, although the overall biggest percentage pertained to the “More Scottish than British” category:

Table 6.2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Scottish, not British</th>
<th>More Scottish than British</th>
<th>Equally Scottish and British</th>
<th>More British than Scottish</th>
<th>British not Scottish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Devine T.M., Scotland and the Union..., p.215*

The numbers tell that not indifferent an attachment to a British identity still existed, although clearly subsided by the affection for homeland. Accompanying evidence to that is the data concerning independence itself: by the same year the SNP won the elections, independence was the option of choice of 23% of the surveyed people. Reasons concerned the perceived fairness of public spending (that shifted from “little less than fair” to “pretty much fair” by 2007) and perceived role of the Parliament as representative of the people in the Union (same as before in the majority’s opinion): all in all, the Scots generally didn’t feel they were losing from the Union settlement. They, however, did believe in the strength and right of the Parliament to rule internally, and in the fact that, should further steps be taken, extension of devolved powers would be the ideal solution. Nonetheless, the SNP did not back up from its plans of independence, at least in theory: their introduction was eventually only delayed. The party began its

---

241 Devine T.M., Scotland and the Union..., p.216
242 ibid., p.219
mandate with the intention of winning over the Scottish electorate by proving itself as a competent governmental body, and marking domestic policies, economic development, relations with other governments and plans on constitutional change with a strong sense of autonomy. Instead of promoting a referendum on independence, given the assumption that too small was the majority for the initiative to survive a contrary vote, it pursued instead a 3-year consultation research on changes in the constitution called the “National Conversation”: the consultation was comprised of documents, interventions, debates and discussions spanning a multiplicity of different media: it started with the publishing in August 2007 of Choosing Scotland’s Future – A National Conversation, a White Paper analysing three possibilities for Scotland’s constitutional future: keeping the Scottish Parliament within the Union, revising the devolution settlement in order to extend the Parliament’s (especially fiscal) powers, and starting the process to independence. Of the various phases the National Conversation went throughout, the last was intended to be the publication of a referendum bill in 2009, and the referendum itself in 2010. The beginning of the first coincided with the launch of a website where Ministers from the Scottish Government would post articles and host discussions on various topics related to the plans for the constitution. After two first seasons of mainly written material, the First Minister Alex Salmond began appearing on appositely organized one-way speeches, public lectures and events broadcasted abroad in order to bring the National Conversation under an international spotlight and keep the consultation project active to the eyes of the media. The aim of the project lied more in a clear explanation of the SNP’s intentions rather than an attempt to convince the Scottish press to back up from its chiefly sceptic position.243 The following series of initiatives involved more participated debates with leaders of social institutions (churches, trade unions, schools, businesses), where people were invited to interact with the Cabinet Secretaries and Ministers present. Furthermore, the series of published documents was enriched by essays and proposals for “Fiscal Autonomy in Scotland” (Feb 2009), “An Oil Fund for Scotland” (July 2009), “Europe and Foreign Affairs” and

“Opportunities for Broadcasting” (Sept 2009), “Rural Affairs, Environment and Climate Change” (Oct 2009), “Supporting Business and Enterprise”, “Employability and Skills”, “People and Communities”, “Your Scotland, Your Voice” (Nov 2009), and “Scotland’s Future: Draft Referendum (Scotland) Bill Consultation Paper” (Feb 2010). The last two were meant to be part of an unsuccessful campaign for the referendum, but were eventually converted to consultation papers to keep the issue alive, even if not, for the time being, in the form initially devised244.

One 6 December 2007, the Scottish Parliament passed a motion proposed by the opposition (Labour, with the support of the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats), to create a commission on Scottish Devolution (also known as “Calman Commission”245) whose aim was “To review the provisions of the Scotland Act 1998 in the light of experience and to recommend any changes to the present constitutional arrangements that would enable the Scottish Parliament to serve the people of Scotland better, improve the financial accountability of the Scottish Parliament and continue to secure the position of Scotland within the United Kingdom.”246 The work of the Commission produced two reports, on 2 December 2008 and 15 June 2009. The results of the first depicted the Devolution as ultimately successful, and the continuation of Scotland’s place within the United Kingdom advisable but incompatible with full fiscal autonomy. The Commission meant the first Report to be followed by another consultation to end on February 2009 with another, more comprehensive Report, which was published on 15 June with the title Serving Scotland Better: Scotland and the United Kingdom in the 21st century (Final Report)247. It contained another confirmation of Devolution as a successful settlement, and a series of 24 recommendations for it to evolve and change, in some points radically: the prime topic were Scotland’s tax raising

246 ibid.
powers, which, in accordance with the Scotland Act 1998, could be used to increase or reduce taxes of 3p in the pound. The Commission suggested to scrap and replace them with a different fiscal system, aimed at making Holyrood more accountable: the UK Treasury would deduct 10p in the pound from standard and upper rates of income tax in Scotland, while reducing accordingly the block grant from Westminster, so that Scottish Ministers would hold a much stronger responsibility for levying or cutting taxes. Furthermore, the Commission proposed the devolution of stamp duty, land tax, landfill tax, air passenger duty and aggregates levy, with a correspondent cut in the block grant as the trade-off. VAT and fuel duty would remain under UK control. An increase in the power for the Scottish Government to borrow cash for easier capital investments and funding of public infrastructures was recommended, while tax power over North Sea Oil, a huge point of the nationalist agenda, was considered too subjected to the volatility of oil and gas prices to be really advisable. The retention of the block grant regulated by the controversial Barnett Formula was considered important, as Scotland still had many taxes not devolved. The Commission requested the devolution of further powers, such as airgun legislation, drink-driving and speed limits regulation (both advocated by the SNP as matters Scotland had specific issues with), animal health funding, licensing of anti-addiction substances and the possibility to run Scottish elections. A transfer of powers from Scotland to the UK was advised for laws concerning charities, food content and labelling, regulation of health professionals and company closures. Finally, the Commission suggested a stronger collaboration between the Scottish and UK Government and a reduced focus on independence, something the Unionist parties saw as a move against the progress of nationalism. Notable reactions to the report upon publication included the UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s appreciation of the proposed stronger interdependence, the Scottish Constitutional Minister Mike Russell’s favourable opinion on greater fiscal autonomy, echoed by the Labour leader Iain Gray and the STUC General Secretary Grahame Smith. On the other hand, the

---


SNP, which had no representatives in the Commission but was invited to contribute with evidence, initially criticised the report, but later acknowledged the possibility for be reworked into a “third slot” option in the independence referendum.250

The two governmental initiatives did not prove inexpensive: an official rundown of the costs of publications, event organization and research put the National Conversation at £643,033, and the combined expenses of that and the Calman Commission were provisionally estimated at over £1 million, opening the decision of funding them with public money highly controversial.251 In terms of reception, the National Conversation did not meet unanimous appreciation, nor did create it for the cause of independence: SNP support remained mostly the same throughout its mandate, but with a notable decline in the latter months of 2009, enough for the Labour to regain the majority on local and regional lists. The SNP maintained its number of representatives in the 2009 European Election, but 2010 voting patterns in UK and the lack of rising support for independence in polls showed reduced affection for nationalism in Scotland: an Ipsos Mori report published on 29 November 2009 showed a poll in which independence was the fifth most important issue facing Scotland, distancing the first (unemployment/factory closure/lack of industry) of 28 percentage points in August 2009 (16% - 44%), and 24 in November 2009 (18% - 42%). Another poll in the same document, centred on the people’s opinion about the proposed referendum on Scotland’s constitutional future, had eagerness for the referendum to be held at 25%, half the result of the leading opinion (“I believe a referendum should be held in a few years time but is not a priority at the moment”), and almost below dismissal of the referendum (20%). Additionally, one in five Scots pronounced themselves in favour of independence, while 32% supported the status quo and 46% advocated Scotland’s stay in the Union with increased

<http://www.holyrood.com/2009/06/next-chapter/>

251 “Conversation and Calman cost £1m” (The Scotsman, 18/7/2009). Retrieved: 2/6/2013
powers\textsuperscript{252}. The SNP had announced in August 2009 the intention to publish on 25 January 2010 the \textit{Referendum (Scotland) Bill 2010}, which would outline the details of the process of a possible referendum to be held on 30 November 2010, consisting in two distinct questions (respectively support for independence and for Devolution Max, i.e. greater devolved powers for the Scottish Parliament)\textsuperscript{253}. On 30 November 2009, a white paper for the proposed Referendum Bill was published, presenting four distinct possible scenarios: “no change in the present set-up”; “more devolution as recommended by the Calman Commission”; “a further degree of devolution”, where the Scottish Parliament was devised to control and collect the vast majority of revenues and spending in Scotland; and “full independence”\textsuperscript{254}. An 84 pages long draft bill, titled \textit{Scotland’s Future: Draft Referendum (Scotland) Bill Consultation Paper} was published on 25 February 2010 for the public. Despite such initiatives, on the 1st of March 2010, the Telegraph reported the results of a YouGov survey showing “Scottish independence support at record low”, with 27% of the interviewed people being for and 55% against independence, and a conservative victory in the upcoming UK Elections being the factor which would move 31% of them to back independence\textsuperscript{255}. In light of waning popularity and arguably insufficient parliamentary power for the referendum initiative to proceed, the SNP was led to consider postponing the referendum to a later date, which, on September 2010, the deputy First Minister Nicola Sturgeon confirmed to BBC Scotland to be sometime after the 2011 elections for the Scottish


Parliament. BBC additionally reported the SNP’s approach concerning what the opposition parties called a “humiliating climbdown” for the Scottish government, which focused on Alex Salmond’s intention to gather a significantly bigger share of votes in the next elections, so that the SNP could proceed more steadfast in overcoming the unionist contrary vote. Following the publication of a manifesto for the elections (which included no planned use of the Scottish Variable Rate, in contrast with the Calman recommendations, but promised presses on Westminster to relinquish control of more taxes and borrowing powers).

The elections for the Scottish parliament held on 5 May 2011 saw a SNP victory that was defined “the most stunning […] in recent Scottish political history” by the Guardian, with the nationalist party taking “Labour seats in every city in Scotland” and a 13% increase over the closest opponent.

Table 6.3:
Elections to the Scottish Parliament, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Total seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SNP</td>
<td>45.4 53</td>
<td>44 16</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>31.7 15</td>
<td>26.3 22</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>13.9 3</td>
<td>12.4 12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib Dems</td>
<td>7.9 2</td>
<td>5.2 3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1.1 0</td>
<td>12.1 3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-11196967>
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-11193304>
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-13083953>
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/may/06/snp-election-victory-scottish-independence>
The newly re-nominated First Minister and SNP leader Alex Salmond declared upon victory to have the “moral authority” to hold a referendum on independence, and was expected to build up public support via attempts to achieve greater parliamentary autonomy and financial freedom for Scotland, while clearing the legal obstacles that would prevent the government from staging the referendum (chiefly the subject of constitutional reform being a matter reserved to Westminster). With the next Holyrood election due in May 2016, Salmond predicted an indicative period for the referendum between 2014 and 2015, during the second half of the parliament. The conservative UK Prime Minister David Cameron guaranteed that “the UK government would not put any legal or political obstacles in the way of an independence referendum” [260], although he made clear his position on the matter by affirming that “if they want to hold a referendum I will campaign to keep the United Kingdom together with every single fibre I have” [261]. Such reasoning was ideally brought to realization when, in late 2011, the Prime Minister considered the solution of a UK-based referendum on Scottish independence, to be conceived and led in 2012-2013, in order to secure control of the terms, question and timing over the SNP. The plan, which involved scouting for participation among the Labour and creating an ad-hoc committee with personalities such as Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne, the Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg and the Scottish Secretary Michael Moore. The prospect prompting Cameron’s intervention was reportedly the issue of the referendum question, on which his and Salmond’s intention were markedly different: on one hand, Cameron pushed for a single referendum (instead of two, as suggested by Moore on the basis that the Scottish government had only the power to stage an “advisory” referendum, that could be followed by an official one determined by the UK Government to formalize the actual terms and solutions agreed upon by the


two governments), organized by Holyrood, and consisting in a single yes-or-no question which would provide a clear-cut verdict; on the other hand, Salmond desired to present a number of different options in the referendum: no change, further devolution or approval to negotiate independence, with the second, commonly called “Devolution Max” or “devo max”, causing widespread discussion and criticism for not being defined clearly enough: Moore described it as “a brand without a product, a concept of more powers for Scotland without any detail about what that entails”, and the former Labour First Minister Henry McLeish pictured it as “substantial fiscal powers being devolved and getting to the point where Scotland raises its money and spends its money”, adding that that would probably be a measure welcome in England as “there has been much criticism of the fact that we spend money but don’t have the responsibility of raising it.

Cameron declared himself not contrary to the idea of a bigger devolution, as long as Scotland stayed in the UK. The further devolution on which Cameron pronounced himself referred to a different product from the SNP’s “devo max”, a “Scotland Bill”, launched on 30 November 2010, which closely followed the final recommendations of the Calman Commission, and was backed by all the unionist parties (Labour, Liberal Democrats and Conservatives). The key measures contained in the bill and outlined in the accompanying command paper Strengthening Scotland’s Future, were the creation of a new income tax from 2015, the devolution of borrowing powers worth £2.7bn, control over speed limits, drink-drive powers, and airguns by the Scottish parliament, increased powers to run Holyrood elections and the creation of a new post of Scottish Crown Estate

---


264 ibid.

265 ibid.

Commissioner. The bill was not supported by the 2007 and 2011 SNP governments: the First Minister Salmond declaring that the bill was “a great opportunity which the UK government has missed” criticising the new tax powers and adding that “unfortunately, people will be disappointed by a lacklustre Westminster bill that tinkers around the edges, retains the key powers in London, and leaves big questions unanswered.” The cession of powers was to follow the same route of the Scotland Act 1998 which the Scottish Parliament was re-instated with, being passed at Westminster to come out as an Act of the UK Government.

By favouring the Bill over the referendum, Prime Minister Cameron was accused by the deputy Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon of “trying to interfere in Scottish democracy”, to which he replied negating any attempt to interfere, and stating that his intention was for the vote to be “legal, fair and decisive.”

On 10 January 2012, the UK Government announced a consultation paper titled *Scotland’s Constitutional Future*, shortly followed by the Scottish Government’s *Your Scotland, Your Referendum* on 25 January 2012, in which were set out the Government’s intentions to hold the referendum in Autumn 2014, a draft Referendum Bill and plans concerning a collaboration with the UK Parliament for a legal resolution of the Scottish Parliament’s competence to legislate for the referendum. The paper also included the question the Scottish Government intended to present in the referendum: “Do you agree that Scotland should be an independent country?” and featured the request for the readers’ opinion on three questions: their view on the referendum question and the design


268 ibid.


178
of the ballot paper (1), their view on the timetable and voting arrangements outlined in the paper (2), their view on the possible inclusion of a second question in the referendum and the voting system that could be used (3). The Scottish Government’s plans, including the vote in 2014 to reflect the 700th anniversary of the Scottish victory at the Battle of Bannockburn, the end of the Union by 2016, the possibility for 16 and 17 year olds to vote (a proposal contrary to UK election law), a second question on “devo max” should the voters say so, and the decision not to give the Electoral Commission a binding role in setting the question, as officially required in a referendum process, were cause of controversy. The question was defined “loaded” by the former Labour Chancellor Alistair Darling, “inviting people to endorse the separation of a successful independent nation.”

The latter half of February 2012 saw the introduction of a new option, “devo plus”. Conceived by the cross-party think tank “Reform Scotland”, in which participated the group leader Jeremy Purvis, the former Scottish Liberal Democrat leader Tavish Scott, the Conservative former Holyrood presiding officer Alex Fergusson and the senior Labour MSP Duncan McNeil, the proposal was advanced for control over all Scotland’s income tax, its corporation tax and 80%+ of North Sea oil revenues, although it would leave national insurance, VAT and defence and foreign affairs taxes to the UK, differing from “devo max” only in the latter’s objective of attaining full financial independence.

The Scotland Bill was made into law after completing the stages in the House of Commons on 21 June 2011, and in the House of Lords on 24 April 2012, but the process of approval needed the resolution of certain conditions to continue: a late 2011 examination of the contents had the SNP majority of an

appositely formed Holyrood Scotland Bill Committee consider the Bill “not yet fit for purpose” and want it to include the devolution of full tax powers, control over corporation tax, excise duties and the TV emitter BBC Scotland, statutory right for Scottish ministers to have a seat at EU meetings, welfare and other benefits. The Holyrood Committee’s doubts about the money the new taxes would be able to rise had them consider the legislation a “significant risk to the public finances”276. The UK Government stated that the Bill would not pass unless the Scottish Parliament had given consent277. The situation was eventually unlocked when a deal with the Scottish Government was made over UK ministers dropping plans to return certain powers to Westminster and the introduction of a new procedure for Scottish criminal cases that go to the UK Supreme Court278, and the Scotland Bill became the Scotland Act 2012 after receiving Royal Assent on 1 May 2012. The financial measures included the new Scottish rate of income tax, the devolution of stamp duty tax, landfill tax, the power to create new taxes and new borrowing powers amounting to £5bn of Scotland’s budget, all to be applied by 2015279. As the opposition parties complimented the results obtained and criticised the SNP’s lack of collaboration, the Scottish Secretary Moore observed that ministers “are now satisfied that the legislation no longer poses a threat to devolved interests”, but that the Scotland Bill “had been bypassed by history and events”, referring to the referendum for Independence280.


<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-16194465>

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-17747502>

279 The complete text of the Scotland Act 2012, its stages and related documents can be found at http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2010-12/scotland.html

On 11 May 2012 the Scottish Government’s referendum consultation officially ended, with 21,000 responses gathered as declared by the ministers. In comparison, the UK consultation had closed on 9 March 2012 with 3,000 responses among academics, politicians, business leaders, and various other bodies\(^{281}\).

The 25\(^{th}\) of May saw the launch of the *Yes Scotland* campaign for independence, whose purpose was to move one million Scots to sign a declaration of support to the independence cause. The campaign, which was publicly supported by celebrities such as actors Sean Connery and Brian Cox, poet Liz Lochead, musician Pat Kane and former BBC head of news Blair Jenkins, was helmed by Alex Salmond as a national community initiative, aimed at gathering interest in the nationalist cause in light of recent polls showing public support for independence lagging at 33% before an opposition vote of 57%\(^{282}\). An opposite campaign, *Better Together*, rallying the support of Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, was launched on 25 June 2012 by the former Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling, with a parade in Edinburgh purposefully devoid of celebrities but, instead, focused on “elemental, grassroots Scotland”\(^{283}\). Both campaigns advanced arguments of chiefly economic interest, with *Yes Scotland* projecting a Scotland made prosperous by keeping North Sea oil and gas revenues north the border, and *Better Together* highlighting instead the benefits of economic and cultural interdependence, especially stability and security.

On 22 August 2012, following the controversies surrounding the wording of the referendum question as decided by the SNP, a panel of experts commissioned by pro-unionist parties proposed an alternate version of the question: “Scotland

---

\(^{281}\) “Facilitating a legal, fair and decisive referendum in Scotland” (Gov.uk, upd.19/2/2013). Retrieved: 10/6/2013

\(^{282}\) “Scottish independence: One million Scots urged to sign 'yes' declaration” (BBC news Scotland politics, 25/5/2012). Retrieved: 10/6/2013
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-18162832>

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-18585835
should become and independent state”, followed by two possible answers (“I agree”, “I disagree”). The Electoral Commission, which was tasked with assessing the referendum question, stated that the question they were to examine would be only one made by the relevant government. Works surrounding the referendum proceeded with a series of meetings between Deputy First Minister Nicola Sturgeon and the Scottish Secretary Michael Moore, until, on 9 October, the prospect of a definitive agreement was announced.

On 15 October 2012, Alex Salmond and David Cameron met in Edinburgh to sign the Edinburgh Agreement, a 30-clause document which officialised, after eight months of negotiations, the staging of the referendum before the end of 2014. The legal power necessary for the Scottish Government to hold the referendum was agreed to be given via an Order in Council under Section 30 of the Scotland Act 1998. Then the Scottish Government would be responsible of promoting legislation in the Scottish Parliament under the obligation that the referendum should “meet the highest standards of fairness, transparency and propriety, informed by consultation and independent expert advice”. Such legislation would include the date of the referendum, the franchise, the wording of the question, the rules on campaign financing and other rules for the conduct of the referendum. A Memorandum attached to the Agreement provided detailed elements to be observed during preparatory work, such as: the observance of a specific framework for referendums (Part 7 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendum Act 2000, denominated PPERA); the presence of a single question, to be reviewed and reported to the UK Parliament by the Electoral Commission; the possibility for the Scottish Government to include 16 and 17 year olds to vote in the referendum; PPERA guidelines for the Electoral Commission, including the regulation of the promotion campaigns’ spending (set at £750,000 in the 16 week


period leading to the referendum date). First Minister Salmond called the day “historic” for Scotland, and declared that he had “won” the chance to hold the referendum in autumn 2014 and to extend the franchise to 16 and 17 years olds for the first time in a national ballot (while Cameron had pushed for the vote to be held in 2013 in order for Salmond not to capitalise on patriotism on the 700th anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn in 2014, and for the extension to younger voters not to be given). However, he considered the limit of one question, which effectively ruled out “devo max”, “devo plus” and other possibilities of greater devolution, was the result of a “compromise”, a “red line issue” demanded by Westminster over which Cameron had not been open to discussion. Despite the Prime Minister Cameron and the Scottish Secretary Moore’s reason for having an immovable position regarding the single question being the desire to have a “fair and clear” referendum, a series of results from polls conducted by independent institutes suggested that the absence of a third choice could make it harder for the referendum to succeed: Peter Kellner, the president of the polling company YouGov, showed that two in three Scots didn’t believe that an independent Scotland would be economically successful, while his research on 16 and 17 year old voters showed their contribution to “yes” at 0.2 percentage points. A British Social Attitudes report with responses from 3000 Britons (including 1.200 Scots) had support for independence at 32%, compared to 23% in 2010 and 35% in 2005, with “no consistent evidence of an increase in support over time.”


On 22 October, the Scottish Government published an analysis of 26,000 responses to the *Your Scotland, Your Referendum* public consultation, which showed a mostly favourable reception to the proposed 2014 date (62%), but a notable percentage of people preferring the referendum to be held earlier (36%) in order to avoid possible bad economic consequences due to a prolonged period of uncertainty. Devo max, the second question discarded in the Agreement, ended up not being favoured by 62% due to it possibly being source of confusion. 56% agreed to the franchise extension to 16 and 17 year olds, while 41% did not. Finally, the wording of the question was widely agreed (64%), with a contrary vote of 28%. On 9 November the Scottish Government confirmed that the question would remain “Do you agree that Scotland should be an independent country?”, and that the Electoral Commission would scrutinize it.

On 16 January 2013, the House of Lords unanimously approved the Section 30 Order, allowing the legal transfer of powers to Holyrood to hold the independence referendum. Fourteen days later, an Electoral Commission report showed concerns over the results of tests with the referendum question, prompting the Scottish Government to accept the Commission’s recommended alternate wording “Should Scotland be an independent country?” In the same report, the cap on the Yes Scotland and Better Together campaigns’ spending limits in the 16-week period before the referendum was raised from £750,000 to £1.5m, with similar variations also affecting the political parties’ campaigning budget.

On 11 February, the UK government started publishing the *Scotland Analysis*, a series of papers aimed at addressing the constitutional, economic and political implications awaiting Scotland, taking into account a possible

---

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-20048107>


independence scenery. The first paper included a “Legal opinion” analysing the legal repercussions of Scottish independence on Scotland and the UK's constitutional future and their potential new position in international affairs, and was followed by “Currency and monetary policy” (23 April), “Financial services and banking” (20 May), and “Business and microeconomic framework” (2 July). The programme, launched with the declared purpose of making sure that “the referendum debate is properly informed,”

Following the formal presentation of a bill to lower voting age on 12 March, and of draft legislation on the vote to the Holyrood MSPs on 21 March, First Minister Alex Salmond announced the date of the referendum: 18 September, 2014. The MSPs are expected to partake in the final debate before voting to approve the referendum bill, which will pave the way to the Royal Assent in November and the publication by the SNP government of a White Paper outlining a “prospectus for independence”, in conjunction with the Unionist parties’ own pro-union papers. In Summer 2014 the campaigns will enter the 16-week final stretch. Finally, the referendum will take place. Eligibility will be for people over the age of 16 living in Scotland (voter franchise for Parliament and council elections + 16 and 17 year olds), including 4,000 people from elsewhere in Britain who live in Scotland, but excluding 800,000 Scots living abroad.

---

6.3: The implications of independence

The political forces currently supporting independence consist in 72 members of the Parliament: 69 from SNP, the two elected members of the Scottish Green Party and the independent Margo MacDonald making for 55% of the political forces. On the social level, the most successful and inclusive campaign is the government-spearheaded Yes Scotland, counting 372,103 supporters. The reasons brought forward by the proposers of independence, as outlined in the government consultation papers and Yes Scotland, can be divided into two major areas: national identity and economic benefits. The first has been repeatedly the subject of Alex Salmond’s declarations, going by which independence would “give Scottish people the power to decide what kind of future they want for their country.” The idea of Scotland becoming able to win control over its destiny and become equal to England not only is, in the nationalist discourse, a counterpoint to a seemingly dominating notion of shared identity, or Britishness, but also an effectual solution to the contrasting voting patterns between Scotland and the UK.

Although publicly focused on having popular support as the primary requirement, the SNP cause for independence has been encountering, since its inception, obstacles of legal, economic, constitutional and social nature the government has been repeatedly asked to provide answers for, not rarely presenting projections and conclusions different from corresponding UK-based plans and forecasts. Point of contention has always been the legality of the whole initiative, since its very inception: the idea that the Scottish government could simply declare independence without any permission, under the assumption that the election of the SNP as the primary party would automatically entail the Scots’

297 “Yes Scotland marks first year with 372,103 signatories to independence declaration” (Yes Scotland, 24/5/2013). Retrieved 21/6/2013 <http://www.yesscotland.net/yes_scotland_marks_first_year_with_372_103_signatories_to_independence_declaration>
support was put to rest as early as the SNP published its 2007 manifesto, in which they expressed their desire for the people to speak their opinion in a referendum\textsuperscript{300}. A subsequent and much wider issue concerned the question if the Scottish Parliament had the power to hold and legislate upon a referendum at all. Multiple cases pointing to different conclusions were made: in a paper published as early as the spring of 2000, the question about a hypothetical pathway to independence took into consideration provisional support from international law to a claim of self-determination, as present in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both of which the UK is participant in\textsuperscript{301}. However, the author admitted difficulty in delimiting the social area such provisions would actually affect, as “the people” is a group that requires interpretation for the different circumstances in place for every case. There is the risk to elevate to representation of a nation what could actually be a minority, or to generate a threat to territorial integrity\textsuperscript{302}. The document’s conclusion on the matter was that no preconditions existed for the right of self-determination to overlap the principle of territorial integrity, as the passage from self-determination to secession could apply only to people subject to “alien subjugation, domination and exploitation”\textsuperscript{303}. An analysis of Aidan O’Neill of Queen Council outlined Scotland’s position within the UK as different from a federal state, devolution notwithstanding, and, thus, subject to UK parliamentary sovereignty\textsuperscript{304}. That would mean two things: first, that the devolved powers were not to be considered


\textsuperscript{303} Decolonization Resolution, General Assembly 1514 (XV), in: UNYB 1960, p.49 or UN Doc A/4684 (1960), p.66

a part of sovereignty ceded, and, with the Scottish Parliament not factually possessing any, the other UK citizens would not be less entitled to an opinion than the Scots on a referendum that would, as a matter of fact, change the very structure of the UK; second, section 29 of the Scotland Act 1998 specified that a matter related to the Union such as, ostensibly, the referendum, was reserved to Westminster, and not within Holyrood’s purview. The Scottish and UK governments decided to adopt a profile of collaboration in order for the legal obstacles to be overcome and a clear result be reached, as in the interest of both parties involved. However, a definitive resolution of the legal debate was not apparent in the January 2012 publications Scotland’s Constitutional Future (by Westminster) and Your Scotland, Your Referendum (by Holyrood), which stated respectively that the Scottish Parliament had no power to authorize a referendum on independence, and that, on the contrary, some questions could be asked. Uncertainty over the fact that the statutory phrase “relates to a reserved matter” could be capable of expansive or restrictive interpretation (following the judgement held over the case Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Others [2002] UKHL 32) and the hypothesis that the referendum could be made consultative for indirect legal effect found ideal counterpoint in the Scottish Affairs Committee’s The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: making the process legal, where it was stated that “The result of a referendum will decide Scotland’s position in or out the Union, and, as such, cannot simply be described as

305 ibid.
308 A committee of eleven members of UK Parliament appointed by the House of Commons to “examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Scotland Office and its associated public bodies”. Source: http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/scottish-affairs-committee/role/
The proposal of issuing a Section 30 Order to give Holyrood temporary powers to stage the referendum was proposed and, finally, officialised in the Edinburgh Agreement in October 2012. Currently, it is undergoing the process of approval by the Commons, the Lords, the Privy Council, with the Royal Assent to be given in November 2013.

The debate concerning Scottish sovereignty and constitutional relationship with the UK concerned initially the legality issue of the referendum, but has since been extended to the prospect of Scotland effectively voting for independence, which will initiate a series of changes to be issued or negotiated over, at least, the decade to come: a transition plan drafted by the Scottish government sees March 2016 as a possible "Independence Day", predating the first independent elections by two months, the opening of a series of agreements with the UK government for the division of assets and liabilities, international connections, a Scottish constitution and dispositions for the retention of monarchy. The achievement of independence in the referendum will also open up a series of issues to be negotiated between Scotland and the rest of the UK, and between Scotland and the international organizations it has been participating in as part of the UK, such as the European Union and the UN. The Scottish Government repeated in many occasions their intention to remain in the European Union to mutual advantage, with plans for a Scottish passport based on an "inclusive mode" of free access across Europe, border regulation being not supposed to have checks or custom posts, and the Common Travel Area, encompassing the UK, Ireland, the Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey, set to endure. The SNP's claim for EU membership is that it should be automatic for Scotland, as

---


no precedent exists for current EU citizens being expelled and having to reapply. However, two things counterbalanced the SNP’s optimism about Scotland’s new international presence: first, the unionist claim that, as an independent state, Scotland would be politically and militarily much smaller and less influential than as part of the UK, risking to incur in the danger of marginalization; second, the negative opinion of the European commission’s president, José Manuel Barroso, which pressured the SNP to concur that a negotiation for membership might be needed. There are two steps a country must take to be allowed to join the Euro: a monitoring and review procedure, with a “comprehensive monitoring report” produced by the European Commission and used as a basis to decide the measures surrounding accession, and a ratification process seeing a draft accession treaty sent to the Commission and then to the European Parliament, than, after being signed, sent to be ratified by the member and acceding states. A legal opinion in line with Barroso’s, coming from Prof James Crawford of Cambridge University and Prof Alan Boyle of Edinburgh University in the UK Government paper Devolution and the implications of Scottish independence, seemed to imply such occurrence: a very likely outcome of independence would be Scotland becoming a “successor state”, an entirely new state to the international community, and the UK a “continuing state”, the same political entity as before, which, unlike Scotland, would automatically inherit the rights, powers and obligations of the predecessor. According to this opinion, Scotland would have to redo any negotiation and agreement as a new state, including applying to the EU, the UN and NATO. Crawford and Boyle’s legal opinion negated the possibility of an automatic EU membership for Scotland, individuating no precedent for succession to state membership and hinting at accession agreements and standard requisite procedures as the most likely process. The remainder of the UK, on the other hand, would suffer virtually no setback, as territory reduction, which is not regulated by EU law, would mean the end of treaty effects in the former territory, and voting

---


313 Ibid.
rights and European Parliament representation would be rebalanced for the smaller population\textsuperscript{314}. Such possibility was heavily criticised by the Scottish government who, via deputy first minister Sturgeon, accused the UK government of having a “staggeringly arrogant” position in thinking “that if Scotland votes democratically to be independent then the rest of the UK waltzes off with all the rights and Scotland is left with nothing”, adding that, by doing so, the UK should also be the sole retainer of the UK national debt\textsuperscript{315}. Another opinion, advanced by constitutional historian from King’s College Dr Andrew Blick and US law professor David Scheffer was that the UK would undergo a more balanced separation in the form of two “successor states”\textsuperscript{316}, and entry in the EU could be made easier through a series of pre-negotiations, which the UK government, not willing to support independence, has preventively decided not to conduct. The legal basis which could determine the likelier outcome is unclear: the debate rages on what would be of the national debt (£1,189.2 billion at the end of May 2013, equivalent to 75.2% of GDP)\textsuperscript{317}. If Scotland will ultimately inherit a share or not shall be cleared only through an agreement, as set out in the Vienna Conventions on Succession of States, and, in absence of that, the division of the debt would be made in “equitable proportions”\textsuperscript{318}.

In the greater scheme of things, Scotland might find more advantageous to take agreements with the remainder of UK, starting with the developing of an arrangement, to be made official, for Scotland to remain in the commonwealth and keep the Queen as the head of state, as the Scottish Government currently is leaning towards. Such arrangement would not be new to Scotland because, as Alex Salmond pointed out, the period between the Union of the Crowns of 1603 and the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[314] “Scottish independence: A question of international law or the EU’s ‘new legal order’? (part II)” (European Law Blog, 15/2/2013). Retrieved: 1/7/2013 <http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=1565>
\item[317] ibid.
\item[318] ibid.
\end{footnotes}
Act of Union of 1707 saw a comparable situation\textsuperscript{319}. Although the relationship between the First Minister and the Royal Family is generally known to be good\textsuperscript{320}, diverging opinions surround the position Scotland should hold in respect to the Monarchy, ranging from former Labour MP and current “yes” campaign chairman Dennis Canavan’s suggestions that Scotland cast off what would be an irreconcilable sovereignty\textsuperscript{321}, to the justice committee convenor at Holyrood Christine Grahame vouching for a referendum on maintaining “full-blown monarchy, an edited version or go for a republic”\textsuperscript{322}. At a 2011 meeting with Prime Minister Cameron, the Queen reportedly expressed fear about the future in UK\textsuperscript{323}, although she met with favour the Scottish proposal of maintaining ties between the two states\textsuperscript{324}. The Church of Scotland intervened on the question to communicate that, should Scottish independence triumph, future monarchs would have two coronations, for them to be cemented as King or Queen of Scots\textsuperscript{325}.

The military structure, unlike monarchy, is bound to be heavily changed: according to a 2012 Royal United Services Institute paper, Scotland could establish


\textsuperscript{322} Johnson S., “Queen may not remain monarch of an independent Scotland” (the Telegraph, 12/5/2012). Retrieved: 2/7/2013 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9261092/Queen-may-not-remain-monarch-of-an-independent-Scotland.html>

\textsuperscript{323} “Queen ‘fears for UK over Scottish independence’” (Metro, 30/5/2011). Retrieved: 2/7/2013 <metro.co.uk/2011/05/30/queen-fears-for-uk-over-scottish-independence-27113/>


a Defence Force (consisting in a separate navy, air force and army) optimized for local, rather than global, focus. RUSI’s paper recommended a surface fleet of 20-25 ships, sixty aircrafts and 10,000-25,000 land personnel, for a total cost of £1,840m per annum (1.3 of Scotland’s GDP, £1.5 less of UK defence costs on Scottish taxpayers), plus arrangements with the UK for intelligence, cyber-warfare and equipment updating\(^{326}\). On 19 October 2012, a longstanding SNP anti-NATO policy was cancelled and accession entered discussion\(^{327}\). Later talks were concentrated on the Trident nuclear missile system, currently located at Coulport weapons depot and Faslane naval base: as the Scottish Government follows an anti-nuclear weapon policy featuring the promise to ban them from Scotland should independence be won, the military bases that currently have nuclear missiles lodged for deterrent strategy, prompting the UK Ministry of Defence to warn of the possibility of designating the space sovereign UK territory. The Scottish Government was warned by former Lib-Dem armed forces minister Sir Nick Harvey that not agreeing to negotiate the cession of the zone as an SBA (sovereign base area), could ensue in the warheads being relocated at a prohibitively high cost\(^{328}\). The Scottish Institute suggested that an independent Scotland’s power over Faslane could both mean negotiating power with the UK and NATO for leasing the base\(^{329}\). The SNP declared that any inherited military assets and other requirements would be covered by a £2.6 annual budget\(^{330}\).


\(^{327}\)“SNP members vote to ditch the party’s anti-Nato policy” (BBC news Scotland politics, 19/10/2012). Retrieved: 10/7/2013 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-19993694>

\(^{328}\)Watt N., “MoD fears for Trident base if Scotland says yes to independence” (the Guardian, 10/7/2013). Retrieved: 10/7/2013 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk-news/2013/jul/10/mod-trident-scotland-independence>


A major point of discussion in the independence case is economy: the SNP’s driving subject has been, and currently is, that, as an independent state, Scotland would have a better economic performance than as a member of the United Kingdom. A Scottish Government report published on 21/5/2013 with the title *Scotland’s Economy: the case for independence* lists Scotland’s core economic strengths in various sectors, including finance, where it is reported that Scotland has “generated more tax per head than the UK for every one of the last 30 years”, rising exports in the food and drink industry, for a most recent annual turnover of £12.4 billion, creative industries (turnover of £4.8 billion), life sciences (turnover of £2.9 billion), green energy reserves (an estimated 25% of Europe’s tidal and offshore wind resources), the tourism industry (almost 200,000 people employed), the manufacturing sector (£14.7bn exported in 2011), and, especially, the oil and gas industry (contributing £26bn to Scotland’s GDP in 2011 and boosting the UK balance of payments by £40bn). Alex Salmond’s comment at the paper’s launch was that “despite all of these inherent economic strengths, Scotland’s long-term economic growth has lagged behind than of comparable European nations, […]” and that “despite our strong economic foundations and excellent global reputation Scotland, with Westminster in control of our economy, is not reaching our potential as a nation [...]”. The paper also anticipated the possession on a number of “levers” the Scottish Parliament could operate on with more control over the nation: those include fiscal levers (oil and gas taxation, excise duties, value added tax (VAT), air passenger duty, capital borrowing, welfare and social security, corporation tax, public sector pay/pensions, capital gains tax, rural and environmental tax) and non-fiscal levers (consumer protection, industry regulation, energy markets and regulation, implementation of EU legislation, competition law, international trade, immigration, public provision and

---

331 “Scotland can more than afford to be independent” (The Scottish Government, 21/5/2013). Retrieved: 4/7/2013 <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2013/05/scotland-can-more-than-afford-to-be-independent210>

332 ibid.
Criticism directed at Westminster’s policies negatively affecting Scotland’s performance was especially drawn by the “job-killing capital spending cuts”, “rising income inequality”, policies made to the advantage of the City of London and pursuit of austerity. An analysis of the paper by the BBC political editor Brian Taylor highlighted the Government’s focus on the disadvantages brought upon by the UK government as a strategy employed specifically to gain the favour of the Scottish citizens who would back independence if assurance came that Scotland would undoubtedly be better off by itself: according to a Scottish Social Attitudes Survey concerning the “Expectations of How Scotland’s Economy Would Fare Under Independence”, the majority of voters expects Scotland to do “a little better” (28%), closely followed by those who believed it would make “no difference” (23%), or even be “a little worse” (21%). Comparatively, a Panelbase survey reported an even proportion of people convinced of a financially worse off independent Scotland (40%) and better off (37%). In the same report, A poll listing “Support for Independence by Expectations of its Economic Consequences” puts in favour of independence 73% of the people expecting Scotland’s economy to be “a lot better”, with very small support for independence among those who think it will be worse. The results of these polls gain further relevance when coupled with Independence Opinion polls: an Ipsos Mori May 2013 report on referendum voting intentions showed a 31% percentage of backers of independence, and a 59% of “no” voters among the people who declared to vote, following a trend of independence support peaking at 50% in 1997 and not reaching more than 40% ever since. The Scottish Government’s hope to win over the majority of the

---


334 “Scotland can more than afford to be independent” (The Scottish Government, 21/5/2013). Retrieved: 4/7/2013 <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2013/05/scotland-can-more-than-afford-to-be-independent210>


336 ibid,

Scottish vote is therefore directly linked to its ability to convince them of the potential of Scotland to thrive by itself and, especially, without the UK. The list of selected successes by various sectors of the Scottish economy, coupled with a prospect for improvement coming with freedom by Westminster’s policies, in the case for independence configured itself as part of this strategy, although two points attracted rival criticism: first, that part of the successes in the list could as well be a consequence of the stability and large market of the Union; second, that no concrete economic policies or financial solutions were included in the paper.\footnote{Taylor B., “Scottish independence: Counting the economic ‘goodies’” (BBC news Scotland politics, 21/5/2013). Retrieved: 6/7/2013}

The greatest problem, as argued over the years on its multiple implications, is the absence of certainty and agreement about Scotland’s future as no longer a member of the United Kingdom: on January 2012, former chancellor Alistair Darling warned about “immense” downsides and “massive” risks for Scotland’s economic future. Darling’s point revolved primarily around currency: should Scotland secede, it would have to decide whether to keep the sterling, adopt a new currency or join the Euro. Retaining sterling has been the Scottish Government’s primary intention, with SNP finance secretary John Swinney foreseeing Scotland keeping the pound in the immediate future, joining the Eurozone currency in the mid-2020s, after an hypothetical referendum, but talks of a concrete possibility have stalled after an initial favourable opinion by Scottish Secretary Moore in January 2012.\footnote{Allen K., “Can Scotland be independent and keep sterling?” (the Guardian news blog, 28/2/2012). Retrieved: 6/7/2013}

It has been given, as a matter of fact, no guarantee that an independent Scotland can keep things as they are, or at least unilaterally decide so, and the historical and economic reasons for that are numerous: the monetary union formalized with the Acts of Union of 1707 has been stable within the UK, but any choice of currency for an independent Scotland would likely disrupt it, and, given

\footnote{“Independent Scotland ‘could keep pound’ (the Telegraph, 15/1/2012). Retrieved: 7/7/2013}
that the choice will cover the nation’s entire economic policy, consultation and potential agreement with the UK and the European Union might be necessary. Furthermore, every choice presents advantages and disadvantages, including possible obstacles that would make it not a viable solution at all. In terms of national identity, joining the Euro would be both a statement of independence and of belonging to Europe, but in economic terms it presents difficult implications: first of all, such adoption would entail UE membership, which London School of Economics researcher Jo Murkens described as possible only with the approval of all member states, and as a new state, as legislated in Article 49 of the Treaty of Lisbon. He Scottish Government’s current intention is to do so, but the risks of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and the prospect of having control over monetary policy switch from the Bank of England to the European Central Bank urge the search for an opt-out option, which the UK currently has. There is, however, chance Scotland may not inherit the derogations accorded to UK for opt-out from the Treaty of Maastricht, and be instead compelled to adopt the Euro or to negotiate a new, specific opt-out option, which no other new Member State has obtained as of now. SNP official and EU lawyer Stephen Noon negated that

---

<http://www.scotsman.com/the-scotsman/opinion/comment/scottish-independence-what-are-currency-options-1-2823483>

342 “An independent Scotland would need to apply for EU membership and would be compelled to adopt the euro” (British Politics and Policy at LSE, 8/11/2011). Retrieved: 8/7/2013
<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/archives/16978>

343 “Article 49” (The Lisbon Treaty). Retrieved: 8/7/2013


346 “An independent Scotland would need to apply for EU membership and would be compelled to adopt the euro” (British Politics and Policy at LSE, 8/11/2011). Retrieved: 8/7/2013
<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/archives/16978>
the first possibility would actually occur by citing the EU accession treaty provision that “each of the new Member States shall participate in Economic and Monetary Union from the date of accession as a Member State with a derogation within the meaning of Article 122 of the EC Treaty”. Noon’s reasoning extends to the fact that Article 122 is now replaced by Articles 139 and 140 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which state that monetary union is ruled out for “Member States with a derogation”, that no automatic EU membership exists, and that certain requisites for applying states include currency convergence “for at least two years” as part of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II), to be undergone voluntarily by non-euro area Member States347. With the premise that there is no precedent to Scotland’s case, a House of Commons research note viewed the “decision on Scotland’s status within the European Union” as being likely “a political one”. Another option for Scotland would be to have a new currency, which might be initially pegged to the pound, but such alternative presents huge risks: Professor of Economics John Kay saw the peg difficult to sustain, due to the “modest size of [Scotland’s] foreign exchange reserves”, and freedom in fiscal policy “subject to the requirements of prudence imposed by the capital markets”348. As a third option, Scotland could want to keep the pound sterling and either agree with the rest of UK (rUK) to a fiscal union or co-ordination, or using it by itself. The viability of the sterling solution was confirmed by a number of experts, such as Prof Angus Armstrong of NIESR (National Institute of Economic and Social Research), who outlined three criteria: the “integration of intermediate and final product markets with a high degree of cross-border trade relative to domestic trade”, “capital and labour market mobility to enable greater integration, specialisation and faster adjustments to shocks”, and “the extent to which nations have similar structures and cycles”349. An agreement

with the rUK would, however, be a less risky route than going alone, as UK economist at the Royal Bank of Scotland Ross Walker explained: under a currency union, Scotland could retain the backing of the Bank of England as lender of last resort, whose absence would not permit the sustenance of Scotland’s financial sector. About the downsides of Scotland’s possible choices, the second report of the UK government’s Scotland analysis, concerning currency and monetary policy, warned of the occurrence of “heavy restrictions on debt and fiscal policy” were Scotland to get an agreement with the rUK. On the other hand, if Scotland pressed for using the pound without an agreement (a case the report labelled as “sterlingisation”), the Bank of England could be able to set monetary policy and interest rates without the need to consider Scotland. Furthermore, the Scottish economy would be market driven, meaning that money supply would be determined by deficits and surpluses in the balance of payments, hardly accommodating either the domestic economy and governmental policy, and borrowing costs and difficulties would depend on market constraints. But even in case of an agreement, the asymmetry in size of the two countries would have rUK decide over 91.5% of the monetary union, and Scotland 8.5%, causing, were the relationship not reciprocal, Scotland not to have significantly more freedom than what it has now as part of the UK. On 23 April 2013, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, expressed his doubts about UK and Scotland being effectively able to reach a deal on establishing a “sterling zone” between rUK and an independent Scotland, a claim described by Scottish Finance Secretary John

350 ibid.
Swinney as a way to forestall the project from the beginning\textsuperscript{354}, but reinforced by a warning from the HM Treasury that a formal currency union could be denied unless Scotland’s public spending was “heavily restrained” and the country’s debt cut to reassure the markets\textsuperscript{355}. The Scottish Government and the “Yes” campaign argued that Scotland’s continued use of the pound would greatly contribute to the Sterling Zone’s balance of payments, citing Oil and Gas UK estimates of oil and gas exports, mostly originated in Scottish waters, boosting the UK’s balance of payments by £40bn in the 2011-2012 period\textsuperscript{356}. Brian Ashcroft, Economics Professor in the Strathclyde Business School, downplayed such “massive positive contribution”, calculating the net cost to the rUK balance of payments (what currently Scotland contributes for) at £3.4bn instead of £40. He then added adding offsetting flows favouring the rUK with Scotland independent, such as the remittances abroad of largely foreign owned north sea oil profits (est. £19bn), Scotland’s deficit on goods and services trade with rUK (est. £13bn), and remittances on profits of companies working in Scotland but registered in rUK (est. £5.8bn)\textsuperscript{357}.

There are two “big” elements which will likely have a special influence the financial and economic policies of a future Scotland: the banks and North Sea oil. The third paper in the \textit{Scotland analysis} series, outlined Scotland’s financial sector as 1,254\% of Scotland’s GDP (compared to Britain’s 492\%), and likened it to Cyprus’ and Iceland’s, two countries whose banks had amassed assets equivalent

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{354} Taylor B., “Scottish independence: Political battle over currency” (BBC news Scotland politics, 23/4/2013). Retrieved: 10/7/2013
\item \textsuperscript{355} Carrell S., “An independent Scotland could endanger sterling, Treasury warns” (the Guardian, 23/4/2013). Retrieved 10/7/2013
\item \textsuperscript{356} “Answering your questions on currency” (Yes Scotland, 23/4/2013). Retrieved: 10/7/2013
\item \textsuperscript{357} Ashcroft B., “Sterling and Scottish Independence” (Scottish Economy Watch, 26/3/2013). Retrieved: 10/7/2013
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
to 700% of GDP before the 2013 crisis and 880% of GDP before the 2007 crisis respectively. The report cited the verdict of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which said that “the banks grew to be too big for the Icelandic government to rescue”\textsuperscript{358}, and extended the problem to Scotland, noting that “a serious banking crisis in an independent Scotland could pose a significant risk to Scottish taxpayers”, and calculating the potential economic fallout at 65,000 pounds per capita. According to the paper, the Scottish banks would find themselves facing bigger risks associated with volatility or in need to restructure and diversification of their assets\textsuperscript{359}. A substantial effort in separating Scotland’s banks from the British financial sector would be needed, as the Royal Bank of Scotland is part of the Lloyds Banking Group, and both are partially owned (80% and 40% respectively) by the British government, who sustained the bailout costs in the 2008-2009 financial crash. The paper also included concerns for savers, on their ability to have the same access to Individual Saving Accounts, mortgages, car insurances, and pension funds, all currently regulated through a single UK market. The job market in the financial sector would also suffer serious consequences, as headquarters would have to “choose” between focusing their services in rUK (60m people) or Scotland (5m)\textsuperscript{360}. In his analysis of the Treasury paper, Brian Ashcroft added one more issue: that currency arrangements will determine how much liquidity from the Central Bank will Scotland have access to, and, should Scotland not be able to access to liquidity from the Bank of England via the establishment of a sterling zone, the markets could fear it may become insolvent and raise borrowing costs for the Scottish banks\textsuperscript{361}.


\textsuperscript{359} ibid.


The Scottish case for independence built the premises of a healthier Scottish economy on the gains coming from North Sea oil receipts: the reported contribution of the oil and gas sector to the Scottish GDP in 2011 was £26bn, with oil reserves estimated at 24 billion barrels to be extracted, and Scotland’s total reserves amounting to 60% of the EU total. Prof Alex Kemp of Aberdeen University estimated Scotland’s share of UK offshore oil production at 96% and gas production at 52% in 2011, with Scotland ultimately accounting for 78% of total UK hydrocarbon production in 2011. In the 2011-2012 period, Scottish offshore revenues coming from a geographical share of hydrocarbon resources were £10.6bn, amounting to 16% of all Scottish tax revenue (a total of £56.9bn), in front of an estimated public spending of £64.5bn. The resulting £7bn deficit, according to governmental agency Government and Expenditure and Revenue Scotland (GERS), put the nation’s public finances in “better shape than the UK as a whole if North Sea oil and gas revenues are taken into account”. Scotland’s 2011-2012 public spending equalled 9.9% of UK public spending (with oil and gas revenues included), generating what Finance Secretary John Swinney called a demonstration that “Scotland more than pays her way in the UK”, while signalling that the UK Government returned only 9.3% (the amount of Scottish public spending without oil and gas revenues). Governmental and independent measurements of Scotland’s past and potential growth include a double track, listing Scotland’s revenues with and without its geographical share of oil and gas. There is, therefore, a twofold question to be asked: what is exactly the share of hydrocarbon production revenue Scotland can claim as its own? What is the best way to estimate Scotland’s actual gains from the sector were it to become independent? Although oil production is thought to have peaked in 1999, the estimated 24 billion barrels equivalent of oil yet to be extracted, new technologies

364 ibid.
and potential discoveries suggest the sector still can have 30-40 years to thrive. An *Oil and Gas Analytical Bulletin* published by the Scottish Government in March 2013 predicted £57bn in tax revenue to collect from production by 2018, while the UK’s Office for Budget Responsibility suggested a drop from £6.7bn to £4.1bn by 2017-2018. Total oil and gas production taxes in the last 40 years are estimated to have brought to the UK Treasury £300bn (adjusted for inflation), roughly 90% of it extracted in Scottish waters. The UK Continental Shelf, the economic region set up by the UK to which oil tax revenues are currently assigned to, is what would by divided on a geographically basis if Scotland became independent. The division line, according to Prof Alex Kemp, would likely be the median line (“a dividing line on which all points are the same distance from the Scottish and the rest of the UK coastline”)\(^\text{366}\), although the final decision could employ a different principle, based on estimates and negotiations. On the subject of Scotland’s gains, a CPPR (Centre for Public Policy for Regions, University of Glasgow) briefing paper titled *Measuring an independent Scotland’s economic performance* did measurements on Scotland and the UK’s growth in the 2001-2011 period, both in cash terms and real terms (numbers corrected for the effect of inflation) of GDP. The resulting data prompted the use of “real terms GDP excluding North Sea, which better measures the performance of mainland Scotland”, and “cash terms GDP including North Sea, which better measures the growth in Scotland’s tax revenue potential, from which government spending can be planned”\(^\text{367}\). A 2001-2011 analysis in per capita terms employing these two measures showed Scotland performing in line with the UK (1), and well above the UK (2). However, great importance was given to the fact that GNI would be a better measure than GDP, but lack of data regarding non-Scottish domiciled extraction companies made a complete calculation impossible. It was, however, noted that an economy strongly benefitting from a resource such as North Sea oil (as Scotland’s would be, and Norway’s is) is subject to the high


\(^{366}\) ibid.

volatility of the sector’s prices. Scotland’s intention is to exploit intensely the oil and gas resource in order to increase public spending by cutting (or not raising) taxes, and also create an oil fund on which a share of the returns from reserves could be directed on for sustainability benefits\(^{368}\), which, however, Scottish public spending at current levels is estimated to erode, as spending in the 1980-2012 period surpassed tax receipts (oil and gas share included) by £15 billion, which population share of UK public borrowing costs (8.3%) has covered, but oil and gas revenues alone will not\(^{369}\). All the provisions, predictions and plans for independence depend on the popular vote the Scottish Government will manage to move in favour of independence, but, as of May 2013, polls show support for independence hovering between 30-35% ever since one last bounce coinciding with the SNP victory at the 2011 elections. Those who have already decided that they will vote formed a 67% to 33% proportion between “no” and “yes” voters respectively\(^{370}\).

Matters are bound to become increasingly complex as Scotland now is, with the rest of UK, in the offing of an “in-out” referendum promised by British Prime Minister Cameron asking the UK citizens if they prefer Britain to avail a governmental initiative to renegotiate the terms of its stay in the UE, or to exit it altogether\(^{371}\). The referendum, which is planned to be held in 2017, has met the negative opinion of deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, and major opposition among Scots, presents Scotland with the possibility that staying in the UK and in the UE might soon become a mutually exclusive choice to be made, rather than the


current reality which, according to recent polls, has been giving a high sense of security among the population: data from an Ipsos-MORI survey published in February 2013 show that the Scots who wanted the UK to remain part of the EU were 53%, with 34% stating the opposite, and that 61%, both among backers and opponents of independence, thought an independent Scotland should be member of the UE\textsuperscript{372}. The impact of the ruling English Conservative government's decision on the country's future, is likely bound to affect Scotland in a negative way should the contacts with Europe be severed: a poll commissioned by the Financial Times in February 2013 showed that British disaffection with EU would lead 50% to vote to leave, and 33% favouring staying\textsuperscript{373}. The inverse results of Scotland and Britain lead to considering a scenario in which Britain would pull Scotland out of UE: with Scotland representing 10.2% of the electorate for a proportion of 10:1 in favour of the other UK citizens, it is not difficult to see Scotland’s opinion not having a large impact on the final decision. The possibility of the UK leaving UE, Scotland's decision notwithstanding, could boost support for independence, and a Panelbase poll apparently confirmed that: when asked “how would you be likely to vote in the next year's Scottish independence referendum in the UK was looking likely to vote to withdraw from the UK?”, “yes” voters equalled “no” voters at 44%, with 12% undecided\textsuperscript{374}. The timing is supposed to be a key element in the Scots' decision: the implications of holding the Scottish referendum earlier weigh on Scotland, as uncertainty over the UK and Europe's future means that a disadvantageous choice will be harder to avoid. Spectator writer Alan Trench pictured a fortunate occurrence for Scotland and, especially, the Yes campaign to be for the UK referendum to be held relatively early, and the Scottish one be

\textsuperscript{372} “Scotland attitudes towards EU membership, 2013” (Ipsos MORI, February 2013). Retrieved: 16/7/2013
\textsuperscript{373} “Only one in three wants UK to stay in EU” (Financial Times, 17/2/2013). Retrieved: 16/7/2013
\textsuperscript{374} Bell I., “Poll: independence support would rise if voters think UK's leaving EU” (Herald Scotland, 19/5/2013). Retrieved: 16/7/2013
delayed, but the issue is currently far from being taken into consideration\textsuperscript{375}. As of now, the only certain fact concerning independence and Scotland’s future is, conversely, uncertainty.

CONCLUSION

As the referendum date approaches, so does the “moment of truth”: will the Scots decide to abandon the UK, factoring in the reason that the UK itself may separate from the European Union, or will they have to wait until the next opportunity (or risk?) for change emerges, while staying, as professor Devine put it, “in bed with an elephant”\(^{376}\)? In the essay titled with this expression, Devine compared the 300 years Scotland spent within the United Kingdom to what the former Prime Minister of Canada, Pierre Trudeau, said about living next to America: “[No matter how friendly and even-tempered the beast, one is affected by every twitch and grunt]”\(^{377}\). Scotland’s history, even as concise as it has been presented in this thesis, has been ripe with occasions which demonstrated Scotland’s status as the smaller neighbour of a powerful country. Both were established as the medieval times passed, were continuously at war, for conquest and independence respectively, until the Union of the Crowns and, more than fifty years later, the Commonwealth and the Act of Union of 1707. Which of the two states was the dominant one was never in question during these periods and occasions. It was rather a matter of what could be better for Scotland, whether to be independent or be together with England and the rest of Britain. We have seen in many occasion the disadvantages of both possibilities: the ruinous Darien experience was an act of defiance that presented Scotland with the implications of being a small state and not having a powerful ally in a context of brutal international competition for colonial resources; vice-versa, the imposition of parliamentary policies in times of Union, often primarily thought for England and then adapted for Scotland, or just imposed as kingdom-wide measures, like the Patronage Act of 1712, was an obstacle the Scottish minority in Parliament, the Scottish office or any other administrative force could not regulate before Devolution. A key element surfacing from this thesis is Scotland’s role in the Union


\(^{377}\) Ibid.
and how the latter managed to last for three centuries despite, as detailed in chapter 2, having been born out of two nations in strong disagreement on foreign policies and dynastic arrangements, one of which had been suffering the consequences of a nationwide investment failure. The negotiations for the Union were made and signed by a small élite of politicians, reportedly against the will of the parliamentary opposition (even internal) and of the Scottish people, and imposed a marriage of convenience which few imagined to last more than fifty years, or even a decade. Although, as we have seen in chapter 3, the Union ultimately survived its difficult inception, anti-unionist movements dotted its entire existence, starting from the Jacobite rebellions aimed at restoring the Stuarts against the Treaty's regulations and the majority of Lowland Scots who, as presbyterians, would not allow a catholic dynasty to gain the throne. The Union gained traction thanks to the expansion of trade opportunities in the new internal British area and the participation of Scots in formerly English ventures. The emigration of sons of the landed gentry élite to London and, later, the colonies cemented a strong Scottish presence at all levels of the Union. Reciprocal consideration between English and Scots grew from a situation of common Anglophobia and Scottophobia, punctuated with satirical publications and widespread prejudice, to respect and loyalty to the Crown by the Napoleonic Wars (1798-1805). Already recognized as a bringer of progress by the Enlightenment intellectuals, the Union brought fast and large economic progress, at the expense, writer Walter Scott said, of Scotland itself, or at least of the Scottish identity, increasingly lost in an Anglicised world. Scott himself spearheaded a rejuvenation of Scottish folklore and literature which provided insights of a legendary and nostalgic past, focused on romantic highlandism, poetry (Robert Burns) and heroism (William Wallace and Robert the Bruce). The subsequent traces of anti-unionism would appear with the celebration of Wallace and the heroes of Scotland past, although mostly where anti-unionism was the already established profile, like in the case the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights. As we saw in chapter 4, Liberalism was the strategy adopted by the Government for Scotland in the 18th century, by imposing provisions for even the most important areas (such as law enforcement and military control) only if absolutely necessary.
The “Workshop of the Empire” freely exerted its industrial and commercial prowess, while legislative reforms formed a local state where class dynamics could undergo changes and rebalancing without needing to search for any more independence, relegating anti-unionist nationalism to small movements. Chapter 5 describes why it all changed: although Scotland entered WWI as a strong and enthusiastic partner in the Union, the price paid in human lives and a strong emigration flux from the Highlands and from the country drastically reduced Scotland’s population growth to a negative, and the heavy industry experienced a severe fall in demand in the late 1920s, which was only to worsen with time. By the time of WWII, Britain was united against the common enemy, with nationalist movements such as the SNP, born in 1934, failing to establish a real presence. The Welfare State promoted by the Labour government met at least partially Scotland’s needs after the 1930 market failure, and the nationalisation of industries allowed the living standards of an otherwise ailing population (especially regarding housing and unemployment) to improve. General consensus in the 1950s awarded the unionist Labour policies, while new perils in the form of international competitors (multinationals) started to insidiate Britain’s industry. Scottish nationalism started to regain foothold as Home Rule possibilities surfaced in Westminster, and the Conservative dominance in British politics in the 1980s, never in those elections attained with Scotland’s votes, led the Scots to question their actual representation in the UK Parliament had the English other preferences. Furthermore, Margaret Thatcher’s imposition of social and economic policies which deprived Scottish industry of any state-based assistance and led some sectors to ruin (chiefly those not offering services and innovative commodities: raw material mining, shipbuilding, manufactures and other traditional productions) were received with massive discontent by the Scots. When Devolution was put into practice, the will of the Scots to regulate the life of their own country well exemplified the strength of Scotland’s national identity. As seen in chapter 6, the work of the Scottish Parliament has been directed, since its very inception in 1999, to the achievement of autonomy in the management of Scotland, through various amendments to the Scotland Act 1998 and, recently, the Scotland Act 2012, which include the matters the Scottish parliament can legislate on.
Scotland has gained and enriched its possibilities as a self-sufficient administration, yet the 2007 and, especially, the 2011 SNP victories seem to demonstrate it wants (wanted?) more. The referendum on Scottish independence the SNP has been advocating since devolution times is now a reality, with a Royal assent, a precise date, a precise franchise and a clear purpose. What is left to know is where will the Scots’ loyalty go. Scotland and Britain’s economy is not the only crucial element at stake (although the prospect of wealth has not had a negligible role in polls): the matter is also political and social. Britain, the “elephant”, is a presence that is not going to disappear, independence or not. The weight of rUK has been examined both in a positive and negative light: Scotland might benefit from special agreements with Britain, yet, at the same time (or even alternatively), it will lose international importance, pre-existing economic prerogatives, security. “Britishness”, the term which has appeared from time to time in this thesis, and encompasses the common identity Scots supposedly share with the rest of the British, will be another key to understand the Scots’ decision: although a strong reason may be convenience, there is no denying that Scotland's ties with the rest of Britain, be them economic, cultural, familial or of other nature, are old and deep, and unlikely to be easily rescinded.

The purpose of this thesis was to explore Scotland’s history and the development of independence and Scottish identity throughout the centuries. It is, admittedly, a very concise work, with no pretense of having successfully presented and explained every single detail and nuance. The direction chosen for it was markedly material, with a strong focus on political and economic events, measures and actions. As a result, it provides a limited account of the sociological aspects, and barely touches the philosophical and literary ones, which, no doubt, had their role in the processes recounted here. This work will hopefully be useful for those who want to discover Scotland’s past and the growth of the country, and those who look for the political and economic history of England’s neighbour.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Borland F., *The History of Darien 1700*, (Oxford University collection, 1779), p.29
Retrieved online at <http://archive.org/details/historydarien00borlgoog>


*Decolonization Resolution*, General Assembly 1514 (XV), in: UNYB 1960, p.49 or UN Doc A/4684 (1960), p.66


Ferguson W., “The Reform Act (Scotland) of 1832: intention and effect”, *Scottish Historical Review*, 45 (1966) pp.105-114


<http://www.scottishpoliticalarchive.org.uk/wb/media/1979%20Referendum.pdf>

Retrieved online on 10/5/2013 at
<http://www.electricscotland.com/history/scotland/chap12.htm>


McGuinness, “Table 1c: General Election Results, 1918-2010, England”, UK Election Statistics: 1918-2012, p.13


Stone L., An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815 (London: Routledge, 1994), p.243


213
Wodrow R., *The History of the Sufferings of the Church of Scotland from the Restoration to the Revolution* (Glasgow: Blackie, Fullarton & co., 1828)


SITOGRAPHY

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/6382177.stm>

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/hi/historic_moments/newsid_8187000/8187312.stm>

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/19/newsid_3208000/3208396.stm>

"20th Century Scotland – An Introduction (II)", (Modern Scotland, BBC). Retrieved:12/5/2013
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/scottishhistory/modern/intro_modern2.shtml>

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/scottishhistory/modern/intro_modern.shtml>


’A’ the Blue Bonnets: Defending an Independent Scotland” (RUSI News, 15/10/2012). Retrieved: 10/7/2013
<http://www.rusi.org/news/ref:N507BDE949F81D/#.UevsEF03PnN>

<http://www.commissiononscottishdevolution.org.uk/about/>

<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/Government/concordats/Referendum-on-independence>

"An independent Scotland would need to apply for EU membership and would be compelled to adopt the euro” (British Politics and Policy at LSE, 8/11/2011). Retrieved: 8/7/2013
<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/archives/16978>


"Holyrood to get new budget powers under Scotland Bill" (BBC news Scotland, 30/11/2010). Retrieved 5/6/2013


"Independent Scotland 'could keep pound' (the Telegraph, 15/1/2012). Retrieved: 7/7/2013


"MSPs 'unable to recommend' Scotland Bill plan" (BBC news Scotland politics, 15/12/2011). Retrieved: 9/6/2013

"MSPs endorse new Holyrood powers under Scotland Bill" (BBC news Scotland politics, 18/4/2012). Retrieved: 9/6/2013

“Only one in three wants UK to stay in EU” (Financial Times, 17/2/2013). Retrieved: 16/7/2013 <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cb2057fc-7917-11e2-b4df-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Zo0wmK17>


“Queen ‘fears for UK over Scottish independence’” (Metro, 30/5/2011). Retrieved: 2/7/2013 <metro.co.uk/2011/05/30/queen-fears-for-uk-over-scottish-independence-27113/>


“Scotland can more than afford to be independent” (The Scottish Government, 21/5/2013). Retrieved: 4/7/2013 <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2013/05/scotland-can-more-than-afford-to-be-independent210>


“Scottish independence: ‘transition plan’ outlined” (BBC news Scotland politics, 5/2/2013). Retrieved: 30/6/2013  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-21331302>

“Scottish independence: A question of international law or the EU's ‘new legal order’? (part II)” (European Law Blog, 15/2/2013). Retrieved: 1/7/2013  
<http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=1565>

“Scottish independence: Alex Salmond sets out case” (BBC news Scotland, 12/7/2013). Retrieved: 14/7/2013  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-23278810>

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-22554898>

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-16998845>

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-18162832>

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-19339477>

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-16702392>

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-21380288>

“Scottish independence. The state of the Union: public opinion and the Scottish question” (British Social Attitudes 29, 2012). Retrieved: 16/6/2013  

<http://www.politics.co.uk/reference/scottish-parliament-guide>

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-22601357>


“SNP members vote to ditch the party’s anti-Nato policy” (BBC news Scotland politics, 19/10/2012). Retrieved: 10/7/2013  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-19993694>

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/6944934.stm>
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-11193304>

<http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/visitandlearn/Education/18641.aspx>


<http://justus.anglican.org/resources/bcp/Scotland/BCP_1637.htm>

<http://reformationhistory.org/fivearticlesofperth.html>

<http://www.nas.gov.uk/about/091103.asp>

<http://www.martinfrost.ws/htmlfiles/scottish_parliament1.html>

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/3210729.stm>;

<http://www.un.org/rights/HRToday/declar.htm>

“Yes Scotland marks first year with 372,103 signatories to independence declaration” (Yes Scotland, 24/5/2013). Retrieved 21/6/2013
<http://www.yesscotland.net/yes_scotland_marks_first_year_with_372_103_signatories_to_independence_declaration>

<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/01/1006/3>


Ashcroft B., “Has Scotland already spent its oil fund?” (Scottish Economy Watch, 10/7/2013). Retrieved: 14/7/2013

Bell I., "Poll: independence support would rise if voters think UK's leaving EU" (Herald Scotland, 19/5/2013). Retrieved: 16/7/2013

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-11863392>

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-13326310>


Brocklehurst S., "Who has a right to claim North Sea oil?" (BBC news Scotland politics, 16/4/2013). Retrieved: 12/5/2013
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-20042070>

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-17094333>

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/apr/23/independent-scotland-endanger-sterling>

Carrell S., “Greens offer to be go-between to end Scottish coalition deadlock” (the Guardian, 9/5/2007). Retrieved 30/5/2013
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2007/may/09/scotland.devolution2>

Carrell S., “Nicola Sturgeon faces accusation of backtracking over Scotland’s EU future” (the Guardian, 13/12/2012). Retrieved: 30/6/2013
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/dec/13/scotland-independence-eu-sturgeon>

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/may/20/scottish-independence-threaten-banking-jobs>

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/may/08/cameron-green-light-scottish-referendum>

Carrell S., “Scottish politicians launch ‘devo plus’ alternative to independence” (the Guardian, 28/2/2012)
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/feb/28/scottish-politicians-devo-plus-independence>
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/may/06/snp-election-victory-scottish-independence>

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/may/06/snp-election-victory-scottish-independence>

<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/20/business/global/british-study-raises-warning-on-scottish-banks.html?_r=0>

Chapman J., “Why did David Cameron hand Alex Salmon this 22-carat propaganda coup? PM flies to Scotland to sign ‘historic’ independence vote deal” (MailOnline, 15/10/2012). Retrieved: 14/6/2013


<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-20048107>

<http://whitehall1212.blogspot.it/2013/04/thatcher-and-scotland-legacy-of-self.html>

<http://www.holyrood.com/2009/06/next-chapter/>

<http://www.esrc.ac.uk/_images/Who%20supports%20and%20opposes%20independence%20and%20why_tcm8-26113.pdf>

<http://www.scottishaffairs.org/onlinelibraries/devine_sa57_aust06.html>


Dinwoodle R., “Sturgeon says Scotland will solve EU problem by common sense” (Herald Scotland, 13/12/2012). Retrieved: 30/6/2013


HM Government, "Scotland's constitutional future" (Gov.uk, 10/1/2012). Retrieved: 7/6/2013


Jacobs E., "It's time the SNP publishes their plans for an independent Scotland" (Left Foot Forward, 22/3/2013). Retrieved: 20/6/2013

Johnson S., "Independent Scotland ‘faces dilemma between Trident and Nato’" (the Telegraph, 24/6/2013). Retrieved: 10/7/2013

Johnson S., “Queen may not remain monarch of an independent Scotland” (the Telegraph, 12/5/2012). Retrieved: 2/7/2013


Johnson S., "SNP about-turns and waves through Scotland Bill" (the Telegraph, 19/4/2012). Retrieved: 8/6/2013


Kirkup J., “Scrap formula giving Scots extra cash, say Tory MPs” (The Telegraph, 11/1/2012). Retrieved: 29/5/2013


Macnab S., “Scottish independence: Single question was ‘red line issue’ for Westminster – Sturgeon” (the Scotsman, 15/11/2012). Retrieved 14/6/2013

Macnab S., Maddox D., “Scottish independence: SNP’s Clyde warships plan” (the Scotsman, 2/7/2013). Retrieved: 10/7/2013

Maddox D., “Margaret Thatcher: Poll tax was the beginning of the end” (The Scotsman). Retrieved: 25/5/2013
<http://www.scotsman.com/the-scotsman/uk/margaret-thatcher-poll-tax-was-beginning-of-the-end-1-2884066>


<http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/alex-massie/2013/05/scottish-independence-its-still-almost-all-about-oil/>


<http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_275906_en.pdf>


<http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/04/23/scottish-independence-osborne_n_3136711.html>

<http://blogs.channel4.com/factcheck/factcheck-can-scotland-avoid-paying-uk-debt/13362>


<http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/nov/08/uk-supreme-court-scottish-independence>


<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-22615166>


<http://www.scotsman.com/the-scotsman/opinion/comment/david-torrance-margaret-thatcher-and-the-scots-1-2882885>


<http://www.scotsman.com/the-scotsman/opinion/comment/david-torrance-margaret-thatcher-and-the-scots-1-2882885>


<http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeeshouse/2013/05/will-an-eu-referendum-kill-the-scottish-independence-referendum/>

<http://www.journal-online.co.uk/article/10181-uk-government-launches-scotland-analysis-programme>

Walker T., “How the Queen will help see off Scottish independence” (The Telegraph, 19/5/2011). Retrieved: 2/7/2013  

Watt N., "MoD fears for Trident base if Scotland says yes to independence" (the Guardian, 10/7/2013). Retrieved: 10/7/2013


Desidero prima di tutto ringraziare la professoressa Katia Caldari, mia relatrice, per i suoi insegnamenti di economia internazionale e l’attenzione e il tempo dedicati alla correzione della mia tesi. Sono grato inoltre alla professoressa Fiona Dalziel che ha gentilmente acconsentito a correggere le parti in inglese, permettendomi così di evitare inopportuni errori. Vorrei inoltre ringraziare con grande affetto i miei genitori Vincenzo Beninato e Sonia Vanuzzo, mia sorella Anna e mia nonna Maria per avermi fornito, durante la stesura della tesi e tutti i miei anni di università, il miglior supporto che potessi desiderare.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS (ringraziamenti)

Desidero prima di tutto ringraziare la professoressa Katia Caldari, mia relatrice, per i suoi insegnamenti di economia internazionale e l’attenzione e il tempo dedicati alla correzione della mia tesi. Sono grato inoltre alla professoressa Fiona Dalziel che ha gentilmente acconsentito a correggere le parti in inglese, permettendomi così di evitare inopportuni errori. Vorrei inoltre ringraziare con grande affetto i miei genitori Vincenzo Beninato e Sonia Vanuzzo, mia sorella Anna e mia nonna Maria per avermi fornito, durante la stesura della tesi e tutti i miei anni di università, il miglior supporto che potessi desiderare.
INDEX

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... p.3

CHAPTER I: Una panoramica storica, dal 1100 al 1700 ................................................................. p.9
1.1: La formazione dello stato di Scozia (1100 – 1280) .......................................................... p.13
1.2: Le guerre d'indipendenza (1296-1357) .................................................................................. p.14
   1.2.1: La successione ad Alexander III e i Guardians of Scotland ......................................... p.14
   1.2.3: L’invasione della Scozia e le prime ribellioni ............................................................... p.16
   1.2.4: Le battaglie di William Wallace e Andrew de Moray .................................................. p.17
   1.2.5: Robert the Bruce e la rivalsa scozzese ......................................................................... p.20
1.3: La salita al regno della dinastia Stuart ....................................................................................... p.25
1.4: La riforma protestante ............................................................................................................. p.32
1.5: L’unione delle corone ............................................................................................................ p.36
1.6: La “Glorious Revolution” ...................................................................................................... p.42
1.7: Il disastro di Darién ................................................................................................................ p.44

CHAPTER II: L’unione d’Inghilterra e Scozia ............................................................................. p.49
2.1: Le conseguenze dell’esperienza di Darién ............................................................................ p.52
2.2: Prime trattative con l’Inghilterra ........................................................................................... p.53
2.3: Il prezzo dell’Unione ............................................................................................................. p.58
2.4: Motivazioni e implicazioni della firma del Treaty of Union ................................................. p.58

CHAPTER III: Scotland after the Union (1707- 1800) ................................................................. p.69
3.1: Growing Pains ....................................................................................................................... p.72
3.2: Managing Scotland the Scottish way ..................................................................................... p.75
   3.3: “Improvement” ................................................................................................................ p.77
      3.3.1: Agricultural revolution .............................................................................................. p.77
      3.3.2: Urbanization and urban development ...................................................................... p.78
      3.3.3: New business ventures ......................................................................................... p.78
3.4: The Scottish Enlightenment .................................................................................................. p.81
3.5: “Britishness” and the Scottish identity ................................................................................ p.86

CHAPTER IV: Change and destabilization in the Workshop of the Empire (1800-1920) ............ p.89
4.1: Electoral reform .................................................................................................................... p.91
4.2: Radical economic change ..................................................................................................... p.93
4.3: Religion and Disruption ...................................................................................................... p.95
4.4: Trade unionism, Radicalism and Labour ............................................................................ p.101
4.5: Liberalism and the rise of home rule movements ............................................................... p.106
4.6: Nationalism and Unionism ................................................................................................. p.109
4.7: Narrations of Scottishness .................................................................................................... p.109

CHAPTER V: From the beginning of the Great War to the Devolution (1900-1999) .................... p.113
5.1: Politics and the economy before World War One ................................................................ p.113
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.2:</td>
<td>Migration fluxes</td>
<td>p.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3:</td>
<td>Social change during WWI and in the inter-war period</td>
<td>p.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4:</td>
<td>Toward Devolution</td>
<td>p.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5:</td>
<td>Scotland’s economy in the second half of the 20th century</td>
<td>p.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.1:</td>
<td>Corporatism and takeovers</td>
<td>p.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.2:</td>
<td>North Sea Oil</td>
<td>p.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.3:</td>
<td>Thatcherism</td>
<td>p.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1:</td>
<td>Devolution and the Scottish Parliament</td>
<td>p.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2:</td>
<td>Devolution practices and independence theories</td>
<td>p.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3:</td>
<td>The implications of independence</td>
<td>p.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td></td>
<td>p.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td></td>
<td>p.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sitography</td>
<td></td>
<td>p.214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td></td>
<td>p.228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>